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INTRODUCTION
In many respects systematic theology is the integrative theological discipline. A certain reciprocity obtains.
It necessarily draws from exegetical and historical theology, and at the same time its mature conclusions help to
curb exegetical eccentricities while providing historical
theology with its requisite raw material. Systematics cannot function for a moment apart from its wellsprings of data
and renewal in the prophetic and apostolic Scriptures. Furthermore, its most diligent and sophisticated products are
stillborn if they fail to vivify the proclamation, catechesis, liturgy, and nurture of the church.
These remarks presuppose that one approaches systematic theology along reasonably classical lines. Until
the eighteenth century, dogmatics set out to organize and
package authoritative revelation in the services of at least
a traditional, if parochial, agenda. Today the nature of
systematic theology itself is in dispute, and definitions
vary with the practitioner.
This situation has done nothing to curb the ambitions
of writers bent on commending their own interpretation and
exposition of Christianity. To be sure, each age has
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made its enduring contribution to systematic theology. The
emergence of the discipline itself has been traced variously
either to Origen or to John of Damascus.1 We think admiringly of Thomas Aquinas' magisterial Summa theologiae; the
radically evangelical Loci communes rerum theologicarum
(1521) of Philip Melanchthon; and, of course, Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion. The Summa represents
the culmination of medieval scholasticism, while Philip's
masterpiece evolved into the spate of Protestant dogmatics
falling from the presses during the age of Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy.2
The Enlightenment's exaltation of human reason to a
theologically determinative status brought about an interlude in the production of dogmatic compendia. This void was
most dramatically filled when Friederich Schleiermacher ushered in the era of "modern" theology with The Christian
Faith of 1821-1822. Lacking any methodological consensus,
the twentieth century has witnessed such disparate efforts
as Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology, Karl Barth's massive
Church Dogmatics, and Karl Rahner's prolific reflections on
nearly every theological topic in Theological Investigations
and Sacramentum Mundi.
The foregoing mountaintops on the landscape of Christian thought omit the legion of more "denominationally" oriented theologians who have enjoyed de facto canonization at
the hands of generations of seminary professors and students
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alike. One thinks, for openers, of Charles Hodge and his
Princeton progenitors among Calvinist bodies, and of Francis
Pieper among confessional Lutherans.
The marketplace is currently experiencing no shortage
of systematic theologies. At both the popular and academic
levels, volumes are published at a rate exceeding the ability of any one scholar to digest or evaluate. The methodological pluralism alluded to above is now a cacophony.
Yesterday's mentors are challenged by process theology, theologies of hope, and seemingly infinite manifestations of
liberation theology--to name only several of the most obvious.
With this history and the above cautions in mind, this
essay will explore the definition, guiding motif, and methodology of three major contemporary theologians: Bernard
Lonergan, Helmut Thielicke, and Edward Farley, representing
the Roman, Lutheran, and Reformed traditions respectively.
How do these post-critical authors conceive and carry out
their theological enterprise? What presuppositions undergird their work? Are these overt or tacit? Do they reflect, implicitly or explicitly, a specific philosophical
orientation? What "formative factors"3 determine the substance and style of their theological assertions? Is their
goal forthrightly stated and kept in focus? How are "traditional" theological problems addressed, if at all? Are
the authors internally consistent?
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Our critical efforts will run along these very lines,
namely, the fidelity of each to the theological task as he
himself envisions it and the constancy of his pursuit thereof. Assessing their adherence to or departure from an assumed dogmatic standard from one locus to the next, while
not altogether irrelevant, is neither the purpose nor the
direct burden of the investigation. Their orthodoxy is not
at issue; rather, we are analyzing the stance from which the
three authors engage in the theological enterprise. (Because their written contributions are not all of the same
character, a bibliographic statement will accompany each
chapter.)
But why explore Lonergan, and not Rahner or Kung or
Hans Urs von Balthasar? Why Helmut Thielicke and not
Wolfhart Pannenberg? Why Edward Farley and not Langdon
Gilkey or even Carl F. H. Henry? These are legitimate questions, and several considerations account for the choices.
Lonergan was selected among Roman Catholic writers because
his work on theological prolegomena is the most explicit,
and it has been regarded as such by many Roman Catholic authors active in this field (for example, David Tracy).
Thielicke wins out over the arguably more intriguing
Pannenberg simply because he is not quite so idiosyncratic
as Pannenberg and his school. The latter has charted a
fascinating and often compelling course with his thoroughgoing theology of history and its pervasive emphasis on
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eschatology. Edward Farley was chosen from among many Reformed writers because he, like Lonergan, has written prodigiously in the area of theological prolegomena.
One cannot read far in the works of Lonergan,
Thielicke, or Farley before realizing that a different
thought-world casts a pronounced shadow over their labors.
Each seizes, albeit eclectically, a philosopher or philosophical school as either the point of departure or the foil
for his inquiry, and some acquaintance with these philosophical premises is essential. For example, Bernard Lonergan
falls within what has been characterized broadly as transcendental Neo-Thomism. This is a complex reassertion of
St. Thomas in the face of the challenges directed against
him by the likes of Descartes, Hume, and particularly Kant.
It is discernible, with important variations, in such modern
writers as Joseph Marechal, Jacques Maritain, and Karl
Rahner. Helmut Thielicke eschews the usual descriptive labels "modern" and "conservative" in favor of "Cartesian" and
"non-Cartesian" classifications. Edward Farley asserts that
his principal contributions to theological prolegomena are
beholden to the phenomenological analyses of Edmund Husserl.
Each of the following three chapters will begin,
therefore, with a survey of the intellectual milieu within
which our protagonists work and write. These necessarily
brief prologues will lead into the exposition of their theological prolegomena. The questions of definition, dominant
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and unifying motif, and methodology will guide this investigation. Thereafter, the critical queries will be directed
to the extent applicable to each author. Obviously, the
structure of these analyses will vary with the character of
their respective writings.
A concluding programmatic chapter explores those stubbornly perduring issues that necessarily will be addressed-note well, either forthrightly or by default--in any comprehensive theological endeavor. How they are addressed in
large measure determines the shape and substance of one's
theology. Certain matters are self-evident and persist:
the question of integrating motif, one's corresponding theological method, and the relationship of faith and reason.
Other seemingly perennial and interrelated questions
center around the basis of theological authority and the
manner in which this authority is rendered contemporaneous
for every generation of the church (in other words, the
thorny but intransigent problem of revelation and its neuralgic corollary, hermeneutics); the relationship of Hellsgeschichte to mundane Historie; the fate of pluralism and
its often unspoken bedfellow, universalism, at the hands of
a radically incarnational faith and the concomitant "scandal
of particularity." What can Lonergan, Thielicke, and Farley
tell us about such issues? (Doubtless the answers one gives
to these problems will impact dramatically on the prescriptive claims churches routinely make in the areas of personal
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and social ethics. While moral theology is an ancillary
branch of systematics, the derivative relationship of ethics
to theological prolegomena will not be explored here.) In
these last pages the orientation of the present writer will
be permitted to surface, and some lessons will be drawn for
the elaboration of a confessional Lutheran systematic theology.

For all their important differences, Lonergan,
Thielicke, and Farley unite in suggesting that one's theology will gain a hearing only if it recognizes that more than
doctrinal affirmations are involved. In fact, a comprehensive systematic theology commends and inculcates a worldview, for in any careful and reflective prolegomena profound
metaphysical and epistemological convictions are operative.
(One can scarcely make a bolder metaphysical statement than
the Apostles' Creed!) If the positive responsibility of
apologetics is the identification of a viable "point of contact" through which the community of faith can communicate
the Gospel to "the world of sensible reality,"4 the theologian will not shirk his responsibility of addressing these
fundamental concerns. Moreover, if truth is one and if indeed "all truth is God's truth"5--bluntly, if the theologian
is the least bit serious about the inherent claims of his
vocation--systematics will attract the widest possible audience by paying close attention to this ultimate integrative
dimension.

NOTES
1 1n favor of the former, see Robert H. King, "Introduction: The Task of Theology," in Christian Theology: An
Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Peter C.
Hodgson and Robert H. King, 2d ed., rev. and enlarged (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), p. 4. Richard Klann opts
for the latter in class notes for the study of systematic
theology (printed by Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, print
shop, n.d.), p. 8. Note also Gillian R. Evans, Alister E.
McGrath, and Allan D. Galloway, The Science of Theology,
vol. 2, The History of Christian Theology, ed. Paul Avis
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company;
and Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1986), 32-38, for the
discussion of Origen. Curiously, the contributions of John
of Damascus are not mentioned. For a good history of the
concept of theology, especially in the early period, see
Yves M.-J. Congar, 0.P., A History of Theology, trans. and
ed. Hunter Guthrie, S.J. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and
Company, 1968), pp. 25-36; see also Emil Brunner, Dogmatics,
vol. 1, The Christian Doctrine of God, trans. Olive Wyon
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1949), 89-96.
2Martin Kahler held that the loci method arose from
the need to render the reformers' commentaries on Romans into textbook form. This is most evident in Melanchthon's
first edition of his Loci (1521), and less so in later editions. See Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and
Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1983), p. 96. For a thorough discussion of the products of Lutheran and Reformed Orthodoxy, see Robert D.
Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism, vol. 1,
A Study of Theological Prolegomena (St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1970-), 72-252; and Richard A. Muller,
Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1, Prolegomena to
Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987-),
53-97. Muller's comment at the beginning of this chapter,
"The Development of Theological Prolegomena," is a helpful
etiology for self-conscious prolegomena (p. 53): "Medieval
theology received from the church fathers a great body of
highly detailed doctrine. This body of doctrine was further
clarified and systematized by the controversies of the Carolingian era and of the eleventh and twelfth centuries--to
the point that, toward the close of the twelfth century, the
theological teachers of the cathedral schools and monaster-
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ies were able to draw doctrine together into collections of
theological statements and definitions, the sententiae.
Only with this latter codification of theology as an academic discipline do prolegomena as such become possible or desirable. A similar situation obtains in the much more rapid
development of a Protestant system of theology. Protestant
system begins to develop within a few years of the posting
of the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517; genuine theological prolegomena appear after 1590."
Edward Farley argues that concern for theological method
came as a result of the Protestant Reformation and, later,
the emergence and application of historical criticism.
First, the reformers asserted the "autonomy" of Scripture
both over tradition as a "material source" of knowledge and
over the magisterium as an indomitable authority. Thus,
Farley contends, "methodological issues are drawn into the
body of theology itself" and so theological prolegomena is
born. Second, a major shift in theological method occurs in
the wake of historical-criticism: "Post-historical critical
theology de-supernaturalized not only the traditional authorities but the content of Christian faith as well."
Theological method thereafter becomes problematic in itself,
and one is left to forage about for a substitute for the
traditional "truth-guaranteeing bearers of revelation."
Precisely this search, Farley maintains, is the one unifying
characteristic of all post-historical-critical theology.
See Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of
Faith and Reality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp.
4-5. For an extended discussion of the development of
prolegomena within a Lutheran context, see also Adolf
Hoenecke, Ev.-Luth. Dogmatik, vol. 1, Prolegomena
(Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing House, 1909), 3-191.
3rhe designation is John Macquarrie's. See Principles
of Christian Theology, 2d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1977), pp. 4-18.
4rhe terminology is that of James M. Childs, Jr. As
will be evident in Chapter II, "point of contact" language
is highly problematic for Thielicke.
5This is the title of a short book by philosopher
Arthur Holmes (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1977). In this connection the comments of
Gerhard Ebeling are instructive: ". . . because Christian
faith knows itself finally to be decisively concerned with
the truth and bound to the truth, confrontation and agreement with the total awareness of truth belongs unalterably
to its living character. The inner necessity of theology as
a responsible accounting for the truth of Christian faith is
based on this, so that theology as such already implies
openness to a comprehensive concern for the truth. Meeting
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and communicating with all scholarly fields must be affirmed
by theology as things that fundamentally belong to its own
constitution. How this affirmation in principle is to be
practiced appropriately is an issue that must ever be struggled with anew in the history of theology." See The Study
of Theology, trans. Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1978), p. 83. Also, note Schubert Ogden, On Theology
(San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), pp.
78-84; and Gordon D. Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion No. 11,
rev. ed. (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979), p. 15.

CHAPTER ONE
THE PRIMACY AND HEGEMONY OF METHOD IN
THE THOUGHT OF BERNARD LONERGAN
Few single works can precipitate such intense scrutiny
and academic acclaim as Bernard Lonergan's Insight: A Study
of Human Understanding and Method in Theology. While some
authors can boast of longer bibliographies, virtually none
can lay claim to volumes of such epochal significance in two
cognate disciplines. Philosophers and theologians alike
have found the Canadian Jesuit a critical thinker of rare
acumen and intimidating breadth. Indeed, a deliberate interdependence and reciprocity characterizes Lonergan's
philosophical and theological endeavors, and these factors
at the very least make a circumscribed theological or philosophical reading of his work problematic if not distorted.
With this stricture in mind, the present chapter on
Lonergan's theological prolegomena will necessarily begin
with his prodigious contributions to cognitional theory,
epistemology, and metaphysics as expressed most overtly in
Insight. The positions he formulates so carefully in Insight are never far beneath the surface in Method in Theology or in his other specifically theological works. This
11

12
disciplinary interaction came in the pedagogical setting of
Rome's Gregorian University, where Lonergan taught dogmatics
in relative obscurity to students who had come from across
the continent and who, equally important, brought with them
notions from existentialism and phenomenology. Their formidable new mentor had laid much of the groundwork for Insight by the time he had arrived in Rome.1 "For [these]
Catholic students it was the bridge they needed from the
outdated world of Thomistic scholasticism to the new world
of critical philosophy and historical reflection."2
The above assessment (perhaps arguable in one of its
assumptions) comes from a Lutheran generally sympathetic to
Lonergan. This same writer notes that Lonergan's plaudits
came incrementally, thanks largely to a cadre of disciples
who disseminated his work in the aftermath of the second
Vatican Council. His reputation spread well beyond the confines of Roman Catholicism with the publication in 1972 of
Method in Theology, when Lonergan was nearing his seventieth
birthday. Lonergan's position as a major twentieth-century
thinker is now both indubitable and altogether secure, his
work having been almost effusively praised by academic journals as well as by such mass-circulation periodicals as Time
and Newsweek.3 This exalted estimation is expressed representatively in Christianity Today, published by and largely
for Protestant evangelicals in North America:
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So who is Bernard J. F. Lonergan? Just possibly the
most important orthodox philosopher-theologian of
the century in the Anglo-American Christian world.
. . . For evangelicals seriously interested in grappling with the critical problem of providing adequate philosophical underpinning for an orthodox
Christian faith in the contemporary world, Bernard
Lonergan is a name to remember.4
Before charting the course of Bernard Lonergan's theological method, we must first establish its intellectual
moorings in the setting of modern Thomism. Moreover, because his work is of one piece, the general contours of his
philosophy must be delineated. Only then will Father
Lonergan's "critical realism," his carefully articulated
method, and his avowedly conservative position over against
traditional Romanism be viewed in their appropriate light
and accorded proportionate emphasis.
Obviously, the key primary sources are Insight: A
Study of Human Understanding (1957) and Method in Theology
(1972). We are now fortunate to have many of Lonergan's
most important essays in three "Collections" (1967, 1974,
1985). These varied articles will be cited frequently, as
will Understanding and Being: An Introduction and Companion
to Insight (1980). Also significant are the following:
Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (1967); Grace and Freedom:
Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas (his
Gregorian dissertation, finally published in 1971); and The
Way to Nicea: The Dialectical Development of Trinitarian
Theology (1976). Finally, when necessary we will refer to
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those untranslated works produced largely as need arose in
the pedagogical context of Gregorian University in Rome.
(With the exception of The Way to Nicea, which is an abridgment and translation of some of his Gregorian material, all
of Lonergan's key works were first published in English.)
The Neo-Thomistic Context of Lonergan's Work
Those who identify the overall context of Bernard
Lonergan's work as "Neo-Thomist" do well to acknowledge that
this label (much less its twin, "neo-scholasticism"5) is
rarely a self-description and is always variously nuanced.
Along with "transcendental"--perhaps the operative adjective--"fundamental theology" and/or "foundational theology"
are the other terms in the Roman glossary calling for some
discussion in any elaboration of contemporary theological
prolegomena. They will be elucidated as need arises.
If, given the above qualifiers, one sought any justification for a discussion of contemporary Thomism, he need
only turn to Lonergan's most demanding monument, Insight.
Near the end of that work, Lonergan observes almost in passing that he viewed his efforts as a contribution to the program inaugurated by Aeterni Patris, the encyclical of Pope
Leo XIII issued in 1879.6 This encyclical marked not so
much a resurrection of Thomism as a reassertion of its viability and promise for an intellectually trying age.7 Indeed, Gerald A. McCool goes so far as to call Aeterni Patris
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a "purely disciplinary document" promulgated in response to
the failure of post-Cartesian philosophy satisfactorily to
address the faith/reason and grace/nature questions.8
While McCool's careful etiology may be accurate,
Aeterni Patris did not signal a return to methodological
homogeneity in the intellectual quarters of Romanism. NeoThomists were and are sharply divided on such basic issues
as the primacy of metaphysics over against epistemology (or,
in Lonergan's case, cognitional theory), the propriety of a
"critical" realism, and the viability of a "transcendental"
Thomism.9 Characteristically, the eclectic and enigmatic
Lonergan is difficult to categorize on these and other important issues. He sets his own course, and in some instances introduces his own set of coordinates. These heretofore uncharted explorations are responsible in no small
measure for the estimations of genius accorded Lonergan in
at least the last two decades of his career.
Given this proviso, it is possible nevertheless to
sketch in general terms the main features of contemporary
Thomism. Whatever their intramural differences, NeoThomists unite in affirming that "the Kantian paradigm" (the
chapter title used by W. T. Jones in his widely-used history
of philosophy)1° does not mitigate decisively against the
contributions of St. Thomas in toto. Kant, roused from his
"dogmatic slumbers" by Hume's criticism of the principle of
causality, shifted the locus of philosophical activity from
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experience to the intellectual conditions of experience.
His agenda was threefold: (1) to rescue science from skepticism; (2) to rid metaphysics of any pretension to objective knowledge; and (3) to make it clear that metaphysics
was an illusion." The conclusion is bold. Metaphysics,
understood as positive knowledge, is dead.12
Obviously, as metaphysics goes, so goes any natural
theology. Simplistically defined, natural theology refers
to that theology developed without benefit of special revelation. It is derived through experimentation and observation.13 In Kant's criticism, knowledge devolves to scientific intelligibility on the pattern of Newton's physics.
"To know" entails the expression of observable relations
between given facts in their mathematical relations."
Etienne Gilson states the inevitable consequences: "Since
God is not an object of empirical knowledge, we have no concept of him. Consequently, God is no object of knowledge,
and what we call natural theology is just idle talking."15
Since God is not an object apprehended in the a
priori forms of sensibility, space and time, he cannot be related to anything else by the category of
causality. Hence, Kant concludes, God may well be a
pure idea of reason, that is, a general principle of
unification of our cognitions; he is not an object
of cognition. Or we may have to posit his existence
as required by the exigencies of practical reason;
the existence of God then becomes a postulate, it is
still not a cognition.16
Neo-Thomists concur in their disavowal of these stark
and radical conclusions. Metaphysics is more than a quaint
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historical curiosity. Yet once this rudimentary postulate
has been duly noted, all concord disappears. Precisely how
the relic of metaphysics is to be rescued from its museum
and restored to the halls of serious intellectual discourse
is another question entirely.17 Indeed, Thomas Gilby's article in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy understates the matter: "It [Neo-Thomism] represents no fixed image of conformity."18 Textbooks, reflecting this situation, more often than not survey the work of Joseph Marechal and/or
Jacques Maritain and are content to stop there. While the
status of these luminaries in the Neo-Thomistic pantheon is
uncontested, they are merely the most prominent of a diverse
group united only by its insistence that the Kantian paradigm is not inviolable. Metaphysics is a perfectly appropriate field of philosophical reflection.
The object of metaphysics . . . is, according to the
Thomists, being as such, ens in quantum ens, being
not clothed or embodied in the sensible quiddity,
the essence or nature of sensible things, but on the
contrary abstractum, being disengaged and isolated,
at least so far as being can be taken in abstraction
from more particularized objects. It is being disengaged and isolated from the sensible quiddity,
being viewed as such and set apart in its pure
intelligible values.19
Jacques Maritain's summary, cited above, represents
the conclusion of what is often a circuituous route to being
aua being. It is in the journey to this destination that
sometimes pronounced differences arise between "classical"
and "critical" realists.
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The former view, championed by Gilson and his followers, stresses the primacy of metaphysics over epistemology. Descartes, Hume, and Kant--for all their undeniable
differences--converge in their emphasis on the human cooito
as the locus from whence philosophizing necessarily begins.2° The critical realists, whom Gilson opposes and who
claim the cogito as their point of departure, are not to be
labeled as skeptics. While they distinguish between "sense
data" and the objects such data represents, the things known
(the objects) remain independent of the knower (mind).
Ideas represent objects: thought refers to objects (albeit
indirectly) and not merely to the ideas of the knower or to
sense data.21
For the likes of Etienne Gilson, who wrote most prolifically on this issue, critical realism in any form is an
oxymoron. Calling his position "classical," "natural," or
simply "Thomist" in the straightforward historical sense, he
argues that philosophers who begin with epistemology or cognitional theory have attempted a theoretical impossibility:
"You can start with thought or with being, but you cannot do
both at the same time. If you wish to construct a Thomistic
epistemology, . . . you must start with being."22 To label
a realism that proceeds from being to thought "critical"
effectively strips the term of all meaning.° In fact, the
net result of "critical realism" is the dreaded opprobrium
"idealism."
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. . . the critique of knowledge is essentially
incompatible and irreconcilable with metaphysical
realism. There is no middle ground. You must either begin as a realist with being, in which case
you will have a knowledge of being, or begin as a
critical idealist with knowledge, in which
case you
will never come in contact with being.24
Bernard Lonergan's personal contributions to this dialogue come in three key areas, each of which introduces and
highlights themes that pervade every aspect of his work.
Stated in preliminary fashion, these interrelated themes
include: (1) the distinction between classical and empirical culture; (2) the introduction of a "transcendental"
method; and (3) the emphasis on the human "subject."
Lonergan enters the fray over classical and critical
realism only indirectly. In itself the debate does not receive extended treatment;25 moreover, Lonergan's direct references to scholars like Gilson is invariably circumspect
and irenic. Father Lonergan does not contest Gilson's exposition of St. Thomas. The point is not fidelity or infidelity to Thomas. Lonergan almost casually concedes that
his metaphysics bears a "marked family resemblance" to traditional views.26 Nor is this just an obligatory sop from a
writer working within a Roman context--even a quick perusal
of Lonergan's specifically dogmatic works disabuses one of
that possibility. At issue for Lonergan is not Thomism per
se or even the primacy of cognitional theory. Rather, any
contemporary advertence to Thomas could only proceed from a
recognition of the cultural disparity that obtains between
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the thirteenth and twentieth centuries. One can open
Lonergan's books or collections of essays virtually at random and soon come upon his relentless insistence that theology must adjust its method to suit the exigencies of an empirical rather than a classicist understanding of culture.27
"A culture is a set of meanings and values informing a
common way of life, and there are as many cultures as there
are distinct sets of such meanings and values."28 Such a
definition represents an "empirical" account of culture, and
it is at the heart of John XXIII's Aggiornamento: "Aggiornamento is not desertion of the past but only a discerning
and discriminating disengagement from its limitations."29
The transition from classicist to empirical culture,
ushered in with the French Revolution, is signaled by five
"transpositions." First, the advent of empirical culture
witnessed a shift from deductive logic to method.
(Lonergan's definition of method is consistent: "A method
is a normative pattern of related and recurrent operations."30) Second, science moves from the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, where certain causality and necessity prevail, to verifiability and probability. Third, classicism's
apprehension of man in terms of human nature gives way to an
empirical apprehension of man through human history--a
transposition of profound import for theology when it comes
to such issues as the development of dogma. Fourth, empiricism entails an unobtrusive shift from the metaphysics of
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the soul to the self-appropriation of the subject. Finally,
classicism's "first principles" give way to transcendental
method.31
. . . classicism is no more than the mistaken view
of conceiving culture normatively and of concluding
that there is just one human culture. The modern
fact is that there are many cultures, and that new
distinctions are legitimate when the reasons for
them are explained and the older truths are retained.32
The above enumeration has switched Lonergan's order
slightly in order to focus on the subject and on transcendental method, both indispensable features of his thought.
Because of the cultural shift here summarized--and linked
inextricably to Father Lonergan's overwhelming, interdisciplinary stress on method--the philosophical preoccupation is
no longer with logical propositions a la Aristotle but instead with "concrete realities": "sensitively, intellectually, rationally, morally conscious sub'ects."33 Taken
one step further, first principles in philosophy are not
merely abstract verbal propositions but rather what Lonergan
terms the de facto structural invariants of human conscious
intentionality.34
The study of the subject . . . attends to operations
and to their centre and source which is the self.
It discerns the different levels of consciousness,
the consciousness of the dream, of the waking subject, of the intelligently inquiring subject, of the
rationally reflecting subject, of the responsibly
deliberating subject. It examines the different
operations on the several levels and their relations
to one another.35
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These remarks introduce the key anthropological point
on which so much of Lonergan's methodological work hinges.
In a fashion analogous to but not identical with the Heideggerian-informed thought of Karl Rahner (what the latter
calls "metaphysical anthropology"),36 the stress on the subject progresses sometimes indistinguishably to transcendental method. To put the matter as simply as possible, the
human subject intends (hence, "intentionality") authenticity, and this authenticity is realized to the extent that
one follows a set of transcendental imperatives.37 These
transcendental directives are "be attentive, be intelligent,
be reasonable, and be responsible."38
Such transcendental precepts derive their theological
import from Lonergan's resolute insistence that they point
one beyond himself. More precisely, human authenticity is
realized only insofar as one cumulatively sustains fidelity
to the principles of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.39 But Lonergan can speak of
"self-transcendence" as well, by virtue of the "transcendental tendency of the human spirit"" to ask questions, to do
so without restriction, and even to question the significance of its own questioning--and thereby to arrive at the
question of God."
The question of God, then, lies within man's horizon. Man's transcendental subjectivity is mutilated
or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards
the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of
value. The reach, not of his attainment, but of his
intending is unrestricted. There lies within his
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horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored.42
The ultimate fulfillment of one's capacity for transcendence--and thus for human authenticity as we1143--is being in love with God." This fulfillment and its enduring
ground is not the product of human knowledge or choice;
rather, it is God's gift of His love for us mediated (for
Christians, at any rate) by Jesus Christ.45 Lonergan repeatedly cites Romans 5:5 in describing the experience of
the gift of God's love:

•

•

•

God has poured out his love

into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, whom he has given us. „46
Father Lonergan's representation of this divine gift approaches the homiletic:
Like all being in love, as distinct from particular
acts of loving, it is a first principle. So far
from resulting from our knowledge and choice, it
dismantles and abolishes the horizon within which
our knowing and choosing went on, and it sets up a
new horizon within which the love of God transvalues
our values and the eyes of that love transform our
knowing.47
In Method in Theology one encounters the claim that an
orientation to "transcendent mystery" is basic to systematic
theology.48 This means, of course, that skeptics, Kantians,
and positivists simply err when they attempt to confine human inquiry within parameters that men and women "naturally
and spontaneously" transcend.49 Because, Lonergan claims,
the question of God is implicit in all one's questioning, so
being in love with God involves the basic fulfillment of
one's conscious intentionality.50 In this way one can link
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the essence of transcendental method with the language of
classical Thomism: "Grace perfects nature both in the sense
that it adds a perfection beyond nature and in the sense
that it confers on nature the effective freedom to attain
its own perfection.""
To this point we have set Bernard Lonergan within the
context of Neo-Thomism by emphasizing the transition from a
static, classicist culture to an empirical one. With this
shift comes a concomitant stress on the intending human subject and a transcendental method that arises from the same.
The transcendental method is a concrete, dynamic unfolding
of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and
responsibility. This unfolding is realized whenever people
use their minds appropriately. The completely open transcendental notions--the questions for intelligence, reflection, and deliberation--constitute one's capacity for authenticity and self-transcendence.52
Lonergan regards St. Thomas as anything but a relic
from a bygone cultural epoch. The cultural and philosophical distance between Thomas and Lonergan entails neither
disparagement nor disengagement but rather the sympathetic
mediation of an albeit critical disciple. In a 1974 lecture
appropriately entitled "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation," Lonergan eloquently weaves together several of
the themes adumbrated here with his own profound debt to the
Angelic Doctor:
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For him theology was not only science but--something
better--wisdom; and this we can retain in terms of
the successive sublations observed in intentionality
analysis, where the curiosity of sense is taken over
by the inquiry of intelligence, where inquiry is
taken over by rational reflection, where reflection
prepares the way for responsible deliberation, where
all are sublimated by being-in-love--in love with
one's family, in love with the human community, in
love with God and his universe. . . .
But if scientific specialization differentiates
our world from that of Aquinas, theology changes
difference into analogy. As Aquinas conceived his
world as coming from God and returning to him, so
too can we. As Aquinas conceived man as the end of
the material universe, so much more clearly and distinctly can we. Finally, as Aquinas, so we too can
place the meaning and significance of the visible
universe as bringing to birth the elect--the recipients to whom God gives himself in love, in the
threefold giving that is the gift of the Holy Spirit
to those that love (Rom. 5:5), the gift of the divine Word made flesh and dwelling amongst us (John
1:14), the final gift of union with the Father who
is originating love (I John 4:8, 16).53
Integral Themes in Lonergan's Philosophy
Twelve years after his celebrated Critique of Pure
Reason of 1781, Immanuel Kant, in private correspondence,
explicitly identified the three questions his philosophical
program sought to address: What can I know? (metaphysics);
What should I do? (ethics); and, What may I hope? (religion) . 54 In similar fashion, Bernard Lonergan often repeats
three queries that guide his own philosophical endeavors.
Calling them sequentially the "gnoseological," epistemological, and metaphysical questions, Lonergan asks: (1) What
are we doing when we are knowing? (2) Why is doing that
knowing? and (3) What do we know when we do it? These ques-
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tions are reiterated frequently, and they afford the careful
reader the internal clues necessary to identify and outline
the salient themes in Lonergan's overtly philosophical writings.55
Father Lonergan's major philosophical effort, Insight:
A Study of Human Understanding, is devoted to an exploration
of "self-appropriation."56 In fact, Lonergan's exceedingly
illuminating Understanding and Being describes Insight as a
set of exercises through which one might attain self-appropriation.57 This paramount concern is reflected in
Lonergan's working definition of philosophy: "Philosophy is
the flowering of the individual's rational consciousness in
its coming to know and take possession of itself."58 Likewise, philosophical method will be concerned with the structure (and aberrations) of human cognitional processes.59
His magnum opus aspires to convey "an insight into insight":" "the object of our inquiry [is] . . . the dynamic
structure immanent and recurrently operative in human cognitional activity."61
For Lonergan, the connection between cognitional theory and systematic theology is anything but incidental. As
he invites readers of Insight to self-appropriation, so he
seeks to inculcate a methodological program that will, more
specifically, inform one's theological method. "Thoroughly
understand what it is to understand, and not only will you
understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood
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but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding. "
. . . we are concerned not with the existence of
knowledge but with its nature, not with what is
known but with the structure of the knowing, not
with the abstract properties of cognitional process
but with the personal appropriation of one's own
dynamic and recurrently operative structure of cognitional activity.
Such self-appropriation will finally become theologically explicit when the knowing human subject moves from the
three overarching questions cited above to a fourth: "What
am I doing when I am doing theology?"64 A fruitful response
to this latter query presupposes full, precise, and wellgrounded answers to the former questions.65 In straightforward terms, Insight is an exploration of methods in other
diverse fields; as such, it is preliminary to his 1972 attempt at theological method." In aspiring to what Father
Lonergan terms "the functionally operative tendencies that
ground the ideal of knowledge,"67 he presupposes a developmental pattern wherein one moves from "the world of immediacy" to "the world mediated by meaning." The infant and
small child know only the former. This world of immediacy
therefore includes all the data of consciousness and all the
data of sense. One's process into the world mediated by
meaning comes through socialization, acculturation, and education. Eventually one is able to ask questions and to be
more or less satisfied with his answers.68 In short, while
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one continues to live in the world of immediacy as well as
in his new world mediated by meaning, he is now in a position to respond--authentically or inauthentically--to the
transcendental imperatives.69
Lonergan's cognitional theory, then, assumes one's
encounter with the world mediated by meaning, and in this
setting "insight" itself assumes the character of a "supervening act of understanding":" "Insight . . . includes the
apprehension of meaning, and insight into insight includes
the apprehension of the meaning of meaning.1'n In far less
obtuse terms, "insight" builds first upon raw empirical presentations, then upon "inquiry," the intellectually alert
effort to understand (compare Aristotle's dictum that wonder
is the genesis of all science and philosophy). "The 'insight' is the click, the grasp, what is added to one's
knowledge when one sees the must in the data."72 There is,
finally, conception, a general formula that satisfactorily
expresses the insight.m
In language again at least superficially reminiscent
of Kant, Lonergan begins his outline of the process of human
knowing by stating that all human knowledge is empirical
insofar as it proceeds from data.74
Yet along with sensory data there is also the data of
consciousness, and among the data of consciousness one's
cognitional activities hold pride of place. These cognitional activities provide empirical grounds for assessing
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all human pretensions to knowledge.m Adverting repeatedly
to man's "detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to
know"76--the integrated unfolding of which is the aim of
philosophyn--Lonergan develops the process that characterizes our coming to know.
Recalling that the ability to pose relevant questions
is basic to an existence in a world mediated by meaning,
Father Lonergan asserts that the conscious and intentional
operations of human cognition take place on four interlocked
levels: experiencing; understanding and conception; reflection and judgment; and, finally, deliberation and decision.78 One is moved (or "promoted") from one level to the
next by questions: "from experiencing to understanding by
questions for intelligence; from understanding to judging by
questions for reflection; from judging to deciding by questions for deliberation."79
To summarize, experience is the first level of knowing. It presents to us the matter to be known. At the second level, understanding defines the matter to be known.
With judgment, knowing reaches what Lonergan calls a "complete increment"--"when the merely experienced has been
thought and the merely thought has been affirmed."8° Human
intellect functions properly when the detached, disinterested, and unrestricted desire to know dominates in cognitional operations.m
Human knowing, then, is not experience alone,
not judgment alone; it is not a combination of only
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experiencing and understanding, or of only experience and judgment, or of only understanding and
judgment; finally, it is not something totally apart
from experience, understanding, and judgment. Inevitably, one has to regard an instance of human
knowing, not as this or that operation, but as a
whole whose parts are operations. It is a structure
and, indeed, a materially dynamic structure.
But human knowing is also formally dynamic. It
is self-assembling, self-constituting. It puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next,
till the whole is reached. And this occurs, not
with the blindness of natural process, but consciously, intelligently, rationally. Experience
stimulates inquiry, and inquiry is intelligence
bringing itself to act; it leads from experience
through imagination to insight, and from insight to
the concepts that combine in single objects both
what has been grasped by insight and what in experience or imagination is relevant to the insight. In
turn, concepts stimulate reflection, and reflection
is the conscious exigence of rationality; it marshals the evidence and weighs it either to judge or
else to doubt and so renew inquiry. Such in briefest outline is what is meant by saying that human
knowing is a dynamic structure.82
Whether Lonergan discusses this "structure" in terms
of three or four levels, considerable attention is given to
the affirmation connoted by judgment. Rational judgment is
the singular constitutive criterion in our knowledge.°
Judgment grasps the sufficiency of the evidence and gives
assent to a proposition.84 The answer to questions calling
for reflection ("explanation" addresses questions calling
for intelligence),0 the act of judgment elevates an object
of thought into an object of knowledge.86 The precise distinction between "judgment" and "decision" (the fourth level
of human cognitional structure) will come into sharp relief
only with a look forward to Lonergan's theological method,
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where decision marks the transition from the last "functional specialty" of "mediating theology" ("dialectics") to
the initial specialty of "mediated theology" ("foundations"). As such, decision within the structure of consciousness plays a role corresponding to "conversion" in
Lonergan's theological method.
Thus, while judgment is not synonymous with decision,
both are rational, both deal with objects apprehended by
insight, and both arise because of what Lonergan calls a
"reflective grasp of reasons."87 "Judging . . . is the
fruit of the actual rationality of consciousness. . . . [It
is] an element in personal commitment in an extremely pure
state."m
If the answer to Lonergan's gnoseological question is
the cognitional theory sketched above, in which human knowing is a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging,89the epistemological question ("Why is doing that
knowing?") recognizes the primacy of the intellect in the
human constitution--so much so that it leads anyone who attempts to avoid it into the cul-de-sac of self-contradiction."
Father Lonergan's own epistemological orientation,
variously labeled Christian realism or critical realism,
will be discussed in the next section. For the time being,
suffice to say that the multitude of other options (for
example, naive realism, naive idealism, empiricism, critical
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idealism, absolute idealism) all fail to meet the exigencies
of the transcendental imperatives.91 The self-appropriation
that affords the subject his ultimate basis is reciprocal:
"[it] is not simply a matter of moving in and finding the
functionally operative tendencies that ground ideals. It is
also a matter of pulling out the inadequate ideals that may
be already existent and operative in us."92
The trick in self-appropriation is to move one step
backwards, to move into the subject as intelligent,
asking questions, having insights and being able to
form concepts, as weighing the evidence and being
able to judge. We want to move in there where the
ideal is functionally operative prior to its being
made explicit in judgments, concepts, and words.
Moving in there is self-appropriation; moving in
there is reaching what is pre-predicative, pre-conceptual, pre-judicia1.93
Lonergan postulates an "epistemological theorem,"
which, in fact, furnishes him with a suitable transition
from epistemology to metaphysics and, by implication at
least, to theology proper.94 The ideal of knowledge, congruent with a transcendental method, is one's self as intelligent, as asking questions, and as requiring intelligible
answers.95 From cognitional theory (what one is doing when
one is coming to know) to epistemology (why doing that is
knowing) one can proceed to setting up a metaphysics: "to
state in general what one knows when one does come to
know."96 His epistemological theorem, variously stated,
makes the connection explicit. Knowledge, properly speaking, is knowledge of reality. Such knowledge is "intrinsi-
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cally objective," that is, objectivity is the intrinsic relation of knowing to being, and this being and reality are
identical.97 From here it is but a short step to overtly
theological considerations. Having argued that ontological
truth entails the intrinsic intelligibility of being,98 or,
in more characteristic language, the conformity of being
(noun) to the conditions of its being known (verb) through
both intelligent inquiry and critical reflection,99 Lonergan
introduces his key metaphysical/theological distinction between the "virtually unconditioned" and the "formally unconditioned." One's judgment is unconditioned or possesses
"absolute objectivity" inasmuch as it is independent of the
judging subject, or as rational consciousness gives rise to
a product independent of itself.m To make all of these
connections explicit, the criteria of objectivity lie in
intelligent inquiry, critical reflection, and grasp of the
virtually unconditioned.'°1
What, precisely, is the "unconditioned"? It is the
requisite metaphysical backdrop to the human drive to transcendence and self-appropriation; and, the "immanent" source
of human transcendence is one's detached, disinterested, and
unrestricted desire to know.102 Father Lonergan asserts this
link-up in more traditional language: "Being is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know. Therefore, the
idea of being is the content of an unrestricted act of understanding. of 103
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The notion of being first appears in questioning.
Being is the unknown that questioning intends to
know, that answers partially reveal, that further
questioning presses on to know more fully. The notion of being, then, is essentially dynamic, proleptic, an anticipation of the entirety, the concreteness, the totality, that we ever intend and
since our knowledge is finite never reach.104
"Proleptic" is perhaps the key term in this citation.
Those questions that can neither anticipate nor admit further riddles directly point to Lonergan's notion of the unconditioned. By tautology, an unconditioned has no conditions.m The "formally unconditioned" is unconditioned in
the sense that it lacks any conditions whatever. Only God,
conceived as absolute necessity, is formally unconditioned.
The "virtually unconditioned" does have conditions, but
these have been fulfilled (hence, "virtually" unconditioned).106 The virtually unconditioned is the cognitional
counterpart to contingent being, and, in addition, a technical formulation of the usual criterion of true judgment, to
wit, sufficient evidence.107
Lest the present division between philosophical and
theological considerations be blurred too excessively, one
might observe that this distinction facilitates an exploration of what has traditionally been termed the "natural
knowledge" of God. Lonergan devotes a chapter of Insight to
"general transcendent knowledge." As one might expect, he
rules out the classical ontological arguments as being merely analytic propositions.108

Moreover, a priori attempts to
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deduce effects from their causes founder for the simple reason that God is not someone who has a cause; indeed, He is
formally unconditioned.109 Rather, the argument for God's
existence must be a posteriori; it must proceed from effect
to cause or from consequence to antecedent."° Stated in a
rudimentary syllogism, Lonergan's argument is this:
If the real is completely intelligible, then God
exists.
The real is completely intelligible; the real is
being.
Therefore, God exists.111
However one might be disposed to this argument and its
exposition, it is clear that Lonergan's whole effort is unintelligible save for its context in his cognitional theory,
epistemology, and metaphysics. "We answered the question
whether God exists by affirming that the real is being and
that being is the completely intelligible objective of an
unrestricted desire to understand correctly.012
. . . the dynamism constitutive of our consciousness
may be expressed in the imperatives: be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible, and the imperatives are unrestricted--they regard every inquiry,
every judgment, every decision and choice. Nor is
the relevance of the imperatives restricted to the
world of human experience, to the mundus aspectabilis; we are open to God. Implicit in human inquiry
is a natural desire to know God by his essence; implicit in human judgment about contingent things
here is the formally unconditioned that is God; implicit in human choice of values is the absolute
good that is God.113
One has thus entered the sphere of metaphysics proper.
Repeatedly stressing that being is what one can grasp intelligently and affirm reasonably, Lonergan proposes to "do

36
metaphysics" in two steps. First, one can do metaphysics
with regard to this world. Second, one can explore the
question of the existence of God.114
The former topic serves to introduce yet another distinction basic to Lonergan's program, namely, "proportionate" being. If Lonergan's "fundamental category" is one's
pure desire to know correlated with the fully-orbed universe
of being, with whatever is known by intelligent grasp and
reasonable affirmation,115 "proportionate" being is whatever
is to be known by human experience, correct understanding,
and true judgment.116 In short, proportionate being differs
from being in general in that the former lies within the
domain of one's inner and outer experience.117 Does the absence of the experiential component preclude a genuine metaphysics in the second sense defined above? By no means.
"The possibility of transcendent knowledge . . . is the possibility of grasping intelligently and affirming reasonably
a transcendent being. And the proof of the possibility lies
in the fact that such intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation occur.11,118
The best that natural reason can attain is the discovery of the paradox that the desire to understand
arises naturally, that its object is the transcendental, ens, and that the proper fulfillment that
naturally is attainable is restricted to the proportionate object of finite intellect."9
Lonergan's standard, most complete definition of metaphysics calls it the "integral heuristic structure" of pro-
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portionate being. UM

A heuristic "notion" is one of an un-

known content; it is determined by envisioning the type of
act through which the unknown might become known. A heuristic "structure" pertains to the ordered set of heuristic
notions. Hence, an integral heuristic structure is defined
as the ordered set of all heuristic notions.121 Still more
precisely, it is the "anticipatory outline" of what one
would know by affirming a complete explanation of possible
experience.122
Traditional definitions of metaphysics as the science
of being aua being123 properly necessitate its inclusivity,
and serve to underscore its import and penetration beyond
any particular class of beings.t'M For Lonergan, metaphysics
in this sense has implicit, problematic, and explicit stages. Metaphysics is implicit simply because men are conscious subjects who experience, understand, and judge. The
problematic stage emerges out of one's aspiration for the
unification of the sciences in terms of a satisfactory method.125 Finally, metaphysics becomes explicit when selfappropriation takes place,126 when and as one "works out" the
implications of the pure desire to know and its unfolding
with regard both to the structure of reality and the unification of knowledge.127 "Consequently, explicit metaphysics
is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the
integral heuristic structure of proportionate being."128
Just as there is heuristic structure with regard to
acts of understanding, so there is a total heuristic
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structure; there is the total goal of intelligent
and rational consciousness as such. We have named
that goal 'being'. When we speak of knowing being,
we mean knowing everything about everything; but we
do not know everything about everything. We are
simply anticipating the totality of acts of understanding and judgment by which we could completely
achieve the ideal, the goal, set us by our desire to
know. . . . Metaphysics is concerned with the integral heuristic structure. It is not content to say
that being is what one will know when one knows
everything about everything. It can become more
explicit. It can go on to say that, in any case of
knowledge of proportionate being, there will be a
component of experience, a component of understanding, a component of grasping the unconditioned and
judging; and because the acts are differentiated
from one another by different contents, the object
known is going to involve a content from experience,
a content from understanding, a content from judgment. Consequently, there will be a triple content
in the known.129
The antithesis to metaphysics is nothing short of obscurantism, specifically, the contention that one's range of
knowledge is limited and that the extent of one's desire to
know is circumscribed.m Conversely, "being" is the objective of one's pure desire to know. As such, it entails
everything that is known and everything that remains to be
known--"the complete set of answers to the complete set of
questions"131 or the act of understanding that leaves nothing
further to be understood.132
In practice, one's viewpoint is universal to the extent that (1) it is one and coherent; (2) it raises basic,
inevitable issues; and, finally, (3) its analysis of the
evidence is sufficiently incisive both to account for the
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existence of every other view and to establish the cogency
of its own.133
The integration of many of the foregoing themes is
facilitated by a parting transitional glimpse at a triad of
key themes: being, truth, and God as the (formally) unconditioned.
Being has been defined as the objective of one's pure,
detached, disinterested desire to know. Such desire grounds
inquiry and reflection. The former leads to understanding;
the latter eventuates in affirmation. Being, it follows, is
whatever can be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably.134
Truth proceeds from a grasp of the virtually unconditioned and conforms to the being it affirms. It demands an
intrinsic intelligibility in being as a condition for the
possibility of knowing.135 Therefore, in brief, being is
what is known truly.136
Insofar as God is a being, he too can be known by intelligent grasp and reasonable affirmation.137 For Lonergan
the theologian, God as the formally unconditioned does lie
within the horizon of man's knowing, thus connoting religion
as a fundamental dimension in human living.1

Indeed, there

is a final dialectical component that really renders any
dichotomy between Lonergan's philosophy and theology misguided. The paradox is this: "I do not think that in this
life people arrive at natural knowledge of God without God's
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grace, but what I do not doubt is that the knowledge they so
attain is natural."139
Lonergan's Christian Realism
The previous section synthesized Lonergan's explorations
on the data of consciousness, from which he developed successively a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysics. The transcendental method and the metaphysics of
proportionate being signal responses to the interrogative
rudders of Lonergan's thought: What is one doing when one
is knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What does one know
when one does it? The second of these queries, which points
to epistemology, was addressed only in the most cursory
fashion, and it is now the focus of our consideration.
The order of the above questions is important. Reversing the classical Aristotelian progression, Father
Lonergan derives epistemology from cognitional theory and
metaphysics from epistemology--and he is adamant about this
sequence.UFO In response to the charge that a basic judgment
of existence undergirds all acts of perception, questioning,
and affirming,141 Lonergan concedes that metaphysics is prior
only if--in the manner of a petitio princeris--one regards
what one is studying as fully known objects. The net result
is that one is left without any way of critically justifying
his metaphysics.142 In Lonergan's view, one can critically
justify a metaphysics only if it is derived from a cogni-
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tional theory and an epistemology. One justifies cognitional theory, in turn, by finding it in oneself: "the terms of
the theory are found in your own operations, of which you
are conscious and which you are able to identify in your own
experience, and the relations connecting the terms are to be
found in the dynamism relating one operation to the other.043
The basic discipline, I believe, is not metaphysics
but cognitional theory. By cognitional theory is
meant, not a faculty psychology that presupposes a
metaphysics, but an intentionality that presupposes
the data of consciousness. From the cognitional
theory there can be derived an epistemology, and
from both the cognitional theory and the epistemology there can be derived a metaphysics. These three
are related to all other disciplines, not by supplying them with elements for their basic terms and
relations, but by providing,the nucleus for the formulation of their methods.
Richard McBrien calls Christian realism the distinctively Catholic manner of integrating the plurality of philosophies which, in turn, reflects a similar doctrinal pluralism.145 To be sure, philosophical answers to the question
of reality are legion. Naive realism, naive idealism, empiricism, rationalism, absolute and critical idealism, positivism, pragmatism, phenomenology, and existentialism are
all enumerated as sundry "misconceptions of truth."146
In their place, Lonergan postulates Christian realism
or critical realism. Critical realism presupposes the cognitional theory outlined above, and it exposes the shortcomings of the various other options. The differences, more-
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over, are substantive and fundamental. Empiricism, idealism, and realism are three entirely different horizons; they
have no common identical objects.147 Naive realism insists
that knowing simply involves taking a good look. Objectivity entails seeing what is there to be seen, with the result
that reality is whatever is given in immediate experience.
Empiricism is the by-product of naive realism: the only
reality that counts is one amenable to quantitative measurement. Finally, empiricism spawns its philosophical opposite, critical idealism (for example, Immanuel Kant). Here
the categories of understanding themselves are empty; they
refer to objects only insofar as categories are applied to
sensory data. (This is the phenomenal world. Things in
themselves, the noumena, are inaccessible.)"
In terms of their failings, naive realism assumes that
the world mediated by meaning is known by merely "taking a
look," for things are what they seem to be to common
sense.149 To arrive at empiricism one need only empty this
world mediated by meaning of everything save what he can
sense, thereby equating the real with what, in Lonergan's
terms, is "exhibited in ostensive gestures."1" The idealist exposes empiricism's failure to acknowledge the "structuring elements" constitutive of human knowing yet--note
well--not given to sense. Paradoxically, he retains the
empiricist notion of reality, avers that human knowledge is
constituted by posing and answering questions, and, most
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characteristic of any idealist view, concludes that the object of human knowledge is not the real but the idea1.1"
To break through the assorted forms of idealism to
realism, one has to discover both that rational and intellectual operations involve a self-transcendence of the operating subject and, to revert to the language of the previous
section, that the real is what he comes to know through a
grasp of the (virtually) unconditioned.'m Stated in less
idiosyncratic language, critical realism finds both idealism
and empiricism wanting inasmuch as it (critical realism)
affirms that a verified hypothesis is probably true and that
what probably is true has reference to what in reality probably is so.153
For Lonergan, only critical realism can acknowledge
the facts of human knowing and affirm the world mediated by
meaning to be the real world. It can do so as it demonstrates the process of experiencing-understanding-judging to
be a process of self-transcendence.154 "The world mediated
by meaning . . . is the world of a critical realism in which
the objects are intended when we ask questions and are known
when the questions are answered correctly."155
Father Lonergan summarizes much of the above in the
following selection from an article expressly devoted to
this theme:
I too hold for the primacy of conscience, for the
primacy of the questions that lead to deliberation,
evaluation, decision. Still, responsible answers to
those questions presuppose sound judgments of fact,
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of possibility, and of probability. But such sound
judgments, in turn, presuppose that we have escaped
the clutches of naive realism, empiricism, critical
and absolute idealism, that we have succeeded in
formulating a critical realism. The key to such a
formulation is basically simple. It is the distinction already drawn between the infant's world of
immediacy and the adult's world mediated by meaning.
In the infant's world of immediacy the only objects
to which we are related immediately are the objects
of sensible intuition. But in the adult's world
mediated by meaning the objects to which we are related immediately are the objects intended by our
questioning and known by correct answering. In more
traditional language, the objects intended are beings: what is to be known by intendin% Quid sit and
An sit and by finding correct answers.
How can one effect the transition from critical realism as an epistemological/metaphysical orientation to an
overt consideration of theological method? The clue lies in
what Lonergan often terms the transcendent exigence,157 the
"immanent source" of which is man in his detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.158 Human inquiry embraces an unrestricted demand for intelligibility, just as
human judgment aspires to the unconditioned. Within human
deliberation, furthermore, there is a criterion that criticizes every finite good. For Lonergan the conclusion is
plain: "So it is . . . that man can reach basic fulfillment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common
sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which
God is known and loved."159
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Lonergan's Theological Method
Whatever criticisms one might have of Bernard Lonergan's Method in Theology, haste or carelessness will not be
among them. As it turns out, Lonergan already envisioned
the publication of a volume on method in the early 1950s,
only to find that he would shortly be teaching dogmatics at
the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. Indeed, Insight
is an exploration of methods in various other fields, in
anticipation of doing method in theology. Only Bernard
Lonergan could claim that he "cut down" his original ambition to do method in theology and "put this book [Insight!]
together."16° Method in Theology finally appeared in 1972.
In Method in Theology Lonergan delineates his method
with care and precision. More than that, Lonergan sets
theological method in the context of the cognitional theory,
epistemology, and metaphysics discussed most massively in
Insight. The previous section of this chapter, pertaining
to Father Lonergan's critical realism (particularly the last
citation), began to signal the transition from philosophical
considerations to overtly theological concerns. Stated explicitly, the transcendental method is a part of theological
method insofar as it provides the basic anthropological component. It does not, and can not, supply the specifically
religious component. To rise from transcendental to theological method, one must add a consideration of religion. 161
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With reference to the classical formulation of Augustine and Anselm (Crede, ut intelligas), Lonergan maintains
that reason illumined by faith--to wit, when it inquires
diligently, piously, soberly--reaches with the help of God
some understanding of the revealed mysteries. "Such understanding rests on the analogy of things known naturally and
on the interconnection of the mysteries with one another and
with man's last end."162 Yet reason is never capable of
grasping these mysteries in the same manner that it understands the truths clearly appropriate to

it.163

At the very

least, Anselm's dictum acknowledges that the truths of faith
which make perfectly good sense to a believer may appear to
be nonsense to an unbeliever. w'
The transcendental method embraces in their complementarity both men and women as attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible and the human world as given and structured by intelligence, reasonable judgment, and decision and
action.165 This terse definition--provided by Lonergan himself, not a synthesis--alludes to the different levels of
consciousness and intentionality discussed in the second
section of this chapter.
There is the empirical level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an intellectual level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the
presuppositions and implications of our expression.
There is the rational level on which we reflect,
marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or
falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement.
There is the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our
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goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of
action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our
decisions.
Within such a transcendental method, with its four
levels of intentional and conscious acts, the lower levels
are presupposed and complemented by the higher.167 The human
subject is aware of himself on all four levels; however, as
one progresses from level to level it is a "fuller self" of
which he is aware and this awareness itself is different.1M
The most basic difference one encounters in the modes of
intending lies in the distinction between the categorial and
the transcendental. The former are "determinations," as
they have but a limited denotation. Father Lonergan's method is transcendental: ". . . the results envisaged are not
confined categorially to some particular field or subject,
but regard any result that could be intended by the completely open transcendental notions. u169
As we stressed earlier, the transcendental precepts
are permanent. The directives to attention, intelligence,
reasonableness, and responsibility obtain both with respect
to the existing situation and with respect to any subsequent, altered situation. The net result is that sustained
fidelity to the transcendental precepts renders cumulative
change an instance of progress.m
In various detailed manners, method will bid us be
attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible.
The details of its prescriptions will be derived
from the work in hand and will vary with it. But
the normative force of its imperatives will reside,
not just in its claims to authority, not just in the
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probability that what succeeded in the past will
succeed in the future, but at root in the native
spontaneities and inevitabilities of our consciousness which assembles its own constituent parts and
unites them in a rounded whole in a manner we cannot
set aside without, as it were, amputating our own
moral personality, our own reasonableness, our own
intelligence, our own sensitivity.171
Can one state more specifically how theology emerges
out of a foundational setting in transcendental method?
Lonergan's answer is decidedly affirmative: as soon as philosophy becomes concrete (for example, in existentialism)
one cannot have ultimate answers without entering into theology. The presumption that philosophy is done by one's own
native endowments of reasonableness and intelligence in turn
presupposes that his philosophical questions are confined to
"the per se" of human nature. To the extent that the latter
presupposition holds, the philosophy so conceived is possible. However, as soon as one's philosophical questions
move beyond this epistemologically circumscribed level, one
has raised the type of question that translates him from one
level to another and propels him from the philosophy department to theology.117
Bernard Lonergan does his overt theologizing in such
works as Verbum, Grace and Nature, and The Way to Nicea. In
his most prestigious works, Insight and particularly Method
in Theology, he stresses that he is not writing theology but
method in theology:'tm "I am concerned not with the objects
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that theologians expound but with the operations that theologians perform. "174
Having forthrightly stressed his preoccupation with
method, Lonergan is not reticent to define theology as such.
Availing himself of the standard etymological definition of
theology as discourse about God, Lonergan defines Christian
theology as an individual's reflections on the revelation
given in and by Jesus Christ.175 Father Lonergan's most celebrated definition of theology, however, comes at the outset
of Method in Theology and is programmatic for that work: "A
theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."176 Elsewhere, in
very similar yet subtly nuanced language, Lonergan defines
theology as reflection on the significance and value of a
religion in a culture.17 Recognizing that Christian theology has been regarded as die Wendung zur Idee (the shift
towards system) occurring within Christianity, theology thus
"makes thematic" that which is already a part of Christian
living.178
The last of the above "definitions" implies the important distinction Lonergan makes between religion and theology. Rejecting the negative estimation of the former attributable to the noted patristic scholar Jean Danielouln (and
one parallel to the view of Karl Barth), Father Lonergan
defines religion as the dynamic state of being in love,
which has the character of response to the divine initia-
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tive.180 To revert to what has been stated heretofore, being
in love with God is the ultimate fulfillment of the human
capacity for self-transcendence; and, note well:
. . . this view of religion is sustained when God is conceived as the supreme fulfillment of the transcendental notions, as supreme intelligence, truth, reality, righteousness, goodness. on
Within the framework of these definitions theology
pertains to the cultural "superstructure," while religion
has reference to what Lonergan terms its "day-to-day substance.082 If theology's function is to illumine the significance and value of a religion in any given culture, it
follows that, while the religion will remain unchanged, a
theology will vary with cultural transitions.183
This, of course, entails the empirical notion of culture. Culture, so conceived, is the set of meanings and
values that informs a way of life.184 As such, it may remain
stable, or it may be in process of incremental development
or abrupt disintegration.185 Recalling that the notion of
doctrinal development is the preeminent characteristic of an
empirical culture, from the conceptions of theology and culture previously outlined it follows that theology is not a
single, monolithic system of abiding validity as in the
Aristotelian and Thomistic synthesis. "[Theology is] as
manifold as are the many cultures within which a religion
has significance and value. "186

51
The key task, then, in contemporary Catholic theology is to replace the shattered thoughtforms associated with eternal truths and logical ideals with
new thoughtforms that accord with the dynamics of
development and the concrete style of method.UST
This is the context from which Bernard Lonergan begins
his consideration of theological method. He variously identifies the theological task as the making explicit of what
already is implicitly believed,188 or as stating clearly and
unequivocally the full meaning of the articles of faith.11"
With a tacit and deferential nod to St. Thomas, Lonergan
declares that it is through the "illumination of method by
faith" that theology exercises "her queenly rule."1"
Like so many other central themes of Lonergan's work,
he defines "method" frequently and, fortunately, consistently. Compared to the definition of theology stated above, a
definition which all other conceptualizations seek to complement, Father Lonergan has a basic point of departure from
which he discusses method: "A method is a normative pattern
of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and
progressive results."m In practice, a method is a set of
directives whereby one guides a process towards a result,192
or, in more pedestrian terms, ordering means to achieve an
end.193
Congruently, Lonergan observes that one's method in
philosophy predetermines what his philosophy will be,194 but
this does not signal any methodological autonomy. The directives of the method will be issued by the self-affirming
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subject to himself.195 Transposing these comments back to a
theological key, the theologian does have a personal contribution to make, and to that extent he does retain a degree
of autonomy. Yet there is an evaluative criterion, one
which guides the theologian in the exercise of his autonomy:
. . . each theologian will judge the authenticity of the
authors of [theology's] views, and he will do so by the
touchstone of his own authenticity" (that is, by fidelity to
the oft-cited transcendental precepts).196
At one point Lonergan terms revelation as God's entry
into man's making of man.m This in turn means that theology is called both to reflect on revelation and in some
fashion to "mediate God's meaning" into the whole of human
life.198 Quite clearly this is a daunting prospect, and for
precisely this reason he identifies the fundamental theological problem of this generation to be that of integration.m Set in the milieu of an empirical culture--a fact
of intellectual life to which Lonergan ceaselessly adverts--theology discovers that what once was in the purview
of a single theologian now can be undertaken only by a largFather Lonergan describes the issue, and he
er aggregate.am
does so by linking up this necessity for integration with
the earlier problem of the relation of philosophy per se to
theology.
Insofar as man in this world suffers from original
sin and receives God's grace or refuses it, there
are fundamental truths about man that cannot be subsumed under a philosophy considered as knowledge
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natural to man, knowledge attained by reason. Those
truths have to be subsumed under a theology. Now,
it is in these empirical human sciences that there
arise problems of integration not only in human
living but within theology itself. The whole of
anthropology, the whole of history of literatures
and, consequently, the literary history of the
Bible, the whole of patristic study and conciliar
study, and all of the particular human studies that
enter into theology, cannot be assimilated by theology unless synthesis is found, unless integration is
found .201
For these reasons Lonergan conceives theological method as a framework for "collaborative creativity."202 Method
is not, however, a rote prescription or set of directives,
which Lonergan finds analogous to a recipe that can lead
only to a single result. Crucial to method is the relation
between questioning and answering: "The questioner, while
he does not know the answer, at least intends it."203 Unlike
classicist logic, which is static, theological method will
be progressive and cumulative. The new results are not
merely juxtaposed to the old; instead, they grow out of it,
correcting and qualifying and complementing what went before
in order to yield an at once fuller yet single view.204 The
vibrancy of method, for want of a better noun, is aptly described in a lecture delivered in 1974:
Method begins with an apprenticeship, with doing
what others have done, or advise, or demand. Method
becomes meaningful in its own good time: when we
discover for ourselves what a discovery is; and when
we realize that the individual's achievement is a
breakthrough because it occurs in a scientific community that needs it, witnesses it, attests it,
judges it, embraces it, and sooner or later goes way
beyond it. Method takes command when one assigns
logic its subsidiary role, when one grasps how questions combine with answers, how they are woven to-
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gether into contexts, how contexts merge into the
horizons of subjects, how horizons can be open to
and subjects can be eager for further development
along certain lines yet, along others, subjects can
be strangely inattentive, complacently obtuse, pompously irrational.m
Method in an empirical culture has a twofold function.
First, it can select and define inadequacies in former procedures while indicating better procedures that are now
available. Second, method may also have to discern the
shortcomings or exaggerations to which the new modern epoch
is itself exposed.m "Indeed, inasmuch as theological development is dialectical, contemporary risks and dangers are
apt to provide, if not the highest motive, at least the most
efficacious incentive towards a renewal of theological method.yl207
Lonergan's method is transcendental in the sense that
it is grounded in the human subject, and, most important,
because it is universally applicable--"transcending the demarcations of fields of inquiry."208 It is transcendental in
the latter sense precisely because it is so in the former
sense, namely, rooted in the universality of human subjectivity.209
Only with this overall context in mind can we understand the role of specialization in Lonergan's method. The
reality of an empirical culture and its concomitant factors
preclude comprehensive interdisciplinary mastery. This
leads to a threefold specialization. Field specialization
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divides the field of data into different parts, thus enabling each specialist to concentrate on his part of the
whole. Subject specialization divides the results of investigations into different subjects as in the various academic
departments at a university. Finally, and most important
for the present essay, there is "functional specialization":
"It divides the process from data to results into different
stages. Each stage pursues its own proper end in its own
proper manner. "no
How does this impact upon theological method? Given
this functional specialization, the task of theological
method is to distinguish between these proper ends and to
determine each of the proper ways of pursuing the proper
ends.211
When Father Lonergan terms method as a model or framework for collaborative creativity,212 it is this specialization that he has in mind. Method comes to be seen as an
"intelligible, interlocking set of terms and relations";
these are useful when one attempts to describe reality or
form hypotheses.213 Moreover, a theological method will
sketch the various "clusters of operations" to be performed
as theologians go about their respective tasks.214
As Lonergan delineates his method, constructive theology "goes forward" in a twofold process: (1) painstaking
recovery of the message; appropriating the available data in
Holy Scripture, tradition, and the contributions of earlier
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theologians; and (2) fresh statement and application; reinterpreting the data to meet contemporary exigencies. In
this fashion we have, respectively, mediating and mediated
disciplines in theology.215
Lonergan envisages eight distinct tasks in working out
a contemporary theological method: research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications.216 These tasks are the functional
specialties. The functional specialties, in turn, are divided into two groups, each group corresponding to the four
stages of the cognitional theory (experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding) and the four transcendental imperatives (be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible).217
Already in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Father
Lonergan sought to demonstrate that the purpose of intellectual activity is the understanding of objective reality.218
Not coincidentally, the act of understanding is the unifying
factor that cuts across any discipline.219
Each functional
specialty corresponds to an appropriate operation of human
knowing; and this interpenetration of cognitional theory,
transcendental precepts, and the functional specialties will
be described in due course. For the moment we shall discuss
very briefly each of the eight functional specialties.22°
Initially, there is research, which assembles and
makes available the data relevant to theological investiga-
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tion. Research establishes the actual contents of the documents. This would include textual criticism as well as the
editions and indexing of texts.221
Interpretation, certainly including if not coterminous
seeks to ascertain the meaning of this
with exegesis,222
data:25 "It grasps that meaning in its proper historical
context, in accord with its proper mode and level of thought
and expression, in the light of the circumstances and intention of the writer."224 In short, interpretation tries to
understand what the authors meant in writing as they did.
Critical history follows. Critical history seeks to
determine what was going forward in the past,26 or, more
technically, to discern the relationship between a historical fact and its intelligible interconnection (zusammenhaung)MI_"what hitherto had been experienced but not properly known.111227 Critical history relates authors and documents in a coherent narrative, along with the other persons,
events, and circumstances of the times.
If history discovers meanings that are "incarnate" in
deeds and movements,2211 dialectic investigates, compares, and
evaluates the conflicting views of the researcher, exegete,
and critical historian.m It prescinds from accurate description of the past to the evaluation of it.
The fifth functional specialty, foundations, sets
forth or objectifies the horizon, the standpoint, from which
religious affirmations have meaning and reveal values.m
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Dialectic and foundations have a key role in Method in
Theoloay. In a lecture delivered several years after the
publication of Method, Lonergan states that dialectic stands
to theology as pull and counterpull stand to the spiritual
life. For its part, foundations stands to theology as discernment stands to the spiritual life:

. .

it sorts out

pull and counterpull and does not permit counterpull to distort the pull or pull to let seep some of its dignity and
worth on to counterpull."231
Left unsaid in this paragraph is that foundations
makes thematic and explicitly objectifies the horizon engendered by affective, intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.232 The role of conversion can hardly be overstated;
indeed, it is the linchpin of his theological method, for it
brings his cognitional theory into an overtly theological
sphere.223
How is the pivot from dialectic to foundations accomplished? Any significant change of horizon comes as one
envisages an altogether different, even incomprehensible,
alternative and then undergoes a conversion.2M At its root,
conversion represents neither change nor even development;
instead, it is a radical transformation from which emerges
an interlocked series of changes and developments on all
levels of human living.226 Conversion is ontic.236 It is a
change of course and direction: "It is as if one's eyes
were opened and one's former world faded and fell away."237
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Father Lonergan's principal works talk about intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. All three are termed
modalities of self-transcendence .m Moreover, all three are
interconnected.lw Still, each is a different type of event,
and each has to be considered in itself before it can be
related to the others.m Religious conversion "sublates"
moral conversion, and the latter sublates intellectual conversion. But this does not imply a sequence wherein one
proceeds from intellectual to moral and finally to religious
conversion. Instead, from a causal perspective there is
first God's gift of His love (Romans 5:5).241 Intellectual
conversion is a consequence of both religious and moral conversion, and moral conversion emerges out of religious conversion. Religious conversion, as noted, is the fruit of
God's grace.242
Conversion involves a new understanding of oneself because, more fundamentally, it brings about a
new self to be understood. It is putting off the
old man and putting on the new. It is not just a
development but the beginning of a new mode of developing. . . .
Conversion is three-dimensional. It is intellectual inasmuch as it regards our orientation to
the intelligible and the true. It is moral inasmuch
as it regards our orientation to the good. It is
religious inasmuch as it regards our orientation to
God. The three dimensions are distinct, so that
conversion can occur in one dimension without occurring in the other two, or in two dimensions without
occurring in the other one. At the same time the
three dimensions are solidary. Conversion in one
leads to conversion in the others, and relapse from
one prepares for relapse in the others.243
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Intellectual conversion is a clarification and, as a
result, an elimination of stubborn residual myths concerning
reality, objectivity, and human knowledge.244 Intellectual
conversion focuses one's orientation on the intelligible and
the true, and it does so by freeing the subject from confusing the criteria for knowledge of the world of immediacy
with the criteria for knowledge of the world mediated by
meaning.245The world mediated by meaning is not known via
sense experience. Accordingly, knowing is not merely seeing; it is, instead, experiencing, understanding, judging,
and believing.246 Intellectual conversion is to truth as
attained by cognitional self-transcendence.247
One's moral conversion elevates the subject from cognitional to moral self-transcendence. Forthrightly stated,
by moral conversion one becomes motivated fundamentally not
by satisfactions but by valuesm--even when the former conflict with the latter.249 This reversal in the moral deliberative process clearly does not approach perfection; nevertheless, the change of criterion does signal a reorientation to values generally, values apprehended, affirmed, and
realized by a real self-transcendence.m
Religious conversion goes beyond the moral. Queries
calling for intelligence, reflection, and for deliberation
disclose the eros of the human spirit, or its capacity and
desire for self-transcendence. However, this capacity only
finds fulfillment--its desire turns to joy--when religious
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conversion takes place. Such religious conversion translates
an existential subject into a "subject in love":251

"It is a

total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations."252 In the following citation from
Method in Theology Father Lonergan indicates how religious
conversion sublates (in other words, cancels yet also preserves and elevates as in a dialectical synthesis) both intellectual and moral conversion:
Religious conversion is to a total being-in-love
as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence,
whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realization of human values, or in the orientation man
adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal.253
While Lonergan can call religious conversion "permanent" as observed in the paragraph above, he also insists,
somewhat paradoxically, that it is dynamic, even an ongoing
process.254 To be sure, conversion is existential, deeply
personal and incomparably intimate. But it is not solitary,
for it has communal and historical, even transcendental dimensions.255 Precisely as communal and historical, as a
movement with its own particular cultural, institutional,
and doctrinal aspects, conversion precipitates a reflection
that cannot but render the movement thematic. Such reflection explicitly delves into its origins, developments, purposes, achievements, and failures.256
The last term in this sequence affords the clue to
resolving the paradox. Father Lonergan insists that alongside conversions there are also breakdowns. What has been
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erected so painstakingly by an individual, a community, and
a culture can collapse.257 This collapse is actually a reversion to "arbitrariness" or, in language more typical of
Lonergan, "inauthenticity." It is a circumvention of, rather than a surrender to, the transcendental demands of the
human spirit (namely, be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be in love).258 Elsewhere in Method in Theology
Lonergan writes that a man is his "true self" to the extent
that he is self-transcending, and conversion is the avenue
to self-transcendence. On the other hand, one is "alienated" from his true self to the extent that he declines
self-transcendence. Furthermore, the basic form of ideology
is the self-justification of alienated man.259
Father Lonergan talks about religious conversion most
predominantly in New Testament terms as an "about-face" and
new beginning.260 By religious conversion one comes to love
God with his whole heart, soul, mind, and strength; and, as
a consequence, he will love his neighbor as himself.261 In
other words, overtly Christian religious conversion is not
only a state of heart and mind, because integral to it is
the interpersonal and intersubjective component.262 It is,
in the language of the synoptic gospels, an authentic response to the Baptizer's Markan cry: "Repent! The kingdom
of God is at hand!"263
Before returning to the functional specialties, it
would be well to recapitulate and express simply the role of
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conversion in Father Lonergan's transcendental method. Objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, and the
latter is the consequence of posing and addressing all pertinent questions for reflection, intelligence, and deliberation. The human subject is capable of authenticity and inauthenticity. Insofar as one is inauthentic, he needs an
"about-turn,"--an intellectual, moral, and religious conversion. Through intellectual conversion one unreservedly enters the world mediated by meaning. Through moral conversion one enters a world mediated by values. Through religious conversion, finally, one accepts God's gift of His love
bestowed by the Holy Spirit.
The authentic Christian strives for the fulness
of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.
Without intellectual conversion he tends to misapprehend not only the world mediated by meaning but
also the word God has spoken within that world.
Without moral conversion he tends to pursue not what
truly is good but what only apparently is good.
Without religious conversion he is radically desolate: in the world without hope and without God
(Eph. 2:12).265
So much attention has been paid here to conversion not
only because of its intrinsic importance to Lonergan's
thought but because of its positive emerging role in his
theological method. If today's empirical theology is reflection on religion, it follows that theology is reflection
on conversion, which in unabashedly circular fashion is fundamental to religion. Father Lonergan makes the point quite
explicitly: ". . . reflection on the ongoing process of
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conversion may bring to light the real foundation of a renewed theology."

In Method a very similar position is

taken when Lonergan declares that an "objectification of
conversion" provides theology with its foundations.267
We have already alluded to foundations as the fifth of
the functional specialties. To complement the cursory definition offered there, foundations objectifies the horizon
effected by the threefold conversion.m "The threefold conversion is not a set of propositions that a theologian utters, but a fundamental and momentous change in the human
reality that a theologian is."269 Thus, with foundations one
enters the second or "mediated" phase of a transcendental
theological method.m
On the heels of foundations comes the sixth functional
specialty, doctrines. Doctrines avail themselves of foundations in order to make a selection from the alternatives
proposed by dialectic.m Doctrines thus state the judgments
of fact and value asserted to by the converted subject within a particular religious tradition. Dialectic, it will be
recalled, expresses the slow, deliberate process that characterizes religious development.272 At root it is not a conflict between any opposites whatever; it is a very specific
opposition between authenticity and inauthenticity, or between one's self as transcending and one's self as transcended.2Th Father Lonergan expressly weaves the fourth,
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fifth, and sixth functional specialty into a single tapestry.
For the functional specialty, dialectic, deploys
both the truth reached and the errors disseminated
in the past. The functional specialty, foundations,
discriminates between truth and error by appealing
to the foundational reality of intellectual, moral,
and religious conversion. The result of such discrimination is the functional specialty, doctrines,
and so doctrines, based on conversion, are opposed
to the aberrations that result from the lack of conversion.
In sum, doctrines are an attempt to express judgments and
affirmations. They are based on an appropriated tradition,
but furthermore they are transposed into those categories
derived from conversion and conceptualized in foundations.m
Systematics, the seventh functional specialty, aims at
the ultimate clarification of the meaning of doctrines.276
Assuredly, both doctrines and systematics seek to understand
the truth, albeit in different fashion. The former aspires
to a clear and distinct affirmation of religious verities:
"its principal concern is the truth of such an affirmation;
its concern to understand is limited to the clarity and distinctness of its affirmation."217 The latter specialty, systematics, attempts to understand the religious realities
affirmed by doctrines.2Th Systematics asks how the doctrines
cohere and how they relate to the rest of human knowledge
and opinion. While obviously it pursues a true understand-
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ing, it recognizes nonetheless that its understanding will
be imperfect, analogical, and routinely only probable.279
The last of Lonergan's eight functional specialties is
communications, without which the first seven never attain
maturity.280

In a word, communications assumes the task of

preaching and teaching doctrines to all people in every
class of every culture--and in a fashion congruent with the
"assimilative powers" (in other words, their particular
stage of intellectual development) of the various classes
and cultures.281
Within these eight functional specialties the theological operations all occur.282 Dynamic interdependence, or
reciprocal dependence, is the rule.283 They represent a distinction of specialties, not specialists. Functional specialization, therefore, arises not to parcel out different
jobs; on the contrary, it distinguishes different tasks and
thereby prevents them from being confused or precludes any
single specialization from assuming potentially "totalitarian ambitions."284 All the principles of division reduce to
the fact that no individual specialization can stand without
the other seven.285
As important as these eight functional specialties
are, their setting and unity in the transcendental method is
even more noteworthy. Theology is an ongoing process pursued within a contextual structure.286 To do method in contemporary theology is to conceive this discipline as a set
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of "related and recurrent operations" that advance cumulatively to an ideal goal. Yet it is not a single set of related operations; rather, it is a series of interdependent
sets.287Lonergan is at great pains to stress that the interaction of these self-regulated and ongoing processes is
not along static logical lines (for example, premise to conclusion, particular to universal, and so forth).am It may
be superfluous to point out that within Lonergan's transcendental method the interaction will be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and religious.m
Finally, how do all these moving parts fit together?
The eight functional specialties each corresponds to an operation of human knowing. In the first phase of "mediating"
theology, research corresponds to experience (accumulate the
data). Interpretation corresponds to understanding (understand what it meant). History corresponds to judgment
(specify and make precise the human activities in temporal
succession and geographical distribution). Dialectic corresponds to decision (attain a comprehensive viewpoint from
which to examine conflicts).a*
At this point the transition to "mediated" theology is
effected, and the initial quartet of functional specialties
pass on their data to the following four, which treat explicitly the faith content of theology.291 Foundations, much
like dialectic, corresponds to the cognitional function of
decision and deals with Christian conversion, which, one
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will recall, is the horizon within which the doctrines can
be affirmed. Doctrines, parallel to critical history, correspond to judgment of facts and values. The facts and
values affirmed prompt further questions as to the truth,
inconsistency, or even fallacy of doctrinal assertions.
Systematics, comparable to interpretation, aspires to appropriate systems of conceptualization, the removal of seeming
inconsistencies, and, eventually, to a comprehensive grasp
of theology. Communications, analogous to research, corresponds to experience, and it is concerned with theology in
its "external relations."292
Table 1.--Cognitional Theory293and the Functional
Specialties
Mediating
Theology

Structure of
Consciousness
deliberation
judgment
understanding
experience

(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)

dialectic
history
interpretation
research

Mediated
Theology
foundations
doctrines
systematics
communications

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

To summarize briefly, the world of immediacy and the
world mediated by meaning are both crucial to Christianity,
the former because of religious experience (because of God's
love flooding one's heart through the Holy Spirit given to
him, Romans 5:5), the latter--and this is central to theological method--because divine revelation is God's own entry
into humanity's world mediated by meaning.294
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Before concluding this discussion and moving to the
final section of this chapter, it is helpful to point out
the manner in which Father Lonergan organizes the relevant
theological disciplines. Among the terms not often seen in
Protestant theological taxonomies are "fundamental",
"speculative", and "positive." These, of course, complement
such more typical classifications as "dogmatic" and "historical" theology.
Fundamental theology, which traditionally has been
identified with "natural" theology and even seen as a form
of apologetics, enlarges the horizon of dogmatic theology to
include comparative religion and general anthropology. It
brings the data of these sciences into the investigations of
the systematic theologian.295 Lonergan insists that natural
theology be pursued in a theological and not a philosophical
context; any abstraction that would separate the two is pedagogically counterproductive and, more important, is foreign
to contemporary modes of thinking .m One cannot chop up the
world and keep it all in separate compartments. Because the
main purpose in this setting is the development of the person, the more one can put together, the more integrated he
or she will be.297
Speculative theology is more straightforwardly defined. It seeks a universal formulation of the truths of
faith.m Dogmatic theology, which Lonergan pursues in his
work on the Trinity, has a similarly clear agenda: "[it]
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sets forth the dogmas of the Church and relates them to
their origins in the sources of revelation."m
Positive theology turns its attention from commonly
shared beliefs to the individual authors themselves, exploring such matters as their background, temperament, interests, aims, and style. It asks, for example, how these idiosyncrasies account for the differences of approach and
emphasis that one discovers in the sources.m°
The historical theologian discloses the "doctrinal
identity" in the verbal and conceptual differences between
(1) the initial revelation; (2) the practical theologians
who are concerned with the effective communication of the
message; and (3) the work of the speculative theologian.301
These pages have outlined at least one major dimension
of what Frederick E. Crowe, S.J. has termed "the Lonergan
enterprise."302 It has stressed that Lonergan conceives theology as a dynamic unity of interdependent parts. As such,
each part adjusts to changes in the others, and the whole
develops as a result of these changes and adjustments.
These internal processes and their interaction have an external pole as well, since Christian theology conceived holistically functions within the larger context of Christian
living; and Christian living, in turn, functions within the
still larger process of human history.303
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The "Lonergan Enterprise" and
Traditional Romanism
The discussion of Father Lonergan's Neo-Thomism, his
principal philosophical convictions, his critical realism,
and now his theological method has been marked by one significant omission, which will be evident to anyone who reads
the preface and this chapter together. For all of our use
of terms such as "orientation," "method," and the like, we
have yet to state clearly and unequivocally the guiding motif or central tenet that both integrates and energizes
Lonergan's theological labors. We have not pointed out the
raison d'etre of Lonergan's theology itself--why he cared so
passionately and devoted himself so painstakingly to the
formulation of a viable theological method.
What accounts for this intentional postponement?
Lonergan does articulate a consistent theological core, and
he does so in various places with a fair degree of frequency. But, and this is the key point, he does not expressly
do so in the context of theological method. Lonergan expressly conceives his theological methodology in ecumenical
terms, and in building a foundation that will accommodate
the largest possible array of dialogue partners, he does not
emphasize an overtly Roman theme that could conceivably imperil the methodological discussion.304 So broadly conceived
is Loriergan's work that Karl Rahner could actually observe
that the program outlined in Method in Theology is not even
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uniquely theological; and to the extent that Lonergan unfolds a method for theology along interdisciplinary lines,
this charge is not entirely unfounded.m
Nevertheless, as stated, Bernard Lonergan does have
guiding theological convictions that do operate in centrifugal fashion to inform all dimensions of his work. He talks
about the "principal concern" of the New Testament:
For first and last, the New Testament is a book with
a message; the message is presented in a great variety of manners, in narratives and parables, in precepts and counsels, in exhortations and warnings.
The message is depicted as emanating from the man,
Jesus, who suffered, died, was quickened from the
dead, and now sits at the right hand of the Father
in heaven. The message announces the imminent coming of the kingdom of God, and, as it challenged Jew
and Greek two millennia ago, so too today it challenges us with a last word about last things.306
Lonergan develops this message in largely Roman Catholic
categories, of which the primary one is "redemption": "in
which Christ suffering, dying, and rising again is at once
the motive and the model of self-sacrificing love. "307
To fall in love is to go beyond attention, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility. It is to set
up a new principle that has, indeed, its causes,
conditions, occasions, but, as long as it lasts,
provides the mainspring of one's desire and fear,
hope and despair, joy and sorrow.m
Moreover, Lonergan manifests a (qualified) soteriological monergism. Humanity lives under the reign of sin, and
its redemption lies not in natural capabilities but in what
is effected by the grace of God.109 Furthermore, the "essential moment" of revelation is a "twofold pull": "being
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drawn by the Father, listening to him, learning from him;
and being drawn by the Son, crucified, dead, and risen.n mo
Similarly, Father Lonergan can affirm a twofold grace:
first, an inner operative grace that extracts a heart of
stone and replaces it with a heart of flesh; second, the
"outer" grace of the Christian tradition that brings the
Gospel to one's ears .311
To be sure, one could state phonetically all of the
above and then proceed to eviscerate the same by means of a
systematic and comprehensive redefinition of terms. This is
not Lonergan's procedure. The classical creedal affirmations are not code words necessitating a new lexicon. If
anything, typical existential categories (authentic, inauthentic, and so forth) are best understood in traditional
Christian terms rather than vice versa. Bernard Lonergan
simply does not set himself up as a dissenter in the same
fashion as a Hans Kiing or Edward Schillebeeckx (though he
did contribute to the latter's Festschrift). 312
Nowhere are Lonergan's traditional views more evident
than in his Christology, where he affirms the dogmas of the
ecumenical councils and expressly rejects the revisionist
proposals of both Leslie Dewart and Piet Schoonenberg.313
Like everything else Lonergan writes, his critiques of these
two writers are not easily assimilated, and questions remain
as one seeks a firm understanding of his own position; however, through his application of a careful historical-
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critical method (what Lonergan usually calls "critical history") he can conclude at least the following:
(1) that Jesus is named time and again from different viewpoints and in different contexts the Son of
God; (2) that we through faith are sons of God and
by baptism are one in Christ (Gal. 3:26-28), that
God sent his only Son that we might acquire the status of sons as is proved to us by the sending of the
Spirit of Christ crying in our hearts "Abba! Father!" (Gal. 4:3-7; Rom. 8:14-17); and (3) that the
Spirit we have received from God knows all and has
been given us that we may know all that God of his
grace gives us (I Cor. 2:10-16; John 14:16, 17,
26).m4
If Jesus is repeatedly declared to be the Son of God,
one can interpret this in several ways. Possibly it is a
mythic or merely honorific title. Perhaps it denotes the
mission of the Messiah. Or, finally, it may highlight an
"inner reality" comparable to our own divine sonship through
Christ and in the Spirit. The other possibility, of course,
is the option confessed by the church for nearly two millennia: "that Jesus was truly a man leading a truly human life
but his identity was the identity of the eternal Son of God
consubstantial with the Father."315 This is the conclusion
of Father Lonergan--echoing Scripture, tradition, and the
councils. Any "Christology from below" (Lonergan does not
expressly use this formula) that permits one to deduce from
the premises of Jesus' humanity and Jesus' personality that
He was "only a man" is reflecting not Christian preaching
but the ancient Ebionite heresy.316

Father Lonergan states
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the issue poignantly, and in an explicit soteriological context:
. . . at Nicea the real import was whether Christ,
the mediator of our salvation, was a creature. Today many perhaps will be little moved by the question whether we have been saved by a creature or by
God himself. But the issue may be put differently.
One can ask whether God revealed his love for us by
having a man die the death of scourging and crucifixion? Or was it his own son, a divine person, who
became flesh to suffer and die and thereby touch our
hard hearts and lead us to eternal life?3"
Most of the above comments are from an essay in which
Lonergan takes exception to the Christology of Piet
Schoonenberg. The previously mentioned response to Leslie
Dewart is perhaps even more instructive because it expressly
raises the scepter of.hermeneutical questions and even one's
theory of truth. In a fashion at very least analogous to
Rudolf Bultmann's celebrated program of demythologization,318
Leslie Dewart advocates a "de-hellenizing" of dogma.319
Without reverting to the archaism and anachronism that mark
a classicist account of culture, with its absence of historical consciousness and its lack of any sense of historical
development,320 Lonergan proposes a "renewal" of theological
method--but he does so with one crucial cautionary stricture:
No less important than a critique of notions and
conclusions is a critique of methods. The new
largely empirical approach to theology can too easily be made into a device for reducing doctrines to
probable opinions. A hermeneutics can pretend to
philosophic neutrality yet force the conclusion that
the content of revelation is mostly myth. Scientific history can be so conceived that a study of the
narrative of salvation will strip it of matters of
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fact. If our renewed theology is not to be the dupe
of every fashion, it needs a firm basis and a critical stance.321
If one can escape from archaism and anachronism, he
will move to the dialectic of "development" and "aberration." Both respond to the contemporary questions within a
proper methodological context, but development answers them
in the light of revelation and under the guidance of the
Holy Spirit, while aberration fails to do so.322 At least in
the case of Dewart, the failure stems from a denial of the
relation between "meaning" and "meant," which in turn
amounts to a denial of the correspondence view of truth.
"To deny the correspondence view of truth is to deny that,
when the meaning is true, the meant is what is so."325
Either denial, Lonergan argues, is ultimately destructive of the church's dogmas. The circle is pernicious, for
if the covert rejection of propositional truth is universal,
it is a self-destructive declaration that all propositions
are false. If, however, the rejection is confined to the
church's dogmas, it is merely a transparent and rather clumsy way of saying that all the dogmas are false.324
Clearly, programs like those of Dewart or Bultmann
find the miraculous element of the New Testament incompatible with their "modern" world-view. Aside from his
blunt assessment of such "modern age, we're different" sentiments as "nonsense,"325 Father Lonergan does come to grips
with the issue of the miracles in Method in Theology, and he
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does so in very straightforward terms. If the historian's
Weltanschaung precludes the miraculous, what is he to do
about witnesses who testify to miracles as matters of
fact?326
The alternatives are simple enough. Either one has to
reconstruct his world view along new lines, or he has to
declare these witnesses to be incompetent, dishonest, or
self-deceived.327 Adverting to the celebrated "father of
skepticism," David Hume, Lonergan notes that even Hume did
not really prove that no miracles had ever occurred; rather,
"its [Hume's criticism] real thrust was that the historian
cannot deal intelligently with the past when the past is
permitted to be unintelligible to him."328
Lonergan asserts that the meaning of dogma is permanent and not contingent on the regnant philosophical orientation." Dogmas are not merely "data"; they are expressions
of mysteries that could not be known by human beings had
they not been revealed by God.33° Moreover, normativeness
and certitude go far beyond any judgment proceeding from
merely human understanding. Certitude arises from the judgment of the church to whom God has promised and conferred
infallibility in faith and morals.'" Faith as seen along
these lines is a supernatural virtue by which we affirm what
God has revealed. Such an affirmation arises not from an
apprehension of the intrinsic truth of what has been revealed, but because of the authority of God who reveals and
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does not deceive.332 Finally, the normativeness of any and
all theological assertions is dependent on the normativeness
ascribed to divine revelation, inspired Holy Scripture,
and/or church doctrine.333
For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed,
has not been proposed as some sort of philosophic
discovery to be perfected by human talent. It is a
divine deposit, given to the spouse of Christ, to be
guarded faithfully and declared infallibly. Hence
there is ever to be retained that meaning of the
sacred dogmas that once was declared by the church.
From that meaning there is to be no departure under
the pretext of some profounder understanding. . . . 334
This does not imply that theology is reduced to a parrot with nothing to do but repeat what has been said in the
past.335 Lonergan never abandons his insistence on an empirical definition of culture and the theological method that
arises within this context. There is a development of understanding, knowledge, and wisdom applicable both to individuals and to the whole church. Yet this development must
be "true to type"--without change of dogma, of meaning, or
of doctrine.336 If there is a tension between permanence and
development, Lonergan addresses it in terms of his affirmation of the first Vatican Council. He asserts: ". . . what
has been both revealed by God and defined by the Church is
permanently valid in the sense determined y its own historical context. "337
This clarification takes on particular significance
insofar as it introduces the notion of doctrinal pluralism
and, further, the more serious issue of potential universal-
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ism in Lonergan's thought. In the case of doctrinal pluralism, Father Lonergan declares that dogmas pertain to the
church's declaration of revealed mysteries.mm The permanence of dogma attaches to its meaning and not to its formula.mW What Lonergan excludes, and what is excluded by the
first Vatican Council, is the retention of a formula and the
investment of the same with a novel meaning.340
The variability of formulas contributes to doctrinal
pluralism, and, certainly, in communications and catechetics
the rule is pluralism. One must express the Christian Gospel in a language and style appropriate to a given class of
people in a particular culture.341 Yet herein lies the enigma, and one that is perhaps never resolved conclusively.
Pluralism, Father Lonergan stresses, does not imply that
there are many diverse Christian messages: "it is the task
of the theologian to ascertain just what is the one message
that the many communicators present to the many different
audiences .0342
The greatest interpretative difficulty in Lonergan
(save for the oblique philosophical passages) does come down
to his position with respect to universalism. Here he
clearly goes beyond the classical Christian assertion of the
universality of the Gospel's appeal. Citing the work of
Friedrich Heiler in comparative religions, Father Lonergan
notes seven areas common to the principal world religions:
affirmation of a transcendent reality; the immanence of the
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same in human hearts; that he (the pronoun is Lonergan's) is
supreme beauty, truth, righteousness, and goodness; that he
is ultimate love, mercy, and compassion; the avenue to him
is sacrifice, repentance, self-denial, and prayer; as these
religions seek God, so also they seek their neighbor's wellbeing, even that of his enemies; and though religious experience is infinitely diverse, the highest way to God is
love . 343
Presupposing the above, the problem becomes one of
accounting for the great similarity among the manifold high
religions without thereby denying the uniqueness of Christianity.344
Though God's grace is given to all, still the experience of resting in God ordinarily needs a religious
tradition for it to be encouraged, fostered, interpreted, guided, developed. Though grace bestows
both good will and good performances, still one
shrinks and draws back from the performance of denying oneself daily and taking up one's cross and following Christ. For the fulfilment that is the love
of God is not the fulfilment of any appetite or desire or wish or dream impulse, but the fulfilment of
getting beyond one's appetites and desires and
wishes and impulses, the fulfilment of self-transcendence, the fulfilment of human authenticity, the
fulfilment that overflows
into a love of one's
neighbor as oneself.345
To

sharpen the focus, what distinguishes the Christian

is not God's grace, which he shares with others, but the
mediation of this grace through Jesus Christ.314 Citing 1
Timothy 2:4 with nearly the same frequency as Romans 5:5,
Father Lonergan explains the Christian "aspiration to universalism" by means of two simple assertions: (1) the sal-
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vation of the Christian is in and through charity; (2) this
gift of charity as religious "infrastructure" can be the
Christian account of religious experience in any and all
people.w
Is Bernard Lonergan, then, a universalist in the sense
that one can attain salvation apart from an explicit awareness of and trust in the benefits of Christ? Given the evidence, this conclusion is inescapable. Once again referring
to 1 Timothy 2, Lonergan makes the point in stark terms: "I
have quoted St. Paul, but I would not have you think that
being in love with God is to be found only among Christians.
God gives all men sufficient grace for salvation. Nor is
his grace without fruit. "348 The following, from Method in
Theology, is even more direct: ". . . it is in such grace
that can be found the theological justification of Catholic
dialogue with all Christians, with non-Christians, and even
with atheists who may love God in their hearts while not
knowing him with their heads."349
In fairness, Lonergan does not just homogenize all of
the "high" religions. There are revealing dialogues in Philosophy of God, and Theology where Lonergan responds to
questions of this sort. In general terms he accepts Rahner's idea of the "anonymous Christian," pertaining to people who are in a state of grace but who do not express themselves in the way such people ordinarily do.m But the love
of God, while it is the common element to all religion and
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manifestly is supernatural revelation, is not complete revelation. Christian revelation goes beyond an unspecified
love for God and thereby introduces a specific difference.
There is, Father Lonergan maintains, an intersubjective element to love that is present in Christianity--since God is
expressing His love in Christ in addition to giving one the
grace in his or her heart--and this added element is missing
where the incarnate Lord is missing.351
To be sure, these comments about implicit or at the
very least potential universalism do not invariably signal a
deviation from "orthodox" Roman Catholicism, and, as noted
in the preface, any such indictment is not the purpose of
this exposition. Even if it were, the inquiry would have to
undertake an exegesis of the pertinent documents of the second Vatican Council before identifying and pressing any presumed discrepancy between Lonergan's published writings and
the magisterium. While such an analysis goes beyond the
scope of this chapter, one can casually observe that many
within the Roman communion would find nothing in Lonergan
inimical to either the spirit or letter of Vatican 11.352
Finally, for all of the perplexities Bernard Lonergan
presents to any reader, he commends, with resolute consistency and a thoroughness approaching that of St. Thomas himself, a program combating the intellectual scotosis wrought
by human fallenness. He seeks neither to affirm reason at
the expense of faith nor faith at the expense of reason;
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indeed, the "amputation" of either is lethal and allows the
surd of sin unchallenged hegemony in both spheres. Instead,
he aspires to a synthesis that unites the two orders of
truth and manifests a fruitful symbiosis of two principles
of knowledge.353 Perhaps nowhere is this unity of Lonergan's
philosophical and theological endeavors more elegantly and
poignantly expressed than in this selection from Understanding and Being, which, we might note, comes at the close of a
consideration of the problem of evil in the context of
Christian revelation:
What God is, the answer to the question, fluid, sit
Deus?, What is God?, is something we do not know.
We do not know God by his essence in this life. We
have only analogical knowledge of Him. But that has
been God's revelation of Himself to us, and insofar
as in humility and simplicity we accept things as
they are, we can advance to a knowledge of God and
an intimacy with God that will leave us convinced
that what, as philosophers, we may call His wisdom
and His goodness, are in truth wisdom suaaassing
wisdom and goodness surpassing goodness.
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Second Collection, p. 213. See also Understanding and

90
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the Modern World," A Second Collection, p. 169: "Experiencing is presupposed and complemented by inquiry and understanding. Experiencing and understanding are presupposed
and complemented by reflecting and judging. Experiencing,
understanding, and judging, are presupposed and complemented
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value, of ethics, of self-constitution; religious conversion--i.e. the transformation of the subject when he is
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fact and achievement (self-appropriation) but as gift: it
is the level of Existenz, of the self as gift of the self by
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St. Ignatius Press, 1987). From a different perspective,
see Francis Schussler Fiorenza, Foundational Theology:
Jesus and the Church (New York: The Crossroad Publishing
Company, 1985), especially the conclusion, pp. 322-323.
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the truth-claims of the interpreted religious tradition and
the contemporary situation."
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Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (promulgated October 28, 1965) are two of the products of Vatican II that would require exegesis in this regard. See also
the similar comments of the American Jesuit Avery Dulles,
The Survival of Dogma: Faith, Authority, and Dogma in a
Changing World (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company,
1982), p. 56. From a slightly different perspective, see
David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1987), pp. 84-93.
ma Insight, p. 732.
understanding and Being, pp. 329-330.

CHAPTER TWO
CHRIST-WORD-SPIRIT: THE EXTRA ME OF
HELMUT THIELICKE'S PROLEGOMENA
Helmut Thielicke appropriately gained his first recognition from an Anglo-American audience as a preacher and
only subsequently as a preeminent ethicist and dogmatician.
We shall explore their relationship further in due course,
but for the moment we note only Thielicke's perpetual insistence that theology grows out of proclamation and arises as
one's sanctified response to it./ His penetrating sermons
came to public attention in North America first; then, in
the 1960s, students were treated to his three-volume Theological Ethics. Finally, in the mid and late 1970s, the
English edition of The Evangelical Faith was translated and
published (also in three volumes). Thielicke's anthropology, his last major theological work, was published in the
United States in 1984, the year of his death.
The outset of Thielicke's career as churchman and
theologian came as the Third Reich was extending its pernicious tentacles into every sphere of German life, including
the intellectual and ecclesiastical. Having earned doctorates in both philosophy and theology by the tender age of
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twenty-six, the Wurttemberg pastor and theologian grieved
the National Socialist authorities with his History and Existence. Among other things, Thielicke suggested that the
Nazi regime represented, in the words of Geoffrey Bromiley
(who, along with John Dobberstein, is his semi-official
translator), "a titanic self-projection of Promethean humanity."2
Not surprisingly, Thielicke lost his teaching post at
Heidelberg, and during the war he was forbidden to write,
speak, or travel. When the ban was relaxed, Thielicke was
allowed to preach within the immediate vicinity of his home.
The felicitous by-products of this period were his inspiring
sermons from the later days of the war and the clandestine
publication of Death. The latter, smuggled to and eventually published in Switzerland, was soon used by German prisoners of war.
When the war concluded, Thielicke returned to academic
life, not only teaching but also serving in various administrative posts at TUbingen and then Hamburg. During
these years he began to "assemble" and publish his ethics
and dogmatics. All the while he availed himself of any and
every opportunity to disseminate the Christian message to an
audience not limited to the seminary lecture hall or university seminar. Sermons from the pulpit of St. Michael's in
Hamburg, extensive lecture and preaching tours to five continents, innumerable publications, coupled with catechetical
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projects that included radio and television, made Thielicke
a cosmopolitan theologian of the first order.
Thielicke continued a rigorous program of writing and
teaching despite indifferent health in his later years. His
published works total more than two hundred, including
Glauben and Denken in der Neuzeit (1983), which as yet is
untranslated.
The Theological Enterprise: The Priority
of Proclamation and Faith
In the last volume of Thielicke's dogmatics he identifies the "core" of his life's work as the comprehensive
survey of dogmatics and ethics, along with his anthropology
(Being Human . . . Becoming Human).3 Throughout these books
several themes appear again and again. Of these, perhaps
none is stated as often and in as many contexts as the affirmation of the necessary priority of preaching to any subsequent theological endeavor. Thielicke defines theology as
a "process of reflection" (Vorgang der Reflexion) that
arises out of faith; specifically, it arises out of proclamation already heard. This means, in practice, that theology will be subordinate to proclamation and at the same time
continually related to it.4
Preaching, Thielicke avers, is the "most appropriate
form" of Christological statement. As such, preaching
heralds the forgiveness of sins, comfort, hope, and a new
future.5 It is always an "addressed" word, an announcement
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of God's condescension to the world.6 Proclamation asserts
that God has antecedently related Himself to the world in
the Christ-event, and from this Word it seeks in turn to
effect a relationship of faith between the God who speaks
and creatures who congenitally are turned from Him. This
points up a non-negotiable sequence: Christ-event, the
proclamation thereof, Spirit-engendered faith, and then (and
only then) theological reflection and expression.?
Thielicke's dogmatic work concerns the relation between God and human beings--not a purely transcendent God
regarded theistically in and for Himself.8 A human being
"is" his relation to God: "he is the one created by him, in
flight from him, visited by him and justified."9
. . . the God of the Bible has always met us as the
Immanuel who encounters man, discloses himself to
him and communicates with him. He is the God who
leaves the other world and comes to this world.
When we speak of him, therefore, we cannot describe
him as he is ontically in himself, as the supreme
being, but only as we see him in this relation of
his to this world. Since he is the reality which
determines our existence we can speak of him only by
speaking of his word which is addressed to us and
his work which is directed upon us. Christ, too, is
not accessible to us as he is in himself, but only
in his benefitsfo i.e., in his history as this is
oriented to us.
By Thielicke's own express and repeated admission, all of
this is really an elaboration of Melanchthon's celebrated
statement in his 1521 Loci: "To know Christ is to know his
benefits.
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When Thielicke argues that theology follows the proclamation of the Word and cannot in principle precede it,
this means that uniquely theological reflection on the truth
presupposes a new state of existence, wherein one has via
Holy Baptism been called into God's salvation history.12
The adverb in this sentence is crucial, for the relational
factor determines whether one is doing theology or metaphysics. For Helmut Thielicke the following question, and the
answer one gives to it, will say a great deal about how one
envisions the task at hand:
Do all the relations between God, the world, and man
derive from the fact that God wills to be relational, that he thus resolves on a history with man,
that he speaks to him and has dealings with him instead of remaining the silent ground of the world?
Or do they derive from the relational structure of
being itself as reason thinks it can explain it in
speculative apprehension?13
Faith originates not in theology but in proclamation.
Proclamation, however, originates not in theology but--and
this redundancy is deliberate--in proclamation. The "effectual" Word is spoken in proclamation, in preaching and the
liturgy, and in pastoral counseling. Theology follows as a
"reflective act"; it is a subsequent meditation on the faith
that arises on the basis of the kervqma." So insistent is
Thielicke on this sequence that he can, in eschewing the
notion of a "perennial theology," confine himself to speaking of a "history of theology and proclamation."15 As far
as Christology is concerned, the need for faith represents
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the "boundary" of theology: if the "theological supply"
exceeds the demand of faith, one's theology becomes speculation.16
To put it simply, the man who is unaffected by faith
in Christ will not be able to understand christological reflection. The man who lives by believing
contact with Christ will recognize him even in the
most paradoxical leaps of reflection, for there is
entrusted to him the reality of him who escapes rational comprehension and who thus makes those leaps
necessary.
Conversely, if theology attains methodological primacy at
the expense of faith, the results are not only the sort of
speculation scored above, but also a sterile, arid orthodoxy
characterized by the absence of commitment."
If theology always has reference to an "addressed"
word, and most emphatically discloses its present significance ("in its actuality 'for me"),19 this does not
signal any retreat from the exacting discipline of theological reflection. The sequence of proclamation-faith-theology
may well be inviolate, yet equally crucial is the retention
of all three of the components of the triad. Reflection per
se cannot comprehend what faith apprehends. However, reflection must not be omitted, and for an interesting Christological reason. When reflection is left out of one's
scheme, Christ is relegated to a position "at the gate of
reason," and He is no longer Lord of every sphere of life.
Certainly faith will precede theology, lest the latter fall
prey to "speculative entanglement" and fail to acknowledge

116
its fallenness as a "broken enterprise." To the extent that
theology is methodologically successful, it will incorporate
the "doxology of reason" within the "doxology of faith."m
The preface to Volume 3 of The Evangelical Faith, in
which he acknowledges his major works in almost retrospective fashion, contains a very instructive discussion of how
Thielicke perceives the relationship of proclamation, faith,
and theology; and he does so in terms of the classical formula of Augustine and Anselm. We cite it in full because it
is so programmatic for Thielicke's work in both dogmatics
and ethics.
If I were to reduce to the shortest formula the
sum of what has come to me by way of theological
insight, I should perhaps reverse dialectically the
saying that Anselm originally envisaged as the title
of his Proslogion. It reads: Faith Seeking Understanding, and it might be appropriately translated
in this way: Faith Demanding Insight or Theological
Reflection. Without, of course, contesting this
statement, I might describe the opposite movement as
the goal of the theological work done with this motive, namely: Understanding Seeking Faith, or Theological Reflection Moving Back Toward the Faith from
Which It Comes. This reversal may also be found in
Anselm and is not, then, directed against him.
The reason why there is this movement back to
faith is to be found in the nexus of Christian
truth. This is proclaimed truth and as such it
triggers unending reflection, not vice versa. It
precedes our thoughts about it. We can only think
and "limp" after it. But we already are in this
truth as we hear and accept it. The Spirit of God
has already planted us in Christ before we examine
the ground in which we are sown and study the botany
that goes with the laws of our planting. Theology
investigates the basis of this proclamation when it
has already been heard. Thus the message always
precedes theology as a text precedes its interpretation. For the same reason theology will never be
healthy except when it goes back to its origin and
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finds its norm in it. It draws a map which must be
constantly checked by the actual terrain.21
Geoffrey Bromiley, the translator of The Evangelical
Faith, observes that Thielicke's dogmatics is "distinctively
Lutheran" in terms of its orientation, even though it is not
a Lutheran dogmatics in the strict, parochial sense of the
term.22 It follows predictably that Thielicke adopts as his
standpoint the "theological center" of the Christian faith,
namely, the doctrine of justification.23 Theological questions (and questions of theological ethics as well) can and
must be oriented to this doctrine: "[Theological and ethical] questions all reduce themselves to the one task of declining the doctrine of justification through all the case
forms in which it appears within the grammar of our existence."24 Turning from the metaphor of language to one from
human anatomy, Thielicke cites the near cliche that justification is the heart of theology, but he adds that whereas
the heart pumps blood into all the regions of the body, the
task and theme of theology necessarily involve the entire
"bloodstream" and are not reducible to "cardiology."25
Several of the citations in the above paragraphs are
taken from Thielicke's Theological Ethics and not from his
dogmatics. This should occasion no surprise, since he argues that dogmatics proper and ethics say the same thing
about the very same theme: they both have their common root
in the doctrine of justification.26 Thielicke regards his
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Ethics (especially Volume 1), published before The Evangelical Faith, as being in large measure a dogmatics and one
that expresses already its author's "normative intentions."27 In simple terms, the ethical and dogmatic works
are a single corpus whose individual components supplement
one another.28
This complementarity not only pronounces a benediction
on our practice of reciprocal citation; it also enables us
to see and appreciate the interrelationship between faith
(wrought in response to proclamation), dogmatics, and ethics. Faith is the "content" of dogmatics inasmuch as dogmatics is "faith reflecting on its object" and treating this
object with "methodical rigor."29 But Thielicke continues
this same theme, for ethics is faith "inquiring as to the
conduct" it posits for the individual toward himself, toward
his neighbor, and toward the world and its orders.3°
Correspondingly, Thielicke defines the "sovereign
claim" of dogmatics in comprehensive terms: it is to be a
message concerning all of reality articulated in the name of
Him to whom all authority is given in heaven and on earth.31
Thielicke the preacher cites favorably Werner Elert's definition of dogma as the expression of what the kerygma should

be32--a definition obviously compatible with the former's
constant stress on proclamation as the first presupposition
of any theological endeavor.
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With communicability the watchword, Thielicke evinces
an overriding concern for relating the Gospel to the contemporary intellectual milieu. He notes near the beginning of
the dogmatics that at least the prolegomena was drafted at
the height of the demythologization and "death of God"
struggles
This admission does not limit Thielicke's efforts to a
fleeting moment in the mid-1960s, when what amounted to a
stillborn positivism enjoyed momentary ascendancy. Nor does
it restrict his work to that of a hermeneutical response to
Rudolf Bultmann--though the concerns motivating Bultmann's
program are never far from view. What it does mean is that
every theologian thinks and lives in the correlation of both
challenge and response.34 Only as one explores how theology
so thinks and lives does he "actualize" Christian truth: he
thus "set[s] it forth in its actuality and . . . understand[s] it afresh thereby."35
Theology is historical, but this dare not be confused
with timelessness.15 Authentic theological history emerges
as the old truth is rearticulated in each new present.
It is because the old truth must be set in each
new present that we have theological history and not
timeless, once-for-all, perennial theology. As the
saving facts to which faith relates are history, so
too is self-renewing faith itself, and also the resultant reflection which explains the correspondence
between what is believed and the self-understanding
of every age. The fact that there is a history of
theology, dogma, and the confessions points to the
dialectic in theology itself between the old and the
new, between fixity and progress, between continuity
and variability in theological truth.37
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This dialectic invites and engenders a series of methodological questions. For instance, to which challenges has the
current theology responded? Which have been overlooked or
neglected? Has it been controlled by these challenges to
the point of accommodation?38
Actualization, or real fidelity to the kerygma, is
achieved when the "beam" of the old, classical truth is focused on the contemporary situation. Such a theology will
be stated in terms taken from one's own Sitz im Leben.39 In
Thielicke's words, this is a call for "transposition.gym)
Attempts at "restoration" are doomed because they should
never have been undertaken in the first place.41 "A past
which is conserved traditionalistically is an alteration
rather than a preservation of the past. The fidelity of
unchanged repetition is a sham fidelity."42
The task, then, is to relate the New Testament Gospel
to the world without collapsing it into the world. To be
sure, the church's message is secular in the radical, etymological sense of the term.
The message of redemption is secular or it is
nothing. It presents God in the world or it is
sound and smoke. But to present God in the world
does not mean equating him with the world. For
. . . only that which transcends the world can make
us worldly. Or, even more directly, only he who did
not think it robbery to be equal with God (Philippians 2:6) and who left his eternity can direct us
to time. And only to him who overcomes the world in
his name is the world given back as an inheritance
in which he is to keep the faith and to prove his
freedom.°
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Secularization, or secularism, however, is another
issue. Secularism regards the world as a "self-enclosed
system of forces," which precludes divine intervention and
which pursues its own course autonomously while still allowing a circumscribed area for human freedom." The secular
attitude stops short of denying God, yet it refuses to acknowledge Him as "magnitude" with a place in the world or in
life. God is, quite simply, irrelevant;45 and the appropriate posture toward such a "being" (for lack of any other,
much less better, noun) is not devotion but benign neglect.
Obviously, if theology is even attempted with these ground
rules, it will never be able to offer the church the spiritual or intellectual apparatus whereby it can proclaim God's
lordship over the entire cosmos and all the attendant
spheres of life.46 Thielicke expresses this contemporary
problem in poignant fashion:
The time when prayer meant knocking on a door
that would then open (Matthew 7:8; Luke 11:10) has
gone. The hour has come when God is a door that is
permanently closed, when transcendence is silent,
when the empirical consciousness posits its own frequencies as absolute. All that is left is the God
of Spinoza with whom there can be no personal relationship. If to the angry irony of the prophets the
mark of the idol seemed to be that it was dumb, that
it could neither hear nor answer, and if this is
what made it inferior to the living God, the dumbness of the gods seems to have come again. But it
now seems to include the dumbness of God. Plainly
the death of God is already imminent.47
At the most fundamental level, secularization means
that an "emancipated" world neither understands nor heeds
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the Christian message." Thielicke's dogmatics and ethics
both aspire to engage this false emancipation. Specifically, the aim is to free the Christian consciousness from the
ill-fated cleavage between private piety and the exigencies
of "secular" life and to establish their unity. Thielicke
uses Bonhoeffer's slogan of a "worldly Christianity" in the
service of his own particular agenda: "I would seek to
. . . rescue Christian dogmas from the sphere of the otherworldly, and bring the church out of the ghetto and back to
earth, to the place where man actually lives in his sociality and where he 'may' live with his faith."49
Thus Thielicke ventures, in the form of proclamation,
an interpretation of human reality from the vantage point of
eternity, or in light of the Word of God. This does not
amount to a theological or Christian Procrustean bed, "a
closed and eternally valid and hence irreformable interpretation of all the phenomena of nature and history." This
would result in a "closed nexus of life and meaning" and
would quickly assume the character of an intellectual theocracy. Instead of liberating reason, this would cast it
firmly in "ideological cement.""
For Thielicke, Christianity differs from sundry ideologies precisely because it does not entail a world-view that
subsumes all phenomena under Christian rubrics and similarly
assigns a fixed place to all historical and natural processes. God cannot be understood in Aristotelian fashion as a
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first principle (as cause or substance) from which one can
deduce all phenomena as either effect or accident.
Thielicke readily and in the very same context affirms that
God is the basis, goal, and meaning of all being and occurrence. But one must not regard or formulate this meaning as
a "principle." It is, he insists, a believed meaning;
therefore, we can neither see it nor pursue it in its manifestations. The "execution" of this meaning is absconditus,
concealed under the veil of the cross. In other words, to
echo the language of Luther's Heidelberg Disputation, God
appears to us in the form of His opposite."
Professor Thielicke preached and taught during an era
when "hermeneutics" was emerging as a discipline in its own
right. No longer definable as the principles of Biblical
interpretation, it came to involve the science of the structure and processes of understanding.52Set in methodological context, Thielicke observed that theology asks its questions on the basis of an encounter with the proclaimed Word.
Theological hermeneutics then explores the questions, their
modalities, and their conditions. As such, it is the "epilogue" in a process initiated by the Holy Spirit through the
instrumentality of the creative Word."
This sequence (here proclamation-theology-hermeneutics)--hermeneutics as epilogue and never prologue--is cut
from the same cloth as the earlier ones cited, and like
these, it forbids any application of a commutative proper-
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ty.54

To reverse the process and start with hermeneutics

would spell a reversion to Cartesianism, which is the bane
of modern theological existence. In passing, Thielicke's
concerns here are reflected in the contemporary inclination
to define theology as a "second-order" discipline.
These observations signal the orientation of
Thielicke's prolegomena. Prolegomena to systematic theology
will attempt "clearance work" in what Thielicke opines is a
very "cluttered" situation. While the conventional questions of prolegomena are addressed, they arise within a
framework of theological analysis: how is theology to be
pursued given the situation posed by modern thought?. This
question, not particularly striking at the outset, assumes
its programmatic and innovative character from Thielicke's
bifurcated assessment of modern theology.55 When the dualism is exposed and Thielicke's own predilection is identified, then prolegomena has accomplished its purpose:
It . .

. the building is always present in the prolegomena,

and the instructed readers can at least get a hint of its
outline from the preparatory activities."56
Though the placing of theological loci is usually a
matter of individual discretion,57 Thielicke's own order is
nothing if not deliberate. Certainly the theological organism as such is indivisible, and it is viewed in its various
components only because of the "discursiveness" of human
thought.58 Nevertheless, the topics emerge as truly theo-
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logical precisely as they are unfolded out of one's relation
to God in Christ.59 Soteriology is primary both to human
existence and to our theological reflection.
. . . it is clear that what we say about God's being
in himself is not in any sense pretheological, metaphysical theory. Ontically this dimension in God
does precede his resolving upon the Word and his
self-determination as my God. Noetically, however,
this position is the final stage in reflection which
begins with the actual encounter with God. It is
thus a conclusion, not a preamble. It is the epilogue, not the prolegomena, to theology.
This is decisive. All theological statements
are determined essentially by their place and rank
in the whole system. Some are in the foreground,
some in the background. Some belong to the prologue, some to the epilogue. To overlook this distinction is to level them all down and to give them
the same emphasis, whether they are soteriological
or cosmological."
When the relational, soteriological component is acknowledged and its position in the theological cornerstone
is secure, then the complementarity and coherence of all the
theological "particles" is evident. Furthermore, the indissolubility of the whole can come to expression--as it must-in a systematic survey.M If the different aspects of the
whole have to be considered separately, this does not mean
that the whole is developed in terms of these parts. Instead, in everything that is said about the parts we are
already confronted with the whole.62
In practice, Thielicke opts for a Trinitarian structure, and he organizes the material around the Apostles'
Creed.° But the church's traditional baptismal symbol does
not serve as a tight theological grid. The excurses and
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frequent discussions of modern theology along several thematic lines mean that this outline is analogous to an artist's sketch rather than to an architect's prescriptive
blueprint.
A key to Thielicke's thought, then, is his overriding
emphasis on the primacy of proclamation and faith to theological reflection. A second and related key to Thielicke's
dogmatics, at least in its main contours, rests in his characterization of modern theology as a struggle between "Cartesian" and "non-Cartesian" systems of thought. This conflict is basic to his prolegomena. This antinomy and its
central function in Thielicke's theology is the focus of the
next section.
"Cartesian" and "Non-Cartesian" Theology
Thielicke is convinced that the current intellectual
and spiritual climate is marked by a "distinctive dualism." This dualism takes its terminological cue, appropriately enough, from Rene Descartes. However, the dualism
is not between "mind" and "body" as it is for the rationalist Descartes. Nor does a preference for a "non-Cartesian"
approach amount to a polemic against Descartes himself.
Descartes is not even Thielicke's principal foil--quantitatively, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing enjoys that distinction.
"Cartesianism" serves as a convenient cipher for a way
of doing theology that begins with and from the human ego
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(cogito, ergo sum) as the subject of experience and understanding.65Cartesianism characterizes modern theology, and
Thielicke calls this approach "Theology A." Herein the
self-understanding achieves thematic rank and soon reaches
normative status.67 It does so surreptitiously, for its
professed apologetic concern ("initial impulse")68 is for
the addressee who is summoned to appropriate the Christian
message.69 Before long, this concern subtly but ineluctably
inverts the subject matter of theology,70 as "I" becomes the
subject instead of God.71
This is not merely a shift of emphasis or an inadvertent lapse that a careful thinker could avoid by paying
closer attention to what he is doing. Clearly, at one level
it is a shift of emphasis, but Thielicke's much more radical
point is that we are talking not just about the process of
appropriation but about the very possibility of this process.n
The consequences are no less dire. Whatever its manifestation, the Cartesian approach in the final tally puts
the kerygma under human control.n The "I" becomes an autonomous theme, and hermeneutics as a chapter within a larger anthropological analysis of existence becomes the determinative theological preoccupation.74 Moreover, when existential analysis is primary, one is no longer talking about
just the appropriation of theology's content. Thielicke
insists that we have also prejudged the content itself:n
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"What matters is what is significant for me. Expectation of
what is significant for me is determined by a pre-understanding which forms a constant framework into which the
contents of the kerygma must be fitted. This framework itself cannot be revised."76
All theologians of Cartesian lineage are determined by
their investigation of the human subject and his presuppositions of understanding!? Frequently, this "modern" orientation has surfaced in discussions of a "point of contact"
(Anknupfungspunkt) between God and the human being, which
functionally enables the appropriation of the Gospel.
Thielicke has very little patience for "point of contact"
language. Obviously, when the New Testament message is presented the person addressed has to be taken into account.78
But what is categorically excluded, and with some repetition, is any postulate of a residual locus of affinity for
the Word of God, whether this locus is defined in terms of
conscience or something else.79
Such debates hearken back to past battles over nature
and grace and the propriety of natural theology.80
Thielicke's favorite way of making his point is to cite the
Thomistic analogia entis and reject it (at least in any
soteriological sense) in favor of an analogia fidei.m Contrary to Kantian moral philosophy, there is no correspondence between "ought" and "can, "12 for such correspondence
arises only from a relationship or continuity between Cre-
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ator and fallen creature that does not and indeed cannot
exist.° Thielicke explores this issue within the matrix of
the classical Lutheran Law/Gospel polarity:
To begin with, the conscience of the natural man
cannot be a "point of contact" for the Law and the
Gospel because, to be so, it would have to be able
to see of itself that man is lost and in need of
forgiveness. But this it cannot do, if in virtue of
man's "light of nature" [lumen naturale] it understands God as judge. For the criteria of this judging are laid down by conscience itself, and these
criteria are determined by the relation between imperative and ability [Sollen and Konnen].
Having a false conception of God, the natural
conscience has also a false conception of sin and
guilt. For these are matters which can be understood only in terms of our attitude to God. This is
why Luther went beyond merely maintaining that conscience has no insight into the depth of man's
plight. He actually gave dialectical precision to
this thesis, arguing that man's real plight is that
man is in no position whatever even to recognize his
plight by the power of his lumen naturale alone.84
Thielicke's handling of this issue says much about his
theological orientation as well as his anthropology. In
terms of the latter, Thielicke asserts that man cannot understand himself as long as he does not know God and understand himself in relationship to Him.85 As to the former,
Thielicke concedes that by virtue of His self-disclosure God
must be discussed with reference to the human consciousness,
but this does not amount to His "enclosure" within it.86
The foregoing signals a first transition from Cartesian to non-Cartesian theology. Professor Thielicke
grants that faith is a form of appropriating what is believed, and that this is impossible without understanding.
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However, this very understanding emerges only within an
analogy between the person who understands and that which is
to be understood. Put in straightforward theological language, this means that some relation has to be demonstrated
between Christ, the object of one's faith, and the individual self-consciousness.87 The emphasis thus shifts to
Thielicke's primary interest: not the subject of faith but
that in which faith believes and, note well, Him by whom the
subject is changed into a "new creature."m
When one moves from the level of abstraction to examine how Cartesian thought potentially insinuates itself as
one actually does theology, we see that at its worst--when
its ubiquitous question of appropriation dominates--systematic theology can be reduced to a system of coordinates to
which the doctrinal content of faith must be related.89
Thielicke illustrates this approach with reference to the
doctrine of the Trinity.
The "I am" of man is the dominant note.. Theology is
controlled, not by the history of God with man, his
self-disclosure as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but
by the history of man's relation to the idea of God,
the arising, obscuring, and re-arising of this idea
as these come about through the state of man's consciousness or his ethical situation."
If Cartesian or modern theology is preoccupied with
the self-understanding and the human agency of appropriation, non-Cartesian theology reasserts the Biblical theme
that God's creative Word does not accommodate itself to the
existing carnal self. Rather, He "reconstructs" or "trans-
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forms" the old self and thereby introduces a new identity.91
Thielicke stresses that the Spirit's work cuts against the
grain of the human proclivity to self-confirmation.92
Christ, he says, is never the answer to a particular question, for He does not fit conveniently into the intellectual
categories of the one who frames the question. Precisely
the opposite is the case. Jesus is the One who asks the
questions, or, in Thielicke's words, He calls the question
itself into question: "He begins with the existing selfconsciousness but does not let himself be integrated into
it. He does not leave it as it is; he turns it upside
down. "93
Just as Thielicke opted for the label "Cartesian" in
preference to "modern," so also he eschews the term "conservative." It too carries connotations he finds objectionable, among them the postulate of verbal inspiration or obscurantist rejections of historical criticism and evolutionary biology.94 At best a slogan, "conservative" too often
amounts to little more than a reactionary inculcation of
one's tradition in authoritarian, immature, and mechanical
ways.95 Thielicke prefers the more descriptive (even if
more clumsy) designation "non-Cartesian," which he in turn
abbreviates as "Theology B."96
Cartesian theology and its preoccupation with the human means of appropriation finally becomes indissolubly wed
to an anthropology that at least implicitly posits some con-
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tinuity (beyond a "marginal," simple identity) between the
old and new self." Conscience, point of contact, the selfconscious and other sundry entities are given short shift in
Thielicke's interpenetrating prolegomena and soteriology."
Thielicke's dogmatic and ethical work make it abundantly
clear that the fall is a reality that impinges human existence in its totality. Only derivatively is it a quantitative failure to reach a norm; primarily, it is a qualitative
and comprehensive revolt against God."
The struggle between Cartesian and non-Cartesian theology boils down to. the Reformation question of synergism or
monergism. Interestingly, Thielicke's self-designated principal works do not frame the issue in precisely these terms.
But the inference is unavoidable. The human being is altogether incapable of moving from the ego to Theos.
There can be no reaching him by human initiative, whether it be intellectual apprehension, religious receptivity or affinity, or the activism of
imitation of Christ. Even though Jesus dispels the
thin air of abstraction by the vivid imagery of the
parables and moves deeply into the sphere of worldly
wisdom (1 Corinthians 1:18), where he touches the
most elementary strata, there is still no natural
bridging of the gulf which separates man from the
mystery of God. Human eyes do not see here nor human ears hear, even when eternal truth is put in
teaching form and given didactically (Matthew 13:
13). On the contrary, in this extreme proximity the
shock.of something alien is felt and eternal truth
is not recognized in the lofty steepness of its
totaliter-aliter. When the parables are unveiled,
it is to those to whom it is given by him who speaks
them (Matthew 13:11). um
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For Thielicke it is self-evident that one can know God
only as He discloses Himself and wills to be present.101
Applied to the present discussion, this means that the creative Word of God is the origin of being itself. Hence, one
cannot integrate this Word into the "continuity of being" or
even view it as an "interpretative event." Thielicke asks
rhetorically how something can be put into a system when it
is the basis of the system to begin with.102
One might put [the hermeneutical problem] as follows: Do I draw the creative Word into my selfconsciousness so that it is integrated into this and
can no longer be regarded as a creative Word but
only as one that modifies this self-consciousness?
Or does the creative Word draw me into its sphere of
influence, so that I am integrated into the salvation event which works on me, and to that extent am
referred to something outside myself?103
A non-Cartesian theology acknowledges that He who is
the Truth cannot be understood by those who themselves are
not in the truth. Whether the human subject can understand
Him hinges on whether He first brings this subject to the
truth. Thielicke states this in epistemological language
when he asserts that everything depends on whether Christ
establishes an analogy with Himself, wherein one is brought
into the truth (in other words, hears His voice) as the object of a prior calling.104
One of several New Testament texts cited most frequently by Thielicke is 2 Corinthians 5:17--"Therefore, if
any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old has
passed away, behold, the new has come." This Pauline selec-
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tion neatly encapsulates Thielicke's theological program and
is as pivotal to prolegomena as it is to soteriology and
ethics. In addition, it is as important for what it implicitly excludes as for what it affirms. It forbids the postulation of any analogy between the works and Word of God,
on the one hand, and the inherent spiritual and/or cognitive
powers of the natural man, on the other. At issue is not
just conversion. More important is Thielicke's insistence
that the starting point of all theological thinking must be
extra nos; that is, God's pneumatic self-disclosure invades
the cul-de-sac of human contemplation and effects the indispensable breakthrough that makes theology possible.
This contrast between Cartesianism and non-Cartesianism has obvious programmatic significance and asserts itself
repeatedly in all spheres of Thielicke's work. As viewed by
Thielicke, the problems inherent in a Cartesian approach-whatever and whomever its embodiment--are legion.105 In
fact, a straight reading of his three-volume dogmatics discloses this very antithesis as the single overriding theme.
In summary, the crucial question is whether and to
what extent man's self-understanding is prepared to allow
itself to be "revalued" or "revitalized" when it is brought
to the kerygma (Theology B or non-Cartesian theology); or
whether and how far the self-understanding itself assumes
the status of the normative (and manipulating?)106 criterion
of the truth addressed to it (Theology A or Cartesian theol-
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The differences can be sought materially and meth-

odologically. The former distinction entails an altered
definition of the relation between proclamation and theology, while the latter pertains to a divergent understanding
of the appropriation of the kerygma. Furthermore, the sharp
contrast can be spotted repeatedly in the different relation
to what is "new" that stems from these material and methodological antinomies.108
A Theology of the Holy Spirit Unfolded
The above title is chosen over the mild protests of
Thielicke himself. In the preface to the second volume of
his dogmatics, while commenting on the reception given to
the first volume, he concedes that it is his intention to
pursue every theological matter "sub specie" of the third
article. His reticence pertains to the connection of the
nominative "theology" with any genitive, a "theology of the
Holy Spirit" being no exception.109
Bearing this proviso in mind, one can state
Thielicke's basic thesis as follows: the doctrine of the
Holy Spirit is a protest against Cartesian theology, against
beginning with preliminary hermeneutical questions or existential analysis. Its point is to direct attention away
from the self, away from any introspection or self-contemplation.110 Positively, it directs attention to the selfevidence of the Word of God and thereby to Him to whom this
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Word bears witness. The Holy Spirit orients one to Jesus
Christ: ". . . the Spirit points us away from ourselves to
the past and the coming event of which Christ is initiator,
content, and finisher. "111
Postponing for the moment Thielicke's understanding of
the image of God, we can note that he underscores the
uniqueness of humanity vis-a-vis the rest of creation by
asserting that only man has been called to "partnership"
with God--"qualified as a 'Thou'"--and intended by God for
redemption.112
This is nearly an anthropological truism.
Much more significant than human responsibility or addressability is Thielicke's insistence that these very features
cannot be construed as a subordination of the Spirit's activity ("what takes place on and to man") to the interpretative grid of "addressable man."113
One can only speak of a point of contact if this concept is wrenched from its schema within Cartesianism. There
is no constant point of contact that one can locate in the
reality of natural man and so form a steady continuum.114 In
one sense there is a point of contact; however, this is the
contact that God makes with human beings. But Thielicke
goes on to emphasize that God makes contact with men and
women precisely at the point where they "dig in" against
Him, at the very "nerve" where they are curved in upon themselves.115 "Contact" is a new creation and a new birth, and
therefore it is a miracle that resists efforts at system-
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atization. In keeping with Thielicke's uncommon facility
for metaphor, he observes that there is no neutral antenna
with which one can hear God's voice. "Contact," Thielicke
avers, is never really appropriate because it suggests "how"
the miracle Can take place given the congenital human attitudes of rejection and self-emancipation. To those who echo
the "how" question of Nicodemus, the only possible answer is
the same one that Jesus gave: God so loved the world.116
Human identity, theologically speaking, is never an
ontologically independent reality. Apart from an obvious
creaturely dependence, Thielicke asserts that the human being learns who he really is exclusively from the Word announcing to him God's condescension, His covenant, and His
mighty salvific acts.117 Real identity is "riveted to" God's
Word:118 "The Holy Spirit who discloses this word to me does
not point me to myself but away from myself to the events by
which I am what I am.019 If one still insists on talking
about "continuity," this can only take the form of a "retrospective glance."120 It becomes part and parcel of doxology:
"I" am the one to whom this has happened.121
The Word does not integrate itself into something that
is already there. Instead, it creates and recreates.122
Moreover, if one learns who he is only from what happens to
this adds a dimension to the classihim and changes him,123
cal dogmatic claim that theological anthropology is always
relational anthropology. Thielicke's concern is to stress
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the Holy Spirit as the Person--the third person of the Trinity, not a psychical force--with whom human beings stand in
relation.124
For Helmut Thielicke, everything in theology commences
with the creative "Word-act" of God; this effects transformation in the micacle of the Holy Spirit.15 The testimony
of the Holy Spirit does not mean that we appropriate the
truth that is set before us; rather, the truth is "disclosed" to us by the witness of the Spirit with which it
(this same truth) is furnished. M In sequential terms, one
can formulate Thielicke's procedure as follows: the revelation of God's Word of truth; the person and work of the Holy
Spirit; one's new identity ("analogy") through faith; hermeneutics and theological reflection. Theological truth,
Thielicke stipulates, is the content of an active Word.127
Professor Thielicke does not hesitate to affirm the
"givenness" of salvation history. This "given" establishes
one's faith and is not established by faith. This feature
of Thielicke's thought becomes important shortly, in connection with his distinction between "ontic" and "noetic" revelation. For the time being, it is useful to acknowledge
Thielicke's frequent use of Lessing as a foil for Cartesian
theology. Lessing has anticipated "every conceivable position" in Cartesian theology.128 Lessing's thesis, stated in
terms of his notorious "ugly broad ditch," is this:

.

.

accidental truths of history can never become the proof of

.
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necessary truths of reason."129 In other words, unqualified
certainty is impossible when we are dependent on the testimony of others, their reliability as reputable historians
notwithstanding. The "givenness" of the mighty acts of God
does not and can not persuade twentieth-century men and
women--and the problem runs much deeper than historical consciousness, secularism, or any other real or imagined symptom of modernity.
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit plays an integral role
precisely at this point. To be sure, God's Word is interpretative. The Word takes events out of the ordinary flow
of history, renders them significant, and constitutes them
as truly salvation history.MI Nevertheless, the Word is not
purely or exclusively interpretative.131 In fact, the Word
must not be dissociated from the Creator Spirit who engenders faith--which faith, in turn, now discerns (but does not
produce) the saving character of God's acts in history.132
The relation of Word and faith or saving event and
faith cannot be reversed.133 To forfeit the preexistence of
the Word and permit faith some cooperative or correlative
status is to abandon the soteriological point of faith and
revert to Cartesianism: ". . . it is the Spirit of God himself who confesses this Word, who bears witness to it as his
own, and who causes the historical event to become preaching
of God's mighty acts. ig 134
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The response to Lessing amounts to an assertion that
the Holy Spirit transports one across the "ugly broad ditch"
by means of His creation of faith through the Word. The
third article is God's way of effecting the transition from
accidental truths of history to a confession of faith.
. . . this reference back to the saving event finds
expression in the fact that we do not make Jesus
Christ our Lord in our own reason or strength. We
cannot produce faith of ourselves. This is the work
of the Holy Spirit . . . . This means, however, that
the historical Jesus of Nazareth, through the Holy
Spirit, makes himself contemporary with us. The
natural man (psychikos anthropos) does not perceive
the things of the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2:14). Hence he cannot produce the present which eventuates in faith. Nor can he reproduce the past in
such a way that it is present for him and Christ
becomes his (contemporary) Lord. . . .
This is the point of the Spirit's testimony. It
means that the evidence of what we believe in is
provided, not by faith, but by what we believe in
itself, i.e., the given fact of the Christ-event.
The Lord makes himself evident and hence he makes
faith possible. Faith does not make the Lord evident. The Lord himself is the Spirit (2 Corinthians
3:17f.). He cannot be controlled, then, by the natural man.135
Thielicke takes Lessing very seriously, and even in
his Pneumatic rejection of his basic assertion he is never
content merely to brush him aside. Thielicke concedes that
the "Lord of history" is not evident in His works. History
is at very best ambiguous, so that God is hidden in these
works: ". . . faith in him can consist only in the protest
of a Nevertheless against what the senses see and what reason recognizes to be the law operative in events of this
kind (Psalm 72:23ff.).036
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The Holy Spirit achieves re-presentation. He discloses God as a lovable object and attests the same through
the narrative of God's own self-demonstration as such. His
mighty acts, from old covenant exodus to new covenant resurrection, have also "happened to us."137 The meaning of Holy
Baptism is to have oneself called out of the old aeon and
into God's salvation history.138

God is present for us as we

recall and look back on the history that He has caused to
happen to us and into which His Spirit includes us.139 How
does the Spirit accomplish this re-presentation?
He evokes faith, kindles fervent love, and opens up
immediate access to God by illuminating the mighty
acts of God as a nexus into which I am taken up and
whose earlier stages are of contemporary or existential significance to me, so that in the simpler and
more expressive language 140
of Scripture I am pricked
in the heart (Acts 2:37).
Thielicke's concept of re-presentation insists that
the presence of the Lord in faith is a sovereign gift, one
which cannot be achieved on one's own initiative. Without
this gift, the most sophisticated theological method or hermeneutical enterprise still leaves one with only a dead past
or Lessing's dreaded historical distance.141 The emphasis is
achieved by frequent recourse to Luther's celebrated metaphor of the "mathematical point." Faith's point of reference dare never become the human psyche itself; there is
nothing in or about the human psyche to orient one to the
God revealed in Jesus Christ. The "mathematical point" is
simply the way Thielicke follows Luther in stressing the
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alienum or extra me of the Word of God.142 The object of
faith is always the person and work of Jesus Christ; and
this implies further that the believer has, strictly speaking, forgotten himself.143
When one sees faith as the way in which the Holy Spirit lays hold of the individual--the "Spirit's surrogate"-one is "immunized" against depicting the new being in terms
of a habitual state.144 Where there is no possibility of
becoming new and in the absence of any claim, God has "activated his own possibilities," and the miracle of His fatherly mercy takes place.145 However, the regenerative miracle
does not amount to any "possession" of the Holy Spirit, as
in "I have the Spirit." The appropriate posture is always
one of prayer: "Come, Creator Spirit." Further, "I am" or
mystical union language signals the relation that constitutes one's new being. To assert "By the Spirit I am in
Christ" or "By the Spirit Christ is in me" is never a selfidentifying, presumptive claim but is always a doxological
confession.146
Faith never outgrows its beginning. It grows
into this beginning. Its beginning is the creative
Word of God which effects regeneration. This is
where our becoming commences. This is where the
battle between the Spirit and the flesh takes place.
The demand that we should enter into this becoming,
this conflict, is simply a demand that, faced with
the alternatives that hang over our lives, we should
take our place with the Spirit and let him be our
advocate (Romans 8:26). When we accept his intercession and live by that alien righteousness in
faith, we can no longer be so interested in our own
empirical image that we are reflected in it, that we
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give it permanence, in short, that we allow it to
become a theological theme of its own.147
To tie together several of these themes, Thielicke
states that the Gospel, God's self-disclosure as a lovable
object, is at the same time the heart of the doctrine of the
Holy Spirit)" The Word of God, by the creative miracle of
the Spirit, posits a new existence.149 This miracle qualifies every vestige of "appropriation" language; indeed, in
the light of the New Testament it means hearing the voice of
Jesus Christ as it applies to me (John 18:37).150 Faith refuses to relate the salvation event to the self-consciousness. On the contrary, by faith one is integrated into this

event151 --and, note well, the Creator Spirit working through
the Word never integrates Himself into what He has created..m
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit embraces the subjectobject relation)" It does so by the re-creating Word,
which discloses the given fact of the Christ-event and
which, in turn, makes faith possible."4 Yet not only is God
the object of faith. The Holy Spirit avails Himself of the
historical, saving acts and thereby imparts a new identity
to the person on whom the miracle of the new birth is performed. Thielicke's point is that one has a definition of
himself only in faith, so that "man defined by God" is likewise the object of faith)"
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Because God's Word cannot be appropriated in any present state of human existence, by the creative miracle of the
Holy Spirit it refashions the old man and itself establishes
the conditions under which one may hear and receive it.
Above all, it is an active Word. We do not pull God and His
Word into the orbit of our own existence. For Professor
Thielicke's non-Cartesianism precisely the opposite is the
case: "We ourselves are set over against ourselves in regeneration and we are integrated into God's history."156

The

human self is not an identity within which there are variations of self-understanding. Rather, the identity of the
self must be viewed in dialectical terms. "I live, yet not
I, but Christ lives in me."157
The Word-Faith. Dialectic and
Theological Prolegomena
For Helmut Thielicke it is axiomatic that one can
"have" the world only as God gives it to him and permits him
to see it. One can "have" God only as He condescends to
him, enters into his world, discloses himself, and imparts
the light with which He can be seen.158 Thus, God is both
subject and object: "He is not only the one I have the possibility of knowing; he is also the basis of that possibility. He embraces both the being of the objectifiable world
and also the subject of objectifying."159
Thielicke's anthropology precludes any analogy that
would admit a personal knowledge of God. Here his insis-
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tence becomes thematic. Knowledge always presupposes an
analogy between the knower and the known. It is precisely
this analogy that no longer exists, for humanity has fallen
out of the original analogy between Creator and creature.
Alienation is the consequence of man's willful flight from
God. In the aftermath of Genesis 3, the only person analogous to God is God Himself. The epistemological effects are
stark:
analogy.

. . . sin is the basis and form of the lack of
The apostle Paul said as much when he told the

Corinthians that the natural man does not perceive or accept
the things of the Spirit of God (1 Corinthians 2:14). He
cannot understand them. In more technical language, fallen
man cannot "produce the present" that will eventuate in
faith; moreover, he cannot "reproduce the past" so as to
render it present for him or in such a way that Jesus Christ
can become his (contemporary) Lord.161 Analogia entis language will not pass muster. It must give way to an analogia
fidei if meaningful theological discourse is to ensue.
The whole point, however, is that one cannot slide
smoothly from analogia entis to analogia fidei. Because the
problem is much more severe than epistemological misdirection, it does not suffice merely to augment the existing
data or even to sharpen its focus. Something far more radical is necessary. An analogy of faith is the work of the
creative Spirit, who effects reciprocity itself through the
Word of God. Of the many places where this re-creative work
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is discussed, perhaps the clearest is the following selection from Volume 1 of The Evangelical Faith.
This gives us new insight on Paul's statement
about no eye having seen or ear heard. We can now
see the epistemological background of the verse. We
stand in analogy to the historical facts of religious history, even the history of the Christian
religion. But we do not stand in analogy to the
divine truth manifested in these facts. This is why
Christ is incognito within them.
We are thus led to an important conclusion. If
there is to be any theological knowledge, any understanding of the salvation event, the analogy has to
be re-established in an act of new creation. The
divine Word must create its own hearer, the subject
of understanding. The theological point at which to
speak of this creative function of the Word, of this
creation of the hearer, and hence of theological
epistemology, is in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.
For this doctrine . . . tells us that we are called
to share in the divine self-knowledge and are thus
set in a real analogy. In this sense the Spirit
searches all things even the deep things of God (1
Corinthians 2:10).
The revelation of God conveyed by the Holy Spirit is
the precondition for the analogia fidei. This further entails a carefully nuanced understanding of revelation.
Thielicke circumvents to some extent the perpetual debate
over propositional and/or personal revelation. He says, in
brief, that revelation involves both a content and a mode by
which this content is rendered accessible.163 Symptomatic of
the fall is a human obdurancy that bids to maintain the status quo of rebellious existence.1" This means that the Holy
Spirit has to do more than disclose: "God needs to make
this self-disclosure accessible in and of itself in order
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that it may enter into the eye, ear, and heart."165 In
short, God has to break through.
For these reasons Thielicke talks about an "active"
Word of God rather than an (entirely) interpretative
Word.164 This Word "breaks continuity" with one's old existence--indeed, destroys it (2 Corinthians 5:17)--and creatively calls forth new possibilities that were neither
present nor available in the prior modus vivendi. Without
the severing of continuity with the old, God's truth cannot
be mediated (though, as we shall observe later, it is not
for these reasons any less true).w
. . . revelation does not take place merely on the
event side of an external history. It is not just
what we usually call the mighty acts of God. It
also takes place as appropriation, as the miracle of
hearing and understanding which overcomes hardening
(Matthew 13:15; Acts 28:27, etc.) and opens deaf
ears. It is closed to the wise and prudent, i.e.,
to the initiative of intellectual work (Matthew
11:25-27). Where the reception of revelation takes
place in the consciousness, it is extolled as the
miracle of an experience that we cannot control
(Matthew 16:17). This miracle in virtue of which
the Word opens itself to hearing and appropriation
is performed by the Spirit of God who dwells in the
Word (1 Corinthians 2:7-16). The Spirit brings it
about that man can break out of the prison of the
world and let God's saving work take place in him.
What takes place on him, and only then and to that
extent in him, he cannot understand in terms of himself because his alienation from God renders him
unable to let God's Word be manifest to him. His
closedness is overcome, and what is not at his disposal is made accessible. . . . God causes man to
participate in the knowledge of himself. Only he
himself can do this. Hence he alone is the subject
of the knowledge of God. Only the Spirit searches
out the deep things of the Godhead (1 Corinthians
2:10).168
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In this comprehensive setting, Thielicke defines Word
of God in the "primal and proper" sense as the Word incarnate in Jesus Christ. This Word is personal and ontic, and
not entirely verbal or spoken.169
Closely associated with
this personified Word is that which instrumentally "passes
on" the message of the incarnate Redeemer through human witnesses. This associated Word applies particularly to the
New Testament: ". . . in these documents there is not merely reference to the Word of God but the Word of God is actually present, . . . it reaches us in them, so that the
Word that was incarnate at a particular point in time is
presented here afresh."170 Finally, the Word of God is the
witness given in later ages by witnesses to the Word, one
made on the basis and under the direction of the kervqma.171
Thielicke rejects any qualitative distinction between
the Biblical testimony and later witnesses, or between the
"verbal form" of past, present, and future witnesses and the
"original witness" inscripturated in the New Testament. His
reasons are not exegetical; they reflect his own theology of
the Holy Spirit. Both Biblical and subsequent witnesses
share the promise that God's Word is proclaimed and that the
Kurios is abidingly present with this proclamation.rn While
he repeatedly scores "verbal inspiration" as a product of
Protestant Scholasticism and renascent fundamentalism,"3 he
objects most to the claim that there was a direct presence

149
of the Kurios in the original Christian witness but only a
reduced and indirect presence later.176
Whither (whether?) the Reformation's sola Scriptura?
Holy Scripture is the most authoritative witness to the
presence of the Pneuma; and only for this reason , Thielicke
avers, does "Scripture alone" achieve the status of a confession whereby the church describes its basis. "Inspired"
is a functional and not an ontological term: "This can mean
only that God was actively at work when he gave witness to
his Word in Christ."' Thielicke applies the same logic in
connection with the Biblical canon, and once again the issue
is one of relative primacy.
As Holy Scripture originates in the spoken Word
which is indwelt by the certifying Pneuma, and as it
leads back to the spoken Word which for its part has
the promise of the Spirit, the Spirit is assigned to
it, too, as the legitimation and power of presentation. If the need for a written deposit is in a
sense an emergency measure deriving from the vulnerability and confusion of the human spirit which in
self-will resists God's Spirit, the deduction cannot
be made that Holy Scripture is a product and abandonment by the Spirit. On the contrary, there is
fulfilled in it the wrestling of the Holy Spirit
with the human spirit. Scripture is the most authoritative testimony to the presence of the Pneuma
Only thus does the sola Scriptura (Scripture alone)
attain the rank of a confession by which the church
describes its basis.176
The spiritual Word is far more than an imparting or
instructing Word that somehow builds on human epistemological presuppositions, as though it (the Word) were limited by
them, made contact with them, or fit neatly into their
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framework. Rather, this Word is active and creative. "It
ploughs up the old and fashions the new creature."117
Thus, the word/faith dialectic highlights once more
the fact that for Thielicke sequence is all-important: incarnate truth; the creative work of. the Spirit active in the
Word; a new analogy and identity; faith; theological reflection and formulation. When this inviolable sequence is observed, one can even talk about a valid analogy of being,
but now it is a new being. Note the deliberate circularity
in the following brief citation:
I can understand the truth of God only through the
Holy Spirit, since the analogy which underlies this
understanding is imparted through him. This analogy, however, is an analogy of being before it is
one of understanding. The existence of this analogy
points to the creative and active Word of God which
renews this being in the miracle of the Spirit and
causes it truly and authentically to "be.""8
One can now appreciate the "highly dialectical structure" that characterizes the process of understanding in
relation to the Gospel. Philip Melanchthon anticipated this
with the aforecited precept connecting the knowledge of
Christ with a knowledge of His benefits. Thielicke asserts
that we learn who Christ is from His words and works, specifically, "from what happens to us through him."m We do
not learn of Christ and His identity through dogmatic statements, however veracious they may be--an "absurd" idea,
Thielicke suggests. On the contrary, Jesus' words and works
in relation to us prompt the question of who He is. As they
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trigger this query, the answer that Jesus is the Christ becomes the light through which His words and works appear to
us. This is a key feature of the dialectic: "Only along
these lines . . . do we assert that the person of Christ is
the norm by which to interpret his words and works.080
The concept of identity, so prominent in Cartesian
theology, can only be retained if it is oriented to what is
outside the human subject.181 In a fashion comparable to the
unextended "mathematical point" used by Luther to counter a
"fatal psychologizing" of faith and lovely--faith has no
place of its own on which to rest but is determined exclusively by its object183--identity and continuity consist in
the faithfulness of God, who honors His Word.164 One's new
identity is characterized not by its element of consciousness but by the extra nos to which it relates, namely, the
"history of Christ" into which he has been adopted.185
There is, then, an important sense in which one can
talk about the creation of faith as one of God's "mighty
acts," a designation routinely applied more or less inclusively to the heilscieschichtlich events chronicled in Scripture. Faith "belongs to" the salvation event, since it is
effected by the Holy Spirit as an act wherein "something
becomes manifest."116 Yet within the matrix of the dialectic
it is vitally important to remember that even given this
status as a salvation event, faith does not stand on the
same footing with the "mighty acts of God" on, as Thielicke
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puts it, the "event side" of history. These acts are set
before faith, and there they remain for all time. The relation of Word and faith can be conceived only as one in
which the Word (as defined above) maintains uncontested primacy.UV
Creation, providence, and history are not transparent:
"The Lord of history is not in fact manifest in his
works."188 Christ is "incognito" within the historical substratum of Christianity. UR The Word of God is the "decisive
basis" of the revelation in these spheres: "[God's] traces
are ambiguous and unrecognizable apart from his efficacious
and interpretative Word."1"
This has profound import for the varied tasks of systematic theology, especially apologetics. For Helmut
Thielicke there is no high ground extra fidem from which one
can survey the historical terrain and so discern its Christocentric meaning and telos. The Word/faith dialectic permits neither neutral observance nor assessment. The spiritual nexus (or reciprocity) of Word and faith cannot be penetrated from the outside. As the Word is active, it creates
the conditions under which it discloses itself, that is, the
(new) being in the truth of which the apostles Paul and John
speak.1"
Apologetics runs up squarely against two insurmountable obstacles. In crass form it fails to take seriously
the utter radicality of human fallenness, which entails and
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even energizes a positive aversion to Christian truth
claims. Less presumptuous apologists are convinced that if
only the Christian claims were accorded an unprejudiced
hearing, the "mighty acts" would be sufficiently credible so
as to effect "openness" (something along the lines of a
fides humana). Thielicke will have none of it, even though
he does not share all the extreme conclusions of New Testament criticism. He objects on both obvious anthropologica1192 and more sophisticated soteriological grounds.
To seek historical facticity as such at a historical
distance and with disinterested objectivity, and in
so doing to cherish the expectation that this will
furnish a basis for faith and a diagnosis of salvation events, is to come under the verdict of trying
to get behind the Word by seeking after signs, and
hence of evading the faith which is engendered by
this Word.193
This analysis accounts for Thielicke's misgivings with
the "revelation as history" theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg.
One Pannenberg disciple, Carl Braaten, states one of his
mentor's central theses: "Unlike special manifestations of
God, historical revelation is there for anyone who has eyes
to see. It is universal in character."194 Pannenberg cites
the resurrection as part of this universal history.
Thielicke objects. He rejects Pannenberg's none too subtle
integration of theology into the sensory experience of all
the various sciences.155 Though he does not disparage the
Historie character of the resurrection, Thielicke stipulates
that attempts to view the event of the resurrection in this
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historicity--that is, apart from faith in the risen Lord-are futile.196 Discernment presupposes discipleship.197 The
same stricture applies to the array of New Testament miracles. Thielicke brings much of this together in the following citation from his dogmatics.
Hence faith does not have to reassure itself by
first examining the facts which are its basis. It
does not investigate before believing. If it does,
it disparages the Word which posits the facts. It
tries to establish a prior relationship to reality
on the basis of which it can prove that the Word has
a real foundation and is in touch with reality.
Faith can take this false path only if it grants
normativity to the subject-object relation which
underlies its "normal" understanding of reality. In
this case the Cartesian I (the subject in the relation) again plays the part of a norm. Since, however, God's mighty acts are effected by the Word, I
can have access to them only through the faith that
this Word brings into being. Hence there can be no
certainty concerning these acts apart from the Word
and faith. One might also put it thus: The facts
cannot be known by the old self; they are nonexistent for its "mind" and "heart" (1 Corinthians
2:9).198
For systematic theology the implications are clear,
and they hearken back to the initial discussion of the priority of proclamation and faith to theological reflection.
Thielicke the preacher is concerned with truth in person,
rather than with truth viewed as "abstractly normative."
Such personal truth can be expressed and explained in narrative form, not through argument. Christian truth, Thielicke
insists, must be told.m
The Word that engenders faith and the salvation events
to which they are oriented are not alternatives. They are
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inextricably linked to one another and expound one another.
The interpretative Word expounds the events as acts of God
and (especially with reference to the miracles) signs of His
inbreaking rule. Reciprocally, the events expound or disclose the Word as active, as a "deed-Word." The object of
faith--the person in whom faith believes--"validates" the
Word.200
When one couples this summary with the earlier observation that the spiritual circle of Word and faith is unbreakable, has Christianity been relegated to a fideistic
subjectivism or, worse yet, to a blithely maintained ideology? On the one hand, Thielicke will not be cowed into
tempering or relaxing either pole of the dialectic. Yet,
perhaps paradoxically, he rejects subjectivism and ideology
as well. Theology as pursued in the modern era entails a
readiness "to examine being realistically" and unconditionally, without trepidation over "possible surprises"
and/or "metaphysical losses." One questions his traditions,
or, echoing Nietzsche, one puts the knife to one's own
roots. If one cannot avoid all presuppositions (of faith),
he can at very least reflect on them. In this way theology
retains its scientific dimension and escapes the charge of
ideology. One is then left with the second task, namely,
interpreting what is discovered and inquiring into its meaning.201
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These twin obligations are illustrated in the following discussion of Thielicke's unique and closely related
positions on the image of God and human immortality. Of the
various loci, they have been chosen both because of this
uniqueness and because they expose key themes in Thielicke's
theology.
The Image of God and Thielicke's
Subjective Genitive
One could probably read at random any one-hundred-page
block from Thielicke's major works and encounter, in fairly
systematic form, his understanding of the image of God.
This makes perfectly good sense in his anthropology itself,
yet it holds true for his dogmatics and ethics as well. The
point is that Thielicke's entire theology presupposes and in
large measure is determined by some bedrock anthropological
considerations, and the image of God is central to these.
After one moves beyond the simple affirmation that
theological anthropology cannot be content with the ontic or
immanent features of the human being, but rather must focus
above all on man and woman coram Deo, he is then in a position to consider those aspects of Thielicke's understanding
of the image that differ (at least in nuances) from a traditional Lutheran orientation.
These departures should not be exaggerated.
Thielicke's doctrine of the imago Dei is in many respects
faithful to the Lutheran tradition, as is evidenced by his
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comparatively strong denunciations of Roman and Reformed
positions on this issue.202 First, Thielicke rejects the
"usual concept" of the likeness, which he finds in Thomism,
as an "indestructible continuity of human nature," so that
one's nature remains the same through innocence, fall, and
redemption.203
Second, Professor Thielicke unequivocally
condemns any notion of the image as a human proprium, some
set of component parts, which purportedly distinguishes the
human being from the rest of creation and which further connotes some inherent or intrinsic "dignity." These constitutive elements are familiar enough: conscience, intellect,
use of language, and even the ability to walk upright.204
Thielicke's polemic is directed primarily to this second aberration. In this connection he repeatedly cites
Luther's observation that any definition of the image in
terms of reason or speech forces the deduction that the
devil himself is also God's image, since he possesses these
qualities to a higher degree than fallen men and women.205
Reason, language, and the like connote a shopping list of
corrupted "relics" of little use to theological anthropology.
Here Thielicke is quite traditional. The image, he
asserts, must be understood in relational terms, and he
quotes Luther approvingly: "[the image of God is] perfect
knowledge of God, supreme love for God, eternal life, eter-
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nal bliss, eternal security."206 Every definition of the
image in terms of "content" is simply false.
If it is impossible to define the imago Dei in any
ontic sense,207 is there anything that is "constitutively"
human? Indeed, what is "human" is the relationship to God,
and this is crucial to both the Biblical doctrines of creation and anthropology. "Faith in creation sets me in a
personal I-Thou relationship to God, not primarily into an
I-it relationship to the created world. Christian thinking
about creation is personalistic."m To articulate this relational character of the image, Thielicke resorts to what
he admits is an "extreme" formulation: "The divine address
constitutes the person." This is not to be construed as
"addressability"; on the contrary, the latter formulation
betrays a reversion to the ontic sphere from which we have
fled.209 It signals the "point of contact" language endemic
to Cartesian theology.210
In numerous places Thielicke describes this theologoumenon as an "alien dignity." Terms like "ontic," "immanent," habitus, and Droprium are all rejected because they
amount to some personal possession. "Alien dignity" underscores Thielicke's emphasis on God's initiative even in this
area of theological anthropology. Relation to the Word of
God constitutes human distinctiveness, since he is the one
creature who is addressed in the second person and summoned
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to communication with the Creator--a communication effected
by the selfsame Word.211
How should we talk about the loss of the image in
light of the fall? One does not lose his humanity, nor does
one entirely forfeit his relationship to God. To be sure,
the relationship is now profoundly disordered; Thielicke
calls this the "negative mode" of humanity. In more mundane
language, this is guilt, and the presence of guilt in turn
presupposes ongoing human responsibility.212
Since the imago Dei is not to be defined ontologically in terms of certain demonstrated qualities,
but as a relationship between God and man, it cannot
be lost, just as man could not forfeit his humanity
even if he wished to do so. The imago, can only pass
into the negative mode. Hence the imago is not
"nothing." But neither is it merely something "left
over," something which has survived as a relic of
the original endowment at creation. On the contrary, the image is really present, but only in that
negative mode which implies negation of the original
fellowship with God, a negation however which is
still a prerogative distinguishing man from the
beasts. Man's very failure to attain the telos for
which he was destined is part of the prerogative of
him who was created in the divine image. For even
in the negative mode he bears on his forehead the
mark of his original nobility, and his misery is
always that of a "deposed king."213
The metaphor in the last sentence of this quote is
borrowed from Pascal and Kierkegaard. This allusion, coupled with the nearly ubiquitous citation of the parable of
the prodigal son, highlights an integral feature of his anthropology. The infinite stress that God places on human
existence confers an "indelible character." This indelible
character is neither won nor lost, nor can it be augmented
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or diminished. Human beings as such are loved by God.214
Christian theology posits the self as an ego created by God,
fallen from Him, and then visited and redeemed by Him. If
we know of God only in His relation to us, it is equally
true that there is no appropriate theological statement
about human beings apart from their relation to God.215
Such reciprocity is rooted in Thielicke's "subjective
genitive." The image of God is the image God has of human
beings: "what is involved is 'our image' as that image consists in God's remembrance of us."216 The father "retains"
an image of his son; indeed, the father remembers that the
prodigal is his son throughout the latter's debauchery in
the "far country." In the face of human depravity and its
sordid manifestations--what one would assuredly regard as
the loss of the image on any empirical reckoning--the Father
keeps the genuine image in His heart. Thus, the image of
God is the object of faith and not of sight or knowledge.217
Human beings as sons and daughters--and partners-stand in a position of "privileged identity" in their relation to God. Moreover, all God's dealings with them have
this presupposition as their point of contact.218 Thielicke
observes that only human beings can fall; animals cannot.
Human dignity arises at precisely this point; and this is
our indelible character, which remains constant through
every experience.219 Finally, with the parable of the prodigal son again serving as the backdrop, Thielicke observes
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that the divine likeness is both that from which one comes
and that to which he goes.220

All of these assertions com-

bine to force the conclusion that the imago is not ontological but relational and eschatological. It is a state of
relation rather than a state of being.221
Thielicke combines his image/identity language with
his radical understanding of human fallenness by noting that
the divine likeness is, in the first place, that which the
human being in re (in other words, phenomenologically) no
longer is, but that on the basis of which he is still addressed--albeit now in a "negative mode."222 Yet in the second place, the divine image is that which is to be apprehended once again in Christ as a quality in spe. "It is
thus something which is given to man, and has to be given
again. Consequently, it expresses not man's own immanent
and ontic dignity, but that alien dignity which is grounded
in and by him who does the giving."223
The last assertion makes the telling point that one's
identity is not somehow confirmed or fitted with a new consciousness. The issue involves new creation and a new creature (2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 5:16). Thielicke explains:
The father in the parable does not simply act on a
claim to the title of son, which in fact is not even
made. Something completely new takes place that
cannot be explained at all by the entelechy of the
old existence. The miracle of raising again is performed on this identity. This miracle is not a creation out of nothing, for it is performed on the old
self that still keeps its identity. Yet there is no
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discernible continuity between the former "living
soul" and the present "life-giving spirit" (122Corinthians 15:45ff.; cf. Ephesians 2:1, 5; 5:14).
The image of God is finally a Christological concept: "Real
man is man as God created him in his own image and as we see
him in the face of Jesus Christ."225
This anthropology has an obvious and direct impact on
how one approaches questions in moral theology, and because
ethics is at the center of Thielicke's work we mention it
here. For one thing, Thielicke finds contemporary slogans
like "quality of life" in such issues as euthanasia to be
misdirected. The insistence on the alien dignity of human
beings means that men and women (or infants and children,
for that matter) must not be evaluated in terms of their
performance on aesthetic or utilitarian inventory checks.
Their lives have quality because it has been conferred and
sustained by Another. Assertions of "human rights" and the
like are really secular transpositions of Biblical anthropology. The key point of reference is the alien dignity one
has as a creation of God--and one whom God visits, purchases
with an unspeakable price, and sets under His care and protection. This reference, Thielicke argues, is what makes
the human being sacred. Once more the order is important:
God did not love men and women because of their independent
dignity. On the contrary, it is because God loved them that
they had this dignity and became sacred (Deuteronomy 7:78).226
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To summarize, in its Christological context the image
of God consists of an alien dignity. Never is it an attribute of humanity aua humanity (Eigenschaft); instead, it is
an attribute of the relationship in which one stands (Aussenschaft).227 Luther's definition is retained, since in its
positive mode the image describes a particular relationship
to God effected by the impartation of Christ's alien righteousness.n8 The character of the imago Dei as alien is
underscored by the fact that as a proprium, as a "true ontic
possession," it is ascribed exclusively to Jesus Christ. So
insistent is Thielicke on this point that he can say that in
the "absolute sense" Jesus Christ is the "only man. '1229
learn from Christ and perceive in him--ecce homo!--what man
is.230 Participation in the Son's "unimpaired" image does
not come by imitation, for this would be a confusion of Law
and Gospe1.451 If Christ is "exemplar" and not "example,"
participation will come only through faith.412
The image of God is the image God has and retains of
human beings. The identity of the human being lies in a
partnership or history with God that does not cease, precisely because God's remembrance never ceases-233 We conclude on this note, moreover, because it is an apt transition to an illustrative promissory and eschatological feature of Thielicke's overall scheme. The present focus has
been on the memory of God; the father remembers the prodigal
even as he proceeds blithely into the far country. Yet the
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imago Dei, given its Christological dimension, turns on what
Adam was before the fall, what he now is in Christ, and on
what he will be in the eschaton (Thielicke's iustitia
finalis).22/11
Personal Immortality and the Memory of God
This section does not purport to be a full-blown exposition of Thielicke's eschatology. For that matter,
Thielicke himself does not comment on every issue often
treated under this locus. We concentrate instead on one
component of Professor Thielicke's reflections on "individual" eschatology, clustered in the third volume of The Evangelical Faith and the shorter Death and Life. The feature
in question dovetails neatly with previous remarks on the
image of God. There we stressed relational considerations
in preference to ontological characterizations of the image.
Consistent with Thielicke's non-Cartesian theology, the focus was on God--God's image of the human being, His conferral of an alien righteousness in Jesus Christ, and, finally, God the Father's memory of His wayward sons and
daughters.
. . . the prodigal does not remain the son because
he has maintained his qualities of sonship, or because his father could still be "seen" in him
. . . even in the far country. He remains the son
only because of another who has maintained his qualities of fatherhood even during the period of exile
and estrangement.2-35
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The human being is perpetually characterized by what
he receives from the alien factor of divine grace.236 As
Jesus Christ is our peace with God (Ephesians 2:14-15;
Colossians 1:20), one has not fully become human until this
peace is realized eschatologically.237 Therefore, here the
emphasis will be on what is routinely termed "immortality"
or the "immortality of the soul." In what sense is human
identity sustained through the phenomenon of death?
Thielicke's answer to this question is distinctive, yet it
follows inexorably from his understanding of the imago Dei.
Thielicke categorically rejects Platonic anthropology,
particularly its assertion of the immortality of the human
psyche.238 He argues that the New Testament's varied anthropological terms--among them psyche, sarx, and soma--refer to
the entire person in a specific relation.239 "Soul" is the
human being as he is addressed by the Word of God, not a
component of the "I": "It is the epitome of the relation to
God, of incorporation into his history with us.” 24°
At the same time, Thielicke does not soften the Bible's description of death. He insists that death is not
the termination of man as mammal (bios). Further, it is not
a natural necessity that approaches one as a law over
against which the human being is a mere object. When one
reads the Pauline dictum in Romans 6 ("the wages of sin is
death") or the brutal pronouncement in Psalm 90 ("for we are
consumed by thy anger"), the conclusion is inescapable: "In
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both [texts, death] is an event which I myself have caused,
over against which I am subject, and which I have freely
brought about as a responsible person."241 The wrath of God
expressed in death is God's reaction to our personal action

; 242

as such, death comes to persons who want to be God

and hence have to learn that they are only men.243
As to the knotty problem of the "intermediate state,"
this is an issue only for the living.244 Does one live on,
in the face of personal death? Thielicke responds both negatively and positively. There is no indestructible quality
of the soul that survives death intact or unscathed.245 The
person dies. To affirm an immortality of the soul per se
would amount again to Cartesianism. It would signal some
domain within the human being hermetically sealed from the
lethal contamination of sin.246 Yet the human being is not
swallowed up in a sea of non-being, either. Eternal life is
a reality, or, in Thielicke's words, a "quantitative survival after death."247 This is so because of the constancy and
fidelity of the promising God who has acted decisively in
Jesus Christ.
. . . what causes us to live on is not a quality of
the soul that survives death unscathed. It is rather that God has entered into a history with us and
that this history will not cease throughout eternity. Thus the power that prevents death from laying its hand imperiously on us and plunging us into
nothingness is God's faithfulness. This is signified by the resurrection of his Son by which he is
the Lord of the dead and the living (Romans 14:9),
as is declared to us in the first installment of the
gifts of the Spirit.248
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Eternal life is a reality because the risen Lord does
not abandon His people. The communion that has been established in Baptism will not be suspended. To be sure, the
"old life" has nothing proper to it out of which the quality
of survival might emerge. Everything this side of the
Parousia is corruptible and finite. This means, of course,
that notions of immortality (for example, the Platonic
athanatos) are brought under judgment. Instead, operative
here are the alien factors of the divine address and the
faithfulness of God, who neither abandons His people nor
leaves them in death.249
I do not believe in the future because of some
dream of the hereafter. I believe in it because I
am already the companion of him who has begun a history with me and will never let me fall away from
his faithfulness. With him I go confidently into
the darkness and inconceivability and total otherness of the future world. For he, who is one and
the same, will never be alien or other to me. I
shall always recognize him whose voice has always
been as familiar to me as the shepherd's voice is to
his sheep. In his person the dialectic between continuity and discontinuity which has permeated all
reflection on existence before and after the resurrection is finally stilled.m
Like the image of God, human "immortality" is rooted
in something outside of man, specifically, in the "memory of
Yahweh": "[Yahweh] knows our names and thinks of them
eternally, having written them in the book of life. "251
Persistent Ouestions
Occasionally one reads summaries of Thielicke's theology on the order of the one ventured recently by John
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Jefferson Davis in an annotation to The Evangelical Faith:
"German Lutheran; generally neoorthodox in orientation."252
Is this accurate? If so, is Thielicke's work subject to the
same criticisms routinely directed to neoorthodoxy in its
classical form (for example, Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr--though
acknowledging their own disclaimers)? These paragraphs will
demonstrate that Thielicke's positions are too eclectic and
too complex to allow such facile classification or criticism. However, this charge does serve a backhanded heuristic function, for it occasions an exploration of several
additional features of Thielicke's theology that together
provide a more fully-orbed account of his prolegomena.
Though the term "neo-orthodox" is itself almost too
indistinct to be useful, it may be characterized as that
attitude or approach which seeks to balance a core of traditional dogma with an adherence to the methodology of liberalism (most overtly in the area of Biblical criticism). In
this context, we shall look first at Thielicke's key distinction between ontic and noetic revelation/knowledge of
God, and, second, his appropriation of historical-critical
methodology in the execution of dogmatics.
In fairness, it is not difficult to understand how
Thielicke gets tagged as neo-orthodox. The English-speaking
audience had read the Theological Ethics for a decade or
more before The Evangelical Faith began to appear. The
ethics is characterized by a massive polemic against natural
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law and, by extension, against a natural knowledge of God.
Their many differences notwithstanding (most notably perhaps
in their views of Law and Gospel),253 such a rejection of
natural knowledge would superficially link Helmut Thielicke
with Karl Barth, for whom a repudiation of the natural
knowledge of God emerged as early as his commentary on
Romans of 1918.254
Thielicke does not temper his negative views on the
natural knowledge of God in his dogmatics. Yet The Evangelical Faith does take positions on other issues that run
contrary to prevalent themes in neo-orthodoxy. At most
Thielicke represents selective neo-orthodoxy, a description
that is self-contradictory and therefore virtually useless
for theological taxonomy.
One particular issue that surfaces in any discussion
of neo-orthodoxy, particularly its Barthian form, is the
nature of revelation and the extent to which God's revelatory acts are "objective," or accessible to neutral empirical observation. We cannot here rehearse the still unresolved debates concerning ambiguities in Karl Barth's writings. Barth, so the charge runs, maintains that the "mighty
acts of God" are not to be understood historically in the
traditional fashion (as Historie); such acts--and the list
varies from critic to critic--are supra-temporal or suprahistorical (Geschichte). They belong to the realm of faith
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and are not amenable to strictly factual or scientific demonstration.65
Thielicke is well aware of the multifarious indictments against neo-orthodoxy, and one can find in his dogmatics at least implicit rejoinders to several of its most
important features. Perhaps the most important clarification (if not differentiation) arises from Thielicke's discussion of ontic and noetic truth. In the case of the former, truth is a quality that belongs to the sphere of being.
As such, it pertains to what things are according to their
true nature.256 The latter has reference to the "structure
of thought,' ' or to the appropriation of the "transubjective"-ontic element.257 This distinction is integral to
Thielicke's view of revelation and to the core salvation
events of the New Testament. Once again, an important dialectic is at work.
Professor Thielicke defines God's self-disclosure as
an active word that posits a new creation by the power of
the Holy Spirit.258 The crucial point here is that revelation is not just a "signifying word" that somehow enhances a
given or ongoing scheme of understanding.259 When revelation
occurs, one's own existence is brought into the truth, and
he undergoes transformation to self-sacrifice and openness
to God.260 Thielicke goes so far as to define revelation in
the strict sense as God's self-manifestation in "absolute
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directness," or, stated less opaquely, when God is identical
with the mode of His manifestation.261
This takes place only in the Word: "God is his Word,
or, better, he makes himself identical with it (John
1:1)."vi2 Revelation in Biblical theology refers to an act
of disclosure and hence to the Subject who performs this
act.263 As a consequence, Thielicke stipulates that one cannot inquire into the being of God in Himself (beyond or behind His economic unfolding as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit)
or into the Word in itself (beyond Law and Gospel).264
•. . "revelation" means self-disclosure in the
sense that God gives other beings a share in his
self-consciousness, in the understanding of his true
being. Thus the nature of revelation is more than
the popular view of it is aware of; it does not refer only to certain forms of supernatural inspiration. Revelation denotes a fundamental relation
between God and man. It then denotes the epistemological block that results from this distinction.
Finally, it stands for the miracle of the divine
self-disclosure, the participation in God's selfknowledge, which alone removes the block.265
The dialectic alluded to earlier is most apparent when
one asserts (1) that God reveals Himself through "transubjective" redemptive acts in history, and yet (2) these
events are truly revelatory (or, better, disclosive) only
when they are experienced within the context of an existing
faith-relationship effected by the Holy Spirit. Thielicke
brings together the objective-ontic/subjective-noetic tension in the following two short theses:
First thesis: Only the fact that Jesus Christ
is risen from the dead makes it possible for me to
die with him (to die to sin and escape its bondage)
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and also to rise again with him, and thus to walk in
newness of life and to be in the truth.
Second thesis: Only when I am in the truth do I
hear his voice; only when I die and rise again with
Christ can I aopropriate noetically his death and
resurrection.'m
The dialectic is an "interpretative interrelation." The
acts disclose and interpret the person. They are a legitimate approach to the question of the "who." But only when
one penetrates the mystery of the "who" does he unlock the
meaning of the acts. The person "opens up" and interprets
the acts. Without Him they are ambivalent and equivocal;
indeed, they might be sorcery.267
The key is to retain the balance and not lay disproportionate emphasis on either the ontic or the noetic pole.
The absence of spiritual discernment does not undermine the
veracity of the core creedal facts themselves.m "The truth
which is concealed from the natural man, or, paradoxically,
the truth which conceals and 'must' conceal itself from the
natural man, is true even apart from man. "269
Thielicke is most insistent on this point when it
comes to the resurrection. Generally speaking, the "facticity" of the works of Christ should be upheld, just as it
is assumed by the New Testament authors.m In the case of
the resurrection, however, Thielicke is adamant: "All references to the meaning of the resurrection are thus designed
to solidify its ontological historicity. Christ is risen.
Existential interpretation has its place as a means of ap-
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propriation. It is preceded . . . by the antic decree.,271
If one dismisses the resurrection, he does not reverse or
undo it, since Jesus died and rose independently of one's
attitude to these events. One's denial alters the nature of
the resurrection. Properly, its nature is to be there for
man. When rejected, it is truth against man, comparable to
one's eating and drinking condemnation upon himself in the
Eucharist.217 "The Christian says: I stand or fall with my
truth; it will become judgment or grace for me; either way
it will always be the truth."m
If the resurrection is objective or transubjective, it
is not thereby "objectifiable."24 A historian operating in
existential detachment with the canons of scientific historiography will neither discern nor assert the bodily resurrection of Jesus. This does not mean that the resurrection
did not happen, or that the evangelists were mistaken. To
conclude as much is to substitute an antic statement (for
example, Jesus did not rise from the dead) for a noetic
statement (the resurrection cannot be proven). The logical
fallacy is that what is not objectifiable is therefore not
objectively existent.25
The resurrection is indispensable to Christian faith.
Thielicke flatly declares that if Jesus is still in the tomb
He cannot forgive sins.m At the same time, it is concealed
to "neutral" historical research. Does this mean that historical-critical research is precluded or its conclusions
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discounted? By no means. In fact, the status of historical-critical methodology is one of the real unresolved
tensions in Thielicke's dogmatic enterprise; and, because
hermeneutics is so intimately linked to theological prolegomena, the issue warrants further discussion.
At one level, historical criticism is permitted because Thielicke refuses to concede to the Biblical text any
privileged status per se. Predictably enough, he traces
such an elevation to the age of orthodoxy:2" "[During this
epoch] the active fieri of revelation yields to the static
propositum of a given document. The act of inspiration disappears in the product in which it is also conserved."278
From here it is a short step to the fundamentalism of
Francis Pieper (among others), which is manifested in the
doctrine of verbal inspiration. Letter displaces Spirit.
Verbal inspiration offers "legalistic security," and, in a
manner never clearly explained, leads ineluctably to an
"unholy mingling" of Law and Gospe1.279
Historical criticism can be employed because there is
nothing intrinsic to the Biblical text to forbid it. But
this statement does not say nearly enough. Historical criticism must be pursued. First, the suppression of historical
criticism would reduce faith to a "partial religious province," and faith would no longer pertain to the "whole
man."280 Second, only as we pose the questions of historical
criticism will we appreciate the significance of faith for
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the personal knowledge of what one knows historically. In
Thielicke's words: ". . . only as we put the objectifying
historical question does the frontier emerge which separates
it from the relations of faith to its historical object."281
Important as these two reasons are, they are still not
the decisive basis for the use of historical criticism.
Thielicke's third and crucial point involves what he calls
the indispensability of "counter-criticism." Here historical work seeks to determine whether the conclusions of historical criticism are inimical to Easter faith, for something demonstrably false can hardly be an object of
faith282--at least not without violating the canon that truth
is indivisible and adopting an intolerable "split in consciousness."283 Elsewhere Thielicke makes a similar point
when he asserts that the hermeneutical presupposition of all
knowledge is the analogy between the structure of thought
and the structure of being.284
Even a superficial reading of these three reasons for
the use of historical criticism will discern a paradox. On
the one hand, there is an insistence on the "happenedness"
of the soteriological events, especially the resurrection.
On the other hand, the mighty acts of God are not objectifiable facts, for in this sphere they succumb to Troeltsch's
inflexible criteria of verification.288 Miracles, Thielicke
says, are "possible events" for an individual only because
he first "has" the One for whom all things are possible
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(Mark 10:27).286 Only "a certain scientific ideology" can
lead one to argue that historical revelation is open to the
detached onlooker, so that a theology of history can rest on
its "universal rational validity."NV
The paradox can be maintained if one recalls the dialectic discussed above. Salvation events are part of earthly history and therefore are the objects of historical science. But their theme or character as salvation events cannot be the objects of ordinary historical study, for only
faith can discern and acclaim that Jesus is Lord. "Once it
is admitted that this [the Christ-event in its totality] is
really a salvation event, the self-disclosure of the personal God, this event demands the category of faith if it is
to be the object of knowledge."m Analogously, in human
interaction some things are perceptible only to the "personal category" of love. In such interaction, love plays
the same epistemological role as faith does in secular history.NW
I have just said that I can think of miracles as
possible events only because I first have the person. But this is too simplistic. The facts are in
truth dialectical. For I have the person only by
way of the works. I allow the witness of Christ,
the accounts of his words and deeds, to refer me to
the person. The records are the spokes of a wheel
that lead me to the true axis. I do not see the
central point directly. It makes itself known to me
through the spokes, i.e., through the works which
emanate from it. Only as the one who is thus made
known becomes "my Lord"--was not this the way of the
eyewitnesses too?--do the works and signs find their
validation, whereas previously they lay in the halflight between God and Beelzebub (Matthew 12:24; Luke
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11:15-19) and to that extent could not be verified.m
Thielicke's approach to historical criticism does not
end with this dialectic, however. The further direction of
his hermeneutic at very least raises some disturbing questions. A considerable portion of Thielicke's work is directed against Rudolf Bultmann, sometimes only tacitly but
occasionally overtly as well. Bultmann's celebrated rejection of the physical resurrection is repeatedly scored by
Thielicke. Indeed, Bultmann's program ultimately signals
the elimination of Heilsgeschichte, the substitution of philosophy for theology, and amounts to a denigration of the
incarnation itself.291
Yet several issues persist even when the uncompromised
disavowal of Bultmann's comprehensive demythologization is
acknowledged. First, what data comprise the nonnegotiable
core of salvation history? Second, what objective criteria
determine this soteriological core? Third, what hermeneutical controls permit one to demarcate the "husk of mythology"
from the "kernel of revelation"--a distinction Thielicke not
only concedes but actually endorses7292 Fourth, does the
resultant catalogue still reflect the substance of New Testament Christianity?
Professor Thielicke himself broaches the third of the
above questions when he admits that the "sole point at issue" is exactly where the line between myth and kerygma is
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to be drawn.293

As formulated in The Evangelical Faith, what

pertains to the "mode of expression" and what is part of the
"authoritative content"?294 The criterion must come from the
text itself and not be imported from an alien ideological
framework.295 Pursuit of the latter alternative is
Bultmann's undoing.296
The Bible, particularly the New Testament, contrasts
sharply with mythological world-views. Its linear view of
time (kairos, or "qualified time") and the understanding of
history as an irreversible progression from fall to judgment
is a "categorical protest" against myth.257 At the same
time, the New Testament is suffused with mythological elements: ". . . temporal myths and views surround the core of
the gospel message. unft If one is to make the requisite distinction between "kerygmatic and sacredly freighted myth"
and "disarmed myth that has degenerated into an empty
form," one must first define myth itself. In general
terms, mythology is a form of human apprehension that is
ideally suited to deal with religious truth.m Moreover, it
is an essential and permanent element in human thought and
not an inferior or antiquated approach to reality.301 Therefore, myth and history are not inherently antithetical. But
this gets at the core of the problem, when one seeks precise
delineation between secondary vehicle and primary cargo.
There are myths which are indispensable vehicles
for the transcendental realities, and others which
are legendary embroidery or accretions from nonBiblical religions. Then there are myths which are
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pictorial clarifications of some historical fact,
and others which are straightforward historical reports, which despite their apparently mythological
form are to be regarded as directly historical.302
So far we have reached two conclusions. First, one
must not transpose the New Testament mythology into the language of ancient mythology. Second, one cannot circumvent
the dilemma by peering behind the mythological veneer to a
pristine, non-mythological kernel of truth. This was
Bultmann's error. Moving forward from these two considerations, Thielicke argues that the exegete must affirm frankly
both the mythology "as it stands" and the temporal limitations of the mythology "as they stand."303
The incarnation meant that Jesus entered into
time and space, that he became our brother and comrade, and in so doing exposed himself to the notitia
of our capacity to apprehend him. This meant that
he entered into the particular form in which our
powers of vprehension express themselves--i.e., by
mythology.
The intertwining of supra-mythical facticity and
ongoing mythical symbols demands a concluding statement. The New Testament is supra-mythical inasmuch
as it proclaims as reality what belongs to the
structure of mythical speech (the incarnation). In
so doing it goes beyond myth. It thus demythologizes, yet not in such a way as to set forth the
signification of mythical statements, but rather by
claiming a reality behind the mythical ciphers. On
the other 305
hand, it also uses many mythical figures
of speech.
The real crux is exposed when one recognizes this pervasive hermeneutical ambiguity. While the issues may be
sharpened, the questions posed earlier never receive unequivocal answers. It is understandable that Thielicke does
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not venture a statement of his full-blown exegetical methodology. One can theoretically integrate the historicalcritical method into Thielicke's "dialectical process of
interpretation."306 Yet this integration becomes increasingly difficult when one seeks to balance several additional
considerations: the absence of any clear definition of historical criticism, except to say that his notion departs
from the Troeltschian pedigree;307 the candid admission that
the limits of historical-critical inquiry cannot be fixed a
priori;308 the reluctance to spell out where mythological
trappings end and kerygmatic substance begins; and, finally,
the relegation of elements traditionally considered constitutive of New Testament Christology to a status of "optional" or "irrelevant" (for example, the descent into hell
and the virginal conception of Jesus).3" The following selection is characteristic--and revealing:
. . . faith in the Kvrios is no longer threatened by detailed critical distinctions. It does not
have to await nervously the approval or disapproval
of historians. It is no longer open to constant
challenge. For it makes no difference to faith
whether the Lord works through accounts of facts or
through responsive doxologies . . mo
Such an admission can only fuel the charge that Thielicke's
theology is a "Lutheran neo-orthodoxy."
Thielicke's work is bedeviled by this paucity of objective hermeneutical controls, a situation all the more
ironic when one recalls the proviso he addresses to Lessing,
Kant, and Bultmann: "Wherever a non-Biblical principle de-
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rived from contemporary secular thought is applied to the
interpretation of the Bible, the Bible's facultas se ipsum
interpretandi is violated, with fatal results."311 While
Thielicke's shortcomings here by no means vitiate his numerous contributions in theological prolegomena and soteriology--for him these two loci all but converge--they do signal
a potential abridgment if not outright alteration of what
the church of Jesus Christ has believed, taught, and confessed for two millennia.
For all of the above, Thielicke remains consistent
about two overridihg themes. First, Goc is not merely an
answer to human questions. Instead, in His self-revelation
He gives the requisite disposition for asking after Him.
The work of the Holy Spirit is always central, for He brings
us into the truth. With the new creature, moreover, He introduces an altogether new set of questions.312
[My] prolegomena is directed specifically against a
theology which is obsessed with analyses of socalled modern man, which always orients itself to
contemporaries, which is concerned about their understanding, which becomes wholly dependent on the
conditions of such understanding. By reason of preliminary hermeneutical questions it can never get to
the point and it threatens to fall under the verdict
that Wilhelm Busch passes on Platonic love, namely,
that of being an eternal seeking without leaving any
imprint .313
In Thielicke's diagnosis, post-Kantian theology has become
increasingly tied to anthropology and has largely been integrated into it .314
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Second, there is in Thielicke a profound recognition
of the impact of the fall on one's theological labors and
the provisional character of any theological work.315 Theology is done by sinners, and thus it pleads for the same
absolution as its practitioners.316 He compares his own efforts to those of the small child who wanted to empty out
the ocean with a cup,317 and he recognizes that Christianity
does not live by academic theology. Many Christians, he
observes, will be preserved in the last judgment while their
theology is dashed to pieces--not only perhaps condemned by
God but even "laughed out of court.oia "The theological
student who plays with the truths that the great ones in
God's kingdom have arrived at only after a life of intellectual struggle is like the boy whose mother has made his
clothes so big that he will have to grow into them."319
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CHAPTER THREE
EDWARD FARLEY'S POST-AUTHORITY REFLECTIVE INQUIRY
Influences and Agenda
A certain irony attends a consideration of Edward
Farley on the heels of Helmut Thielicke. Farley searches
for an "Archimedean point" from which to approach the theological enterprise, granting no privileged status to centuries-old revelatory claims. It is precisely this sort of
external vantage point that Thielicke decries. For
Thielicke one begins with the Holy Spirit and the regenerative Word, and as a consequence theology can proceed in
meaningful fashion only from the "inside."
Edward Farley's views would not always have been described in these terms. A graduate of Louisville Theological Seminary and the doctoral program at Columbia University, the youthful Farley produced The Transcendence of God:
A Study in Contemporary Philosophical Theology (1958), a
book noted by such conservative authorities as Carl F. H.
Henry. In fact, Farley has even been identified as a former evangelical.2 All this changed with Farley's encounter
with Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological school he
founded. Farley's theological orientation was radically
altered, as he assimilated many of Husserl's most important
203
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themes. By 1983 the Presbyterian professor of systematic
theology at Vanderbilt Divinity School placed himself at the
"liberal" or "revisionist" end of the theological spectrum.3
The accuracy of this self-description is evident to anyone
who reads Ecclesial Man:• A Social Phenomenology of Faith
and Reality (1975) and Ecclesial Reflection: An Anatomy of
Theological Method (1982), Farley's major two-part work of
theological prolegomena.
Unlike Bernard Lonergan and Helmut Thielicke, Farley's
thought is virtually unintelligible apart from the phenomenological apparatus that both undergirds and informs his
work. Because of this pervasive indebtedness, the present
chapter must do more than identify one or two major phenomenological themes. Therefore, once Farley's basic agenda
has been identified, we will sketch the conceptual and terminological background in social phenomenology necessary to
unravel and appreciate his theological prolegomena. Only
then will we be in a position to understand Farley's avowedly radical alternative to all traditional theological approaches.
Edward Farley insists, as a matter of absolute primacy, that theological prolegomena does not commence with the
problem of "authorities," "criteria," or methods, but rather
with what he calls the problem of reality in faith.4 His
theological prolegomena has two parts: first, the "problem
of foundations," or the ways in which realities are "pre-
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given" to theology; second, the "judgment," or the ways in
which these same realities lay claim to truth.5 This prolegomena, in turn, reflects a particular conception of theology itself:
. . . theology is a determinate religious faith attempting to understand itself, bringing its prereflectively apprehended 'realities' into a reflective
mode which grasps their interior structure and interrelationships as well as worldly situations illumined by them.6
Professor Farley elsewhere notes the ambiguity inherent in the term "theology" and defines it in less technical fashion. In Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity
of Theological Education (1983), Farley identifies theology
in existential terms as the personal, sapiential knowledge-understanding--that can occur when faith opens itself to
inquiry and reflection.? In this sense theology is definitely a habitus.8 But it is more. In practice, theological understanding is not just a "timeless instant" or an
impregnable structure. It is an activity, a life-process.
Because the process ideally undergoes perpetual selfcorrection, theological understanding is a dialectical activity,9 or a "dialectic of reflection."10
The dialectical, self-critical character of theology
carries with it the assumption that it is not simply correlative with "the orthodox conceptuality."ii In fact, a good
portion of Farley's efforts is a synthesis of the criticism
leveled against this orthodox framework. Indeed, one con-
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sistent merit of Farley's work is his willingness to state
the consequences of his convictions in brutally candid
terms: "The problem beneath the problem of theological
method is whether and in what sense faith with its cognates
of revelation and redemption is directed toward realities."12 The failure adequately to come to grips with the
issues raised by historical criticism over the last two centuries has left contemporary theology in "methodological
paralysis."13
Present-day theology appears to be trapped within
two impossible alternatives. First, acknowledging
that the faith in which it is grounded does, in
fact, suspend the axiom of object-evidence correspondence, it can charge this faith with being
grounded on a several-thousand-year-long logical
fallacy. Theology itself is, therefore, scientifically purified. Its cognitive grounding is no longer suspect, for it now does what all genuine disciplines do; it describes and explains on the basis of
genuine evidence. Therefore, theology's historiography is genuine historiography. Its ontology is
genuine ontology. The difficulty with this rather
simple and "honest" alternative is that it reduces
historical faith to something other than itself,
and, therefore, puts theology out of business. Second, theology can make a heroic attempt to do justice to the "realities" on which this faith insists
and to which it testifies. In this case, it must
live with the impossible situation of admitting that
these realities are arbitrarily asserted. Presentday theology is trapped by what appears to be a paralyzing feature of faith itself, a deadly seriousness about and a sublime indifference to reality.14
In short, are the realities to which one's faith is directed
reducible to an empirically describable content (in cult,
language, historical essence, community self-understanding,
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and so forth), or is this content merely the mode in which
the realities appear?"
We are ready then to formulate precisely our problem. Are there in faith's situation apprehensions of
realities which are not simply apprehensions of authorities, and which are sufficient bases for judgments about realities not directly apprehended? Do
representations such as God, Jesus Christ, creation,
end-time, or salvation touch ground, so to speak, in
direct apprehensions? Systematically formulated,
this is the problem beneath the problem of theological method. Does faith involve apprehensions of
realities which transcend a mere phenomenal status?"
Farley gets at these questions in Ecclesial Man and
Ecclesial Reflection. This two-volume prolegomena does not
approach the usual catena of issues in customary fashion.
The books are neither a description of Holy Scripture as the
principium cognoscendi of dogmatics, nor do they account for
the anthropological conditions of the knowledge of God17
(as, for example, Karl Rahner's Hearers of the Word). Ecclesial Man accounts for faith's cognitivity and its
grounds, while Ecclesial Reflection is devoted to theological reflection and inquiry with the overall aim of providing
a critique of theological judgment."
The above paragraphs have endeavored to state Farley's
agenda without using an obtuse phenomenological vocabulary.
The following section will sketch the phenomenological
themes that run through Farley's key writings. Nevertheless, some rudimentary observations must be made if Farley's
orientation is to be appreciated. Perhaps above all, Farley
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is convinced that faith occurs in a "faith-world": "a social matrix whose concrete corporate form [is] ecclesia."19
Any attempt to inquire into faith's cognitivity goes astray
if it circumvents this matrix, since faith's apprehensions
occur within a consciousness shaped and made determinate in
this matrix. Bypassing the phenomenological jargon, this
means that for Edward Farley theological prolegomena and
ecclesiology overlap in key areas,20 for theologia is a
"perennial possibility" for faith as the latter occurs in
various social contexts.21
Farley seeks an alternative first to classical liberal
views of theology as a historical description of "Christianity" and, second, to a "neo-orthodox" retention of theological authorities long since discredited.22 He recognizes
that theological prolegomena will not offer a single, definitive procedure that, if followed consistently, will solve
problems, clarify obscurities, or produce understanding.
Such a conception of prolegomena amounts to a fruitless
"treasure hunt."23 At the same time, theology does have a
"subject

matter," a recognizable content to which questions,

disputes, and clarifications can be traced.
Does theology have a "subject matter," a content
to which its inquiries, controversies, and clarifications can be traced? In a phenomenal sense, the
answer is clear. There are "phenomena" about which
theology constantly talks. These phenomena have
empirical dimensions which measure up to the narrowest kind of empirical concern, space-time entities
apprehendable in sense perception. There is "before
our eyes" the historical phenomenon of the Christian
religion which extends into the past and is partial-
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ly reconstructable by historical method, and which
embraces a continuing living cultus. Like other
religions, the Christian religion contains within
itself an origin and development, various epochs,
signal events, significant individuals, visible institutions, and, perhaps, a persisting though developing distinctive "essence.""
The larger, much more radical questions--and ones that get
to the heart of Farley's enterprise--are whether there are
ontological verities to which one can trace the "normative
language" and "intellective acts" of theology as well as the
images resident in faith, and, in addition, where and how
such verities are apprehended.3 The intent is to discern
how faith "apprehends" (see below) God as a reality who is
not merely coincident with human subjectivity.26
As a summary transition, we can observe four features
pervading Farley's theological prolegomena. First, Farley
does not begin with the problem of authorities, criteria, or
even methods; rather, as previously indicated, he begins
with the problem of reality in faith.27 Second, a major focus of Ecclesial Reflection especially is an analysis of
"the legacy of theological method," what Farley variously
calls the "house of authority" or the "classical criteriology.,a8 Third, Farley concentrates on a "phenomenology of
tradition," specifically, the structure of ecclesial process
and its bearers ("a determinative corporate memory carried
in a determinate network of symbols") . 29 Fourth, Farley
identifies as the goal and "culminating focus" of his pro-
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legomena the problem of truth, which, in turn, devolves to
the issue of theological judgment.3°
Before any of these can be delineated further, it is
essential that we unfold the conceptual backdrop of Farley's
theology in the thought of Edmund Husserl and the terminology of social phenomenology. Save for this lexicon, it is
difficult to attain more than a superficial acquaintance
with even Farley's most obvious themes.
The Phenomenological Apparatus
Even the previous section was imperiled slightly by
the use of expressions the technical nuances of which could
only be inferred. Citation of other overt assertions of
Farley's agenda in both Ecclesial Man and Ecclesial Reflection had to be postponed until their phenomenological import
was satisfactorily elucidated. Such is the burden of this
section. These paragraphs will outline the most fundamental
themes of Husserl's phenomenology and define a core of terms
indispensable to an understanding of Farley's use of social
phenomenology. Farley avails himself of Husserlian phenomenology because he believes that its descriptive method potentially suggests a way of "salvaging" both the historical
and the existential components of faith.31
Phenomenology is no monolithic orientation, nor can it
be reduced to a set of pre-packaged methodological assertions.32 Even students of Edmund Husserl do not agree en-
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tirely as to their master's teachings, a situation due in
part to the treatment Husserl encountered at the hands of
the Nazis and also to the incremental, posthumous publication of an enormous body of personal papers. Nevertheless,
we can summarize the basic tenets of phenomenology as these
impinge on Farley's theological work.33
Edward Farley acknowledges that phenomenology has had
its most extensive and fruitful influence in the history of
religions.34 At this level, however, "phenomenology" is being used very loosely, in almost a purely descriptive sense.
Here, as sometimes in cultural anthropology, the issue of
truth or falsity is rarely considered.35 Ironically, phenomenology has only recently impacted theology, and then
often indirectly through existentialism .36 Farley offers a
generalization to account for this:
The more universal and 'phenomenal' is the discipline the more explicit is the appropriation of the
Husserlian method and conceptual apparatus. The
more normative and determinate is the discipline,
such as theology, the more phenomenology is present
indirectly and without the Husserlian categories.37
At the most basic level of the relationship of philosophy to theology, faith and reason are at odds only when the
former is rooted in loci of authority or, in Farley's terms,
"when faith fixes the details of its appresentations from
its authorities."38 Philosophy is appropriately occupied
with ontology. Theology, on the other hand, transposes the
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"local apprehensions" that transpire in ecclesia into modes
of understanding.39
What is the appeal of phenomenology for Farley, and
how does phenomenological theology emerge as a distinct entity? Farley was first attracted to Husserlian phenomenology because of parallels between the philosophical situation
to which phenomenology responds and the theological situation with its attendant "problem of reality."40 Farley explains:
Knowledge is an "accomplishment" of human beings not
simply because it involves physical experiments and
the like but because it rests on structures and performances of human consciousness which synthesize
disparate impressions into meanings and meant objects so that these objects can be retained as unified objects over a period of time. His [Husserl's]
complaint was that the philosophy of his day had
lost sight of the one problematic whose investigation distinguishes philosophy from all discrete sciences. It lost this subject matter because it appropriated from the natural sciences models pertinent to their investigations but absurd when applied to consciousness.
Phenomenology thus attempts to reach the foundation of human
knowledge in transcendental structures and accomplishments.42
Correspondingly, phenomenological theology is the
"founding moment" of theological prolegomena:43 "[it] attends to faith's reality-directed apprehensions and their
conditions, on which depends the second moment, theological
method or criteriology."" Repeatedly Ecclesial Man defines
phenomenological theology in terms similar to these and fur-
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ther insists that its analyses do not establish the realities of faith's apprehensions.45 Its aspiration is more
modest. It seeks to locate, expose, and set forth the
founding apprehensions of religious faith in their distinctive setting and with due attention to the various strata of
that setting.46Stated in still more generic language, phenomenological theology is the attempt to penetrate and describe the pre-reflective (and hence pre-theological) matrix
of faith's acts and structures.47
What phenomenological theology can do is to render
explicit the contours, the essence, the modes of
existence which lie present but hidden in these apprehensions. . . . What phenomenological theology
cannot do is to so duplicate the apprehensions themselves that they are actually and concretely mediated to a reader. In other words, the actual
reality-apprehensions of a determinate community do
not occur in the "uncovering" analyses of phenomenology. but in participation in the community itself.
This quote, though rendered somewhat opaque by its use
of yet to be explained phenomenological jargon, underscores
Farley's insistence that phenomenology must precede theology
or theological criteriology (see below). Historically, the
classical theological authorities grew out of the social and
redemptive existence that preceded them; in no sense did
they produce or engender this special existence. To anticipate Farley's own concrete proposals, authorities are authorities only when their usage conforms to ecclesia; and
ecclesia, in at least one of its dimensions, includes the
constitutive structure of redemptive existence.49 Reiterat-
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ing the above observation that phenomenological theology
does not establish the realities of faith," Farley does
concede to it a "consciousness-reshaping role," which serves
to uncover these realities. To this extent, it can serve a
positive function as a "theological therapeutic.""
Farley does not undertake a summary exposition of
Husserlian phenomenology per se, although he does explicate
certain of its fundamental features. Only after we have put
the main themes of Husserl's work into some systematic focus
can we appreciate Edward Farley's theological claims and the
technical vocabulary with which he expresses them.
At its root phenomenology is a non-empirical science.
To be sure, it yields new information and is not limited to
analytic propositions; but because it does this in a way
that the so-called "hard" sciences cannot, it is not empirical in the usual sense of the word. Phenomenology provides
access to pure phenomena. "Pure phenomena" do not constitute mere appearances vis-a-vis the Kantian things-inthemselves. Phenomena appear to us in "immediate experience." However, this is not the raw material of sense impressions or one's stream of consciousness.52
Anything, phenomenology avers, is a phenomenon if it
is considered in a particular way, the explanation of which
is in large measure an explanation of phenomenology. By
considering objects, the contents of awareness, or the acts
of awareness in this distinctive way, one can "intuit" the
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essences of the same and grasp the essential connections
between these essences.M The Husserlian scholar Max Farber
explains: "A phenomenological description deals with what
is given in experience as such, with experiences just as
they are in themselves. The aim is to bring to evident consciousness the essence of that which is experienced."54
While phenomenology may well examine the same things as other disciplines, its special consideration thereof prescinds
the empirical or contingent to an intuition of the essential.55
The central feature of the phenomenological method is
"intentional analysis."56 The thesis of intentionality is
rooted in the thought of Husserl's teacher, Franz Brentano.
Very simply stated, Brentano noted that human beings are
always conscious of something; consciousness is always about
something and directed toward something. This "aboutness"
is the essential characteristic of consciousness." Inasmuch as all consciousness points toward an object, there is
no such thing as pure consciousness.58
Intentionality as developed by Husserl entails several
other characteristics. First is the way intention "objectivates." The sensory data of experience is distinguished
from objects. We are aware of a plurality of sensa: color,
shape, weight, size. As these sensa are related, they disclose the object. The perception is given through sensa,
but the object transcends the sensa. The referent of one's
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consciousness is not a simple, straightforward relation.
The sensa are the raw material of a complex structure, which
are integrated into the total object. One is conscious of
the object because all the sensa refer to it; they are not
atomistic ingredients of awareness. They come to us as
qualities of the object, and the intentionality of consciousness links an object to its "horizon." (For example,
the front of a box refers or "intends" its side, bottom,
rear, inside, and so forth.) In this way, what one perceives provides valid expectations of future experiences.
The net result is that intentionality is responsible for the
identity of an object.59
The notion of intentionality of consciousness mitigates decisively against any split between subject and object. Objects are always objects of consciousness, and consciousness is necessarily a consciousness of objects. Intentionality is not limited to the content of consciousness,
to material objects, or to the activity of perception. In
fact, intentionality has correlative aspects: the intentional act or act of consciousness (noesis) and the intentional content or "meant-object" (noema) . 60 Phenomenology
analyzes both the act of the eqo coqito (noesis: perception, imagination, image consciousness, memory) and the
"what" of our awareness (noema).M
There are several stages of phenomenological analysis
rooted in the preceding distinctions, and these impact di-
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rectly on Farley's appropriation of Husserl for theological
purposes. The first step of phenomenological analysis is to
deepen and expand the range of one's immediate experience.
As early as 1910, Husserl pronounced the manifesto of the
phenomenological movement in "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." There he coined the slogan "back to the things themselves!". Parallel to Cartesian methodological doubt,
wherein one seeks to be free from prejudgments and preconceptions, phenomenology begins with a purgative stage, in
which people must liberate themselves from ossified theories
and beliefs and grapple only with what is given in direct
experience.62 This, of course, is the celebrated phenomenological epoche, or suspension of beliefs, and for Husserl
this is indispensable to any authentically critical philosophy. It meant the utter exclusion of all claims that could
not be completely realized in terms of intuitive experience
alone--and even this subject to well-defined conditions.63
The ideal of freedom from presuppositions . . .
requires that there be no unexamined assumptions of
any kind; that there be no metaphysical or existential assumptions unless there is a special reason
for explicitly positing them; and that there be no
prejudgments. It properly means the explicit examination and constitutive analysis of all elements of
the structure of knowledge and reality."
It takes little imagination to cast Husserl's epoche
into theological categories, and Professor Farley does not
disappoint. He recognizes that "presuppositionlessness" is
more a goal, criterion, or "ideality" than a psychological
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or intellectual capacity of the investigator or even a feature of his method.65 Specifically, two sorts of commitments or belief-systems are suspended in this "initial
moment" of theological reflection. The first is any theological commitment to the authorities posited by church tradition, such as Holy Scripture or confessional/conciliar
documents.66 The second set of belief-systems sidelined by
the theological epoche are any and all metaphysical schemes,
which would presume to determine beforehand the nature,
scope, or criteria of faith's reality-apprehensions.67
The theological epoche in other words is partly an
existential act involving not just a temporary
change of stance but a permanent attempt, perhaps
always only an attempt, to put out of action the
reality models which have shaped our consciousness,
so that the specific realities of a determinate
faith can appear. In this sense the epoche is a
turning around, a transformation, or as religious
people would say, a kind of repentance.m
To some extent the following two sections of this chapter
are a response to the question of what remains after the
theological epoche.
With the intellectual decks suitably cleared, one is
in a position to intuit phenomena.. For phenomenology this
difficult enterprise does not mean having a bright or inspired idea. The "intuition" of which Husserl speaks literally means "looking at" (Anschauung) in an effort to reach
the essence of something (or, to take matters a step further, "essential relations") .69 As Farley observes, using
the terminology of Husserl, the phenomenological method is
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an eidetic one: "This means that it was a descriptive method based on a special kind of intuition into the eidos or
essence of something."m
Given the obvious terminological indebtedness to
Plato, it is not surprising that eidetic intuition
(Wesenschau) has prompted the charge of Platonic realism.
Husserl does regard universals as irreducible entities, but
he quickly parts company with Plato when he insists that the
general essence has neither a superior nor even an equal
reality to that of individual essences. To apprehend a
general essence one looks at the particulars as instances or
examples of the general essence. Such is Husserl's "eidetic
reduction": the movement from particular to universal essence. Intuiting a particular facilitates an apprehension
of general essences.7'
Husserl uses "free imaginative variation" to apprehend
essential relations. Here one may drop certain components
entirely, or even replace them with others as we examine
essences. Are a plurality of associated essences necessary
to each other? Are they essentially compatible, or perhaps
incompatible? These considerations do not amount to tautology, since we are grappling with a word's referent and not
the vocable itself. Moreover, these essential insights are
not merely empirical inductions, since the individuals are
examined as examples of essences.72 Diogenes Allen explains:

"Empirical intuition could never yield the general-
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ity and necessity of eidetic intuition. The insights are
obtained by a nonsensuous intuition."Th
This momentary digression is prompted by Farley's appropriation of an eidetic method for phenomenological theology. As will be apparent shortly, through his use of phenomenology Farley is attempting what he calls an "eidetics
of religious cognition." Bound up with social phenomenology
(see below), this eidetics of religious cognition refers to
the apprehension of theological verities under the determinate conditions of a historical faith. This, in turn, entails an "eidetics of redemptive existence" and the "communal matrix" of this existence.74
Phenomenology deals with the phenomena available when
one considers things in a particular way. Often this is
called "the phenomenological reduction," which in rudimentary terms comes down to a suspension of judgment as to the
existence or non-existence of the content of consciousness.

Husserl's mathematical metaphor for this operation

is "bracketing," and it is related to the earlier call for a
suspension of presuppositions.76 "Bracketing" the issue of
existence allows one to focus on the content, the "what" of
one's awareness. In this way phenomena are made accessible;
further, what one intuits in phenomenological analysis is
used as a clue to concealed meanings." Returning to a
theme discussed above, Husserl's reality-bracketing sought
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to expose the "intentional structures" present in reality
appearance.78
As a transcendental philosophy, Husserl's lifetime program is an attempt to obtain access to and
disclosure of the pre-reflective structures and accomplishments (Leistungen) by which the taken-forgranted objects in the everyday world are perceived,
meant, associated, distinguished, and thereby known.
For instance, it is at the pre-reflective (and even
pre-psychic in the sense of the concrete flow of
experience) level where consciousness performs a
synthesis of an amalgam of colors and shapes into an
enduring and "meant" object such as a tree, man, or
table. In his initial formulations of the problem,
Husserl argued that philosophy could only recover
its own scientific integrity and rigor by attending
to its proper task, the investigation of the transcendental foundation of knowledge as such.79
Farley's indebtedness to social phenomenology for his
theological prolegomena is evident from his use of such concepts as "life-world" and "faith-world. is 80

The transition

is effected by Farley's insistence that the "region of the
transcendental" ineluctably "mirrors" the structures of the
world.81 Here "intersubjectivity" is the key: "The degree
of [a particular truth-claim's] reality status is the degree
of its accessibility to a plurality of apprehensions. The
cognizing 'I' is, therefore, always an intersubjective
82
'I."'

This assumes, of course, that one has the notion of

"intersubjectivity" in clear focus.
Intersubjectivity . . . refers to an interpersonal
structure which exists pre-consciously and which is
already prior to any actual relationship or dialogue
as their condition. Intersubjectivity in other
words is human consciousness in its intrinsically
social aspect. It is not produced by everyday acts
of interrelationship but is presupposed by such
acts. The being of the human being is therefore not
merely subjective but intersubjective. Therefore,
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when we wish to designate the actual empirical relations between persons, we shall use the terms reciprocity and interpersonal relations, reserving intersubjectivity for the pre-given, sociallx structured consciousness which such presuppose.
How does the faith-world relate to the social-world?
Professor Farley asserts that the multifarious cognates of
"world" share one common feature: each attempts to express
a "stratum" of world, the unity of which is "prereflectively
intended."84 At the most basic level, the connection between social-world and faith-world arises from the simple
observation that faith does not occur merely in an individual consciousness but "occupies" its own "world."85 Faith
emerges in conjunction with a "determinate social world"m
or through participation in the community's "determinate
intersubjectivity":87 "The point is that faith occurs in a
world or environment in which certain realities come to
light, specific mutual intentionalities occur between human
beings, and a special symbolic universe accompanies these
activities."m
Edward Farley finds phenomenological method, with its
eidetic and intentional analysis, a potentially useful instrument for theological prolegomena. Perhaps above all,
since the procedures involve viewing what is immediately
given, it is not a naturalistic or metaphysical system to
which the content of faith must conform. One can employ the
procedure without Procrustean metaphysical commitments,
wherein one reality scheme acts as the criterion for judg-
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ments about another. Finally, though it avowedly focuses on
the human subject, Farley believes that intentional analysis
escapes the charge of subjectivism. For one thing, it is
not an introspective description of contingent mental feelings or processes, and, in addition, the intentional object
points the analysis beyond the human subject to what appears
to this subject.89
The "House of Authority" Demolished
At one level, this is perhaps the easiest feature of
Farley's prolegomena to summarize. The basic thesis is
clear and ceaselessly reiterated. The classical "way of
authority," most overtly expressed in the "Scripture principle," is now altogether untenable. Therefore, systematic
theology in the sense of the standard loci method is now
meaningless." The "models of authority" traditionally used
in Roman, Lutheran, and Reformed dogmatics have been irreparably shattered.91 Farley is merciless in his express repudiation of the Scripture principle,92 and while some continue to inhabit the "house" even after its collapse (they
are written off as antiquarians) ,93 the real action is taking place among those who are doing theology in a "postauthority" setting.94
Professor Farley acknowledges that his criticism is
radical, and he concedes that the house of authority is the
"historical form" of ecclesial existence.95 Yet this does
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not mean that the main features of the Scripture principle-its Heilsgeschichte framework, the "Adamic myth" (from Paul
Ricoeur's lexicon), the "royal metaphor," and the "logic of
triumph"96--are endemic to ecclesial existence. On the contrary, the Scripture principle is antithetical to the "immanent essence" of ecclesial existence as Farley understands

it .97
A large part of Ecclesial Reflection is Farley's effort to heed the phenomenological call to "bracket" (in other words, temporarily suspend commitment to and not presuppose)" the traditional strata of authority within classical
Christianity." This exercise of epoche involves a massive
critique of "classical criteriology," the latter signaling
those authorities or norms that always function in theological work--however methodologically self-conscious it may
be.im He calls this criticism "archaeology," which suggests
an exposure and subsequent investigation of the strata assumed, often unreflectively, by the classical criteriology.
These strata typically underlie beliefs, symbols, actions,
and institutions.101

Farley has no pious illusions about the

program he is advocating or about what he sees as its inexorable consequences.
Rather than a selective response to the classical criteriology, archaeological inquiry amounts to
a psychoanalytic purge of the theological consciousness. Or, to put it differently, it represents a
theological parallel to Heidegger's beginning his
philosophical program with a negation, the "destruction of the house of ontology." It is only when the
founding strata of the classical criteriology are
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brought to the surface that the problematic which
attends any contemporary theological appeal to specific norms can be experienced in its radicality.
The classical criteriology tends to be of one piece,
or, to change metaphors, a pattern created by a long
series of upright dominoes. The archaeology will
attempt to disclose the pattern. Interpreters of
the Christian faith will have to decide whether or
not to flick the first domino. Historically speaking, the row was toppled centuries ago.102
Without ignoring the nuances, the classical criteriology is roughly coterminous with the house of authority, and
the latter at its core connotes the Scripture principle. To
affirm or impugn one is to affirm or impugn all three. In
brief, the way of authority is a code word for certain features of classical Roman Catholic and Protestant ways of
grounding truth claims:103 "(it entails) some specifiable
entity (Scripture, text, church father) whose truth character was an a priori quality. As an authority, the text
could be a norm for truth but could not itself be subject to
something outside itself to determine its truth.
Reverting for a moment to the language of social phenomenology, the essence of the way of authority is its inveterate displacement of "spheres of immediate evidence"
(the sphere of "reality presentation") by vehicles of social
persistence.105 In fact, Farley contends that wherever it
occurs, the central feature of the Scripture principle is
this coincidence of written authority and vehicle of social
identity and persistence.106
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Historically, the Scripture principle emerges out of
the milieu of synagogal Judaism, not Israelite religion.107
The dispersion and its manifold effects led to a new focus
on written Torah. In Judaism, "Scripture" attains a fairly
precise connotation: "[it] means a written deposit of the
definitive and completed revelation of Yahweh to his people,
the primary function of which is to be the source of community cultic and moral regulations (halakah).008
Farley argues that the Scripture principle was by no
means required by the emergent Christianity of the first
century. Christianity came close to transcending or even
rejecting the Judaic Scripture principle.109

The "self-

conscious retention and confirmation" of the Scripture principle is incompatible with Farley's notion of ecclesiality.110 But for now we note simply that, with the necessary
modifications, Christianity did retain the Scripture principle.111 The assorted Christian modifications of Judaism's
Scripture principle result in a new definition of Scripture.
Scripture means a two-part collection of writings
which prefigures (the Old Testament) and describes
(the New Testament) the central event of salvation
history, the coming of the Messiah and the beginnings of the universal messianic community, which
functions to control and measure the continuing traditioninq event and proclaiming of that event to all
nations.
To sum up, in either context Holy Scripture refers to a collection of writings reflecting a normative period of revelation,113 the genre and function of which concerns divinely
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given cultic and moral regulations for the life of the community.114
This Scripture principle is attended by several "middle axioms."115 Farley's definition is technical: "I am
using the term to call attention to a stratum of presuppositions which mediates the founding stratum and the explicit
criteria or authorities appealed to in self-conscious reflection or disputation.o m Perhaps most important, they
are rooted in what Farley calls the "principle of identity,"
a foundational pillar of the house of authority.117 The
principle postulates an identity between what God desires to
communicate and what comes to expression in language in the
interpretative act of the individual or community.118
The principle of identity has two sides. The objective side is God's disclosed will for the corporate life of
His people. The "agential" side refers to the specific process of divine communication, which eventually finds expression in such notions as "prophets" and, most overtly, "inspiration.""9 The recipient of God's disclosed will, or the
bearer of His communication, becomes His de facto presence,
the locus where His word/will can be perpetually found.120
To summarize, the principle of identity involves
interpreting the creaturely entity as the ersatz
presence of the divine, a synthesis of divine intention and human interpretation into one content, and
the explanation of that content by divine causal
efficacy. The result is an identity of content between what is divinely
willed (revealed) and what is
humanly asserted.121
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As part of the classical criteriology, Farley maintains that there are three "locations" of the divine-human
identity. Without detailing their parallel development from
oral tradition all the way through the church's magisterium,
the three locations (or, perhaps better, the threefold location) are Scripture, the eventual written testimony to
Jesus' word by his followers; orthodox dogma, the "definitive doctrinalization" of the apostolic testimony in the New
Testament; and the church's teaching authority, a "definitive institution" arising as the "perennial guardian and
interpreter" of Scripture and dogma.122 Scripture is the
cornerstone of this foundation,m yet all three locations of
divine-human identity presuppose and require the others.124
In any case, the locus of divine-human identity--the authority--is itself the evidence (or location of evidence) for
theological judgment and religious belief.125
The middle axioms are likewise threefold. The middle
axioms extend the principle of identity, and they too are
part of the presuppositional strata of the classical criteriology. While they are not quite so readily surveyed as
the locations of divine-human identity, they are the axiom
of secondary representation, the axiom of leveling, and the
axiom of immutability.MS These three, in turn, are further
rooted in two "founding presuppositions": salvation history
and the periodization of history.127

229
The first middle axiom, secondary representation, concerns the extension of identity to a secondary representative that functions as a vehicle of social persistence.
Here the believer interprets the chronologically successive
entity--a conciliar assertion or magisterial pronouncement-as a further locus of divine-human identity.12.13 This axiom
is central, and Farley explains it carefully:
The initial and most basic extension to a secondary representative occurs in the transition from a
living, charismatic, authoritative figure to its
persistence or revival in ongoing tradition. A second extension of representation occurs in the transition from oral tradition and its characteristic
mode of duration (in cultic recital, in memorization) to written deposit. A third extension of representation occurs in the transition from written
deposit to a definitive commentary on or interpretation of that deposit. A fourth extension, which can
also take place concomitantly with other extensions,
occurs in the emergence of an institution whose role
is to maintain, protect, and purify the tradition
and its ongoing interpretation. In all of these
transitions, the original locus of identity between
divinely willed content and human recipient is extended to entities (institutions, writings, oral
traditions) that represent the original ersatz divine representative and thus have a secondary statUS.
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The order of the middle axioms is important. In the
second middle axiom the focus shifts from the content of the
original identity to its vehicle.130 Farley calls this shift
"leveling": "the equal distribution of truth in the vehicle
of communication"131--including its interior details and
parts.132 Clearly, this means that each component of the way
of authority is equally authoritative; furthermore, all ve-
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hicles of divine authority are as internally veracious at
one point as another.133
Finally, the third middle axiom stipulates that the
bearers of divinely communicated content, in whole and in
part, are unchangably valid and applicable. This is
Farley's principle of immutability, and it signals a permanence of the divine content extended even to interior details of the secondary representative.04 This and the first
two axioms together ground a notion of across-the-board inerrancy,n5 and they pave the way for a non-historical and
inherently atomistic exegesis.136
Only against this backdrop of the Scripture principle
and its supporting middle axioms can one understand traditional theological method. In almost tautological fashion,
Farley declares that theological method traditionally construed is criteriology.137 This is really an admission that
at key points within the classical criteriology there is
simply little concern for or even consciousness of method.138
In the "framework of authority" theology is not scientific,
evidence-gathering inquiry; instead, it is the citation,
exposition, and harmonizing of the relevant texts.139 If one
recalls the middle axioms sketched above, particularly the
axiom of secondary representation, he will realize how circular the whole procedure can become--and thereby how it can
claim immunity to any criticism, inquiry, or even the question of truth. VW Once the secondary representation has tak-
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en place (in other words, once a theological query has attained dogmatic resolution), this same theological and doctrinal "accomplishment" comes to enjoy the status of criterion, given, and evidence.u1 Criterion and doctrinal formulation now coincide.142 Classical theological method is
demonstration,143 and the house of authority is soon an
pregnable castle."144

"im-

. . this way of authority locates evidences for
judgments in vehicles of social persistence (authorities) rather than in immediate manifestation; it is
in style and genre citation rather than inquiry;
and, it restricts the question of truth to very formal operations.145
Summarizing to this point, classical theology operated
on a pre-critical, source-to-application model. Theological
understanding is a simple matter. It describes a movement
from a disclosed knowledge, facilitated by an acquaintance
with the deposit of revelation, to the exhibition and application of the same.146 Both Roman and Protestant orthodoxy
assumed this method of authority. Within this mode of
thought, the authorities (Scripture and/or tradition) function as or in place of evidential and critical ways of establishing truth claims. The theological enterprise was
grounded in the deposit of divinely revealed truths. The
single entity, theology, lent itself to various usages and
purposes, among them exhibiting and defending truth and opposing heterodoxy.147
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The impregnable castle, Farley contends, was blown to
bits with the advent of modernity. If one theme is obvious
in Farley's work, from the popular Requiem for a Lost Piety
(1966) to Theologia, it is his total and unrelenting rejection of the Scripture principle and with it the whole house
of authority. This has self-evident import for theological
prolegomena: "Our question is, how can theology proceed to
make true judgments and back them up if it cannot draw on
the features and concepts of the way of authority?048
At a straightforward historical level, the Scripture
principle is crushed under the weight of emergent Biblical
criticism. Farley does not challenge the claims of such as
Lessing, Kierkegaard, or Troeltsch;149 indeed, there can be
no "mere authority" once critical method assumes academic
hegemony. To retain the Scripture principle in this setting
is "special pleading" or "ideology."50 The historicalcritical method, taken in undiluted form, desupernaturalizes
and relativizes both the traditional authorities as well as
the content of Christian faith,151 since the origin of the
Biblical material is now recognized as a historical and not
a supernatural process.152
Once the house of authority has been destroyed, its
theological content will soon be plundered. Attempts by
church leaders to retain some residue of their traditional
faith are doomed to failure.153 At a very basic level, the
history of modern theology is a salvage operation. Con-

233
stantly in retreat, Christian theologians have been, in
Farley's words, "searching for the gold nugget somewhere in
the network"; that is, they seek the remaining authoritative
element that will not be destroyed by the next pronouncement
of critical historians.154
If the framework and presuppositions of the house of
authority are not in operation, these writings cannot be regarded as "holy Scripture." That is, they
cannot be differentiated from other writings as
having their origin in a special divine act of inspiration which gives all their parts (passages,
texts) the a priori quality of truth and authority.
We put the matter as clearly and bluntly as possible because it is our conviction that much of the
confusion that attends modern theology is a result
of ambiguity and vacillation on this point, symptomized in antinomies that attend the commitment to
historical-critical methods and the Scripture principle. A number of unsolvable problems have occupied theologians as a result. One unsolvable
problem attends the long and fruitless search for a
new locus of authority in Scripture. This search
acknowledges the discreditation of the old model of
plenary inspiration and the a priori authority of
all biblical passages. It looks for some residual
authority, some nucleus in Scripture where a priori
truth, the truth to which the church is subject,
makes its last stand. Proposed are salvation history, revelatory events, a canon within the canon
composed of Jesus Christ, justifying faith, and the
like. The problem is simply that there is no such
residue once the presuppositions of the Scripture
principle are undercut.
The obstacles involved in any mix of historical consciousness with elements of the way of authority (this mix is
roughly Farley's definition of neo-orthodoxy, as represented
by the likes of Karl Barth and Karl Rahner)156 are simply
insurmountable. 157
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There is much more to Farley's archaeology of the
classical criteriology than the claim that historical-critical methodology debunks the Bible. The problem with the
Scripture principle is not only its epistemological inadequacy. Within Farley's theological prolegomena the issue is
much more fundamental: the Scripture principle is per se
inimical to ecclesial existence.
The problem that attends this cornerstone of the
classical criteriology is not simply a hermeneutical
one, as expressed in this way: "We know from historical evidence that atomistic citation of Scripture is invalid so let us discover a more adequate
set of rules by which to apply, interpret, believe
in, and appropriate the texts of Scripture." The
problem is the Scripture principle itself and its
incompatibility with ecclesial existence.158
In the face of this incompatibility, the retention of
the Scripture principle leads to a series of antinomies and
to inherently confusing ways of grounding theological judgments.159 The most basic of these antinomies concerns the
Scripture principle's conflict with a key feature of ecclesial existence, namely, the experience of salvation in a
universally available mode.IN This feature will be developed at greater length in the following section. Here we
note simply that in both form and content the Scripture
principle presents a host of impossible dilemmas.
First, Christianity's (unnecessary) appropriation of
the Jewish Scripture principle signals a capitulation to the
profound ethnicity of post-exilic Judaism.161 Farley goes so
far as to assert that a universal religious community cannot
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embrace the Jewish Scripture principle without contravening
its own nature.1!'2 He elaborates:
The Scripture principle can be workable if one
grants the desirability of a continuation of a single ethnic community which perpetually adopts Scripture's regulations to its situation. But once a
religious community accepts the validity of cultural
pluralism, it cannot model itself on Scripture under
the principles of identity and leveling. This is
why the Christian movement has always been a hybrid
phenomenon. It embraces the Scripture principle in
full, with each age claiming to model its communal
and individual life on Scripture. This can be done
only by ignoring most of the actual contents of
Scripture or by so interpreting selective parts that
Scripture appears to be the authority.163
This citation and its reference to the-"actual contents" of the Bible point to the other problems Farley finds
inherent in the Scripture principle. For instance, the
royal metaphor noted earlier as an element of the Biblical
history scheme entails a glut of "theodicy considerations."
Farley argues that the royal metaphor involves a "willful
nonsalvific presence" in most of history; or, on the assumption that God's will and action are universal, the evils of
human history would have the same relation to God's causality as do His saving acts.14
[The two alternatives] involve admitting either that
God can but does not will to operate salvifically in
all his creation or that he can and does determine
all his creation and is thus the determiner of good
and evil. Both alternatives retain the royal metaphor but abolish any meaningful affirmation of the
goodness and love of God.165
When the royal metaphor is coupled with the principle
of identity, it is a short step to a charge of idolatry.
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The house of authority can and has functioned as an ersatz
god, especially when it attains institutional or hierarchical form.166 When ecclesia is identified with an authoritative and definitive institution, the historical faith is
susceptible to ethical imperialism and the domination of
culture.167 Such tendencies exist precisely because the
classical criteriology places entities (whether individuals,
writings, or institutions) outside "the network of multiple
influences."'m
The foregoing is Farley's application of the phenomenological epoche to the classical way of authority, and it
is a major theme of his theological prolegomena. Farley
proposes his own thesis: "The Scripture principle does not
offer a vehicle of duration that corresponds to ecclesial
existence."169 Quite obviously, the repudiation of the
Scripture principle entails a further overhaul of the nature
and method of those theologies that have long presupposed
it. When theology flees the house of authority, it abandons
its foundational materials: Heilsgeschichte, identity,
canon, divine inspiration, "sacred" Scripture, inerrancy,
and all the rest.170 Its treasured methods soon follow:
"the substitution of authority for evidence, the genre of
citation, and the formalistic restriction of truth."171
Once the effects of this earthquake on faith's selfinterpreted content have been felt,117 the remaining task is
an examination of those features of ecclesia that necessari-
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ly burst the old wineskins of the Scripture principle. The
epoche and its bracketing are behind us. We seek now to
apprehend the essence of ecclesial existence.
A Revisionist Alternative: Theology
As Ecclesial Reflection
Application of the phenomenological epoche to the
classical criteriology has thoroughly discredited the traditional way of authority. Holy Scripture in traditional theology is the locus of divine-human identity, so that when
one listens to the Biblical Word he hears the voice of God
Himself.m Scripture and the other elements of the classical criteriology are nearly a sociological effort to survive
the "dispersive effects" of historical transition. However,
once this classical criteriology is cast into dogma, it absolutizes a particular historical achievement and the resolution of a specific epoch. M In the long run, this calcification led to a host of unacceptable intellectual sins,
the nature of which is anything but venial: "[the way of
authority] continues to foster obscurantism, dualisms in the
human self, superstition, sexism, reality denial, legalism
as a unifying piety and mindset."115
Clearly, theology has to find a better way. Farley is
convinced that the classical criteriology, despite its historical pretensions, is not a priori to what he calls the
"immanent essence" of Christianity.176 This claim is the
basis for the constructive side of his prolegomena, which is
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cast in fairly esoteric phenomenological dress. For example, he contends that "the post-epoche residue" is the matrix of "reality apprehensions" of the community of faith."7
This becomes a little more transparent when one notes
Farley's distinction between "concrete reality apprehensions" and criteriology. The former is concerned with religious knowledge and the latter with theological understanding and method.m Very simply, one can have reality apprehensions without the old way of authority. This means, in
turn, that theological understanding remains a possibility
too .179
Vital to the above is Professor Farley's conviction
that the mediating vehicle of religious insight is a "determinate historical community" (or "ecclesia," as described
below).UM A post-authority theology will ground its judgments in accessible "fields of evidence."181 Theology cannot
be pursued above the "grid of life itself" because theological understanding is preceded by and grounded in the predispositions of faith.182 Also, the immediate apprehensions
of faith occur pre-reflectivelym and preinstitutionally
they are mediated through the "distinctive sociality" of the
ecclesial community.185
Farley presupposes the primacy of this community as
the locus of immediate apprehensions.186 This is transitional to a specific pursuit of the "constitutive aspect" of
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theology, an uncovering or apprehension (Wesenschau) of the
essence of ecclesial existence.187
Phenomenological theology's aim is to locate the
immediate and founding apprehensions which accompany
faith. Generally expressed, our thesis is that
faith's apprehensions occur pre-reflectively and by
means of an enduring participation in a form of corporate, historical existence which we are calling
ecciesia. Specifically, we submit that the major
clue guiding our search is provided by a nexus of
interaction and interdependence between certain components of ecclesia.'
Farley is very careful to stipulate from the outset
that theological prolegomena itself cannot mediate the references and realities of theology.UP Rather, theological
method attempts to discover how the apprehensions that accompany participation in ecclesial existence will supply a
reflection concerned with truth and culminating in understanding .190
A post-authority theology will not be explication or
citation of ossified propoitional deposits.191 The "method"
of phenomenological theology is reflective: "an attempt to
penetrate and open up matters which are present but hidden."192 At one level, the goal of such reflection is the
"situation of faith," what Farley calls the components and
structures that facilitate the reality-apprehensions of
faith.193 For this reason, "authorities" cannot be the key
to the situation of reality apprehension. Instead, in a
theology informed by the categories of social phenomenology
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the terms are reversed and the situation of reality-apprehension defines and illumines the authorities.194
. . . phenomenological theology must precede theological criteriology. This is not because "phenomenology" precedes such, but because the question of
the mode of givenness of the object is that which
should found decisions about authorities and norms,
not vice versa.195
The genre of theology Farley proposes is reflective
inquiry.196 Commensurate with the scientific mentality in
general,197 theology as inquiry is not content to exegete
authorities relativized by historical consciousness.198 Theology is devoted to the interrogation of appropriate--and
multiple--fields of evidence.

Because theological inquiry

is a process, it simply cannot occur within the framework of
the classical criteriology.200
By way of preliminary introduction, theology as reflective inquiry has three dimensions: portraiture, truth
discernment, and praxis discernment.201 The first two dimensions are considered in Ecclesial Reflection. The third
--"theology as it occurs in and toward specific biographical
and social situationsI'M_ _
awaits systematic development.
Portraiture is the first "moment" of theological reflection.m It is the historical description of ecclesial
existence.2" Portraiture is both historical and theological
in character. Historically, it tries to portray a genuine,
corporate historical existence. Theologically, though, it
depicts this historical reality in its "ideal and entelecha-
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ic" aspects:216 " . . . theological portraiture attempts to
grasp the relative origin of ecclesial existence in the
sense of describing the event(s) and person(s) to whose
causal efficacy the new kind of historical existence owes
its being. to 206
Hermeneutics is integral to theological portraiture.
Farley is adamant that portraiture is not concerned with
Christianity aua Christianity.207 The hermeneutical task is
one of "disengagement": "to disengage the symbolic universe
of faith from its territorial and landed-meaning framework."am One seeks to "see through" the latter to the former.209

To the extent that one succeeds--as the symbolic

universe is "mapped"--ecclesiality comes increasingly into
view.210
Hence, the focus of theological portraiture is ecclesialitv.211 It may well avail itself of historical studies
of Christianity. But what will emerge from these efforts
is, in Farley's words, "a type of corporate existence."212
So far the terms "ecclesial existence" and "ecclesiality"
have been used sparingly, and only when the same point could
not be made with different vocables. However, they become
central at this point. These concepts are so important to
Farley's overall scheme that he can define theology itself
as "ecclesial reflective inquiry."213
Ecclesiality is a mode of corporate historical existence, which is undergoing redemption under universal condi-
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tions.214

The three underscored terms signal the quintessen-

tial features of ecclesiality. Ecclesia and ecclesiality
are definitely not synonymous with their counterparts in the
traditional way of authority, church and Christianity.215 At
their best, the latter pair may be vehicles of the former.
Ecclesiality and ecclesia are comprehensive types; they are
partly actual and partly ideal/teleological notions.216

All

too often, the institutional concepts of Christianity and
church have inhibited the eschatological features of ecclesia and ecclesiality.
To say that ecclesiality is a mode of corporate existence is tautological. More specifically, a distinctive
"intersubjectivity" is involved,217 which moves beyond mere
self-identity.218 In more phenomenological jargon, what
Farley calls "depth sociality" is at work. This concept
inquires into the meanings or meaning-acts ("mutually intended meanings") which occur between the persons of this
community, and without which people relate to this community
as an aggregate of strangers.219 Still, this does not exhaust the significance of this feature. For Farley, faith's
"cognitive dimension" is founded in this community participation; therefore, theology's "given and ground" commence
there .220
Perhaps above all, ecclesiality is redemptive existence. Ecclesia is thus a mode of existence that is
"alienation-in-transition-to-redemption:021 "What it means
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to be ecclesia in any time is the envisioning of the stranger (the weak, suffering, oppressed other) through the imagery of redemptive existence."222 Correspondingly, ecclesia
is ideally a community that has a redemptive effect on its
environment.m This "modification" of existence "toward"
redemption--the possibly cumbersome expression points up its
incomplete and eschatological dimension224--is as close as
Farley will come to "essence of Christianity" language.
Note very well, he is not referring to a historically unchanging kernel vis-a-vis a changing husk in the manner of
Harnack.m Theological portraiture as Farley envisions it
is a perpetually changing enterprise, the aim of which is
ecclesiality. So conceived, ecclesial existence, the "kingdom of God," connotes a process:226 n a way in which the
spaces of any culture become open to redemptively transforming power.11227
Redemption has both negative and positive aspects.
Negatively, redemption reduces the inclination and need of a
person to secure himself, which further involves founding
one's own meaning and telos by "absolutizing attachments" to
temporal, worldly entities.228 Positively, redemption transforms an idolatrousm way of "being-in-the-world": "The
world and its contents are grasped as not-the-eternal and
dependent-on-the-eternal. Replacing enmity and fear are
wonder, awe, and concern toward worldly entities, an empathetic, emotive appreciation of them, as part of the network
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of created being."230 In more traditional language, redemption shows how the human world is and how it can be in contrast to sin.m Moreover, redemption effects a new mode of
being-in-the-world as the presence of the eternal and so
ends the pursuit of a "mundane remover of chaos. "232 This
dovetails with Farley's stated purpose in Ecclesial Man:
"to illustrate the appresence of God to redemptive existence."m
If redemption signals the participation in co-intentionalities of freedom and obligation instead of idolatry
and flight,m. it is important to recognize that redemptive
existence occurs in the ecclesial community in connection
with the particular "mythos" (gospel) of this community.
Ideally, the mythos and gospel govern the way the community
endures over time.

This means, in turn, that tradition and

"traditioning" are one aspect of the redemptive nature of
the ecclesial community.235 Involved here is what Farley
calls "ecclesial process": "an ever-moving horizon of redemptive activity."236 This is an "ideal-historical" term
describing the community's persistence through time as an
occurrence of redemption. Hence, it approximates the synoptic gospels' designation "kingdom of God."237
Ecclesial process and its related notion of "ecclesial
corporate memory" naturally introduce the question of the
relationship of redemption's "originating event" to its (redemption's) occurrence in the ecclesial community. Farley
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insists that redemption has a "historical" character insofar
as it occurs as the historical occurs ("in the network of
reciprocal interrelations and interactions").V.M The theologian will be concerned, among other things, with a study of
the originating event, its appropriate "linguistic unit" and
written account, and its institutionalization.
The "originating event" effected universalization of
the ethnic "Torah community" and gave redemptive existence
its new focus. Its "initiating center" is the person of
Jesus of Nazareth--His message, ministry, death, and renewed
presence.229 The primitive gospel is the announcement that
in and through this Jesus, salvation is now available to
everyone.240

It is "normative," Farley avers, not in the

sense of authoritative--"the community's attempt to make all
subsequent events and empirical religious communities representations or limitations of the original one"241--but rather
definitive for the self-interpretation of future historical
expressions of the same type of corporate existence.242
The concepts of social and ecciesial duration are at
work here. Social duration is the antithesis of historical
indifference, since some stratum of its past is recalled and
revivified as part of the society's present.243 The decisive
feature of specifically ecciesial duration is the remembrance and celebration of the originating, normative
event.244 As such, it is the perpetuation of ecclesial existence:245 "[including] the originating universalizing event,
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the ecclesial community (and its intersubjectivity), and the
experienced and proclaimed salvation."246
Duration and persistence invariably occur through vehicles (written and institutional) and activities.247 Here
the written vehicles emerge as central to theological portraiture. First in sequence is the literature of the faith
of Israel. Its unique contribution to theological portraiture is the expression of the faith's "symbolic universe,"
one which constitutes ecclesial existence.248 Most important, however, is Kerygma: "the literature of the initial
transition to ecclesiality. n249 By virtue of this transitional role, and because it conveys the "paradigm of ecclesiality," it enjoys a certain primacy.250 Its normative
function is to attest the originating events of ecclesial
existence.251
There is, then, a literature that attended the
transition to ecclesial existence which records,
even if the purpose of the author was specific and
occasional, various moments of the transition from
the perspective of belief-ful participation in the
transition. This literature, written from faith,
records the events of ecclesial origin. For this
reason it has the character of kerygma.252
This literature is not to be confused with the canonical New
Testament of the classical way of authority.253 One need not
take refuge in "theories of inspiration, "254 nor is one troubled by historical "uncertainties" in the gospels.255 Such
matters are never at issue:

. . when the collection of

authoritative writings is submitted to ecclesiality, the
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resulting function of that collection in the community
bursts the Scripture principle altogether."256
Theological portraiture cannot properly approach the
literature of the faith of Israel or the third literature,
"Interpretation," apart from the paradigm of kerygma.257
"Interpretation" as a vehicle of ecclesial duration and
self-identitym signals the community's efforts to formulate
the Christian mythos at levels of belief, understanding, and
knowledge. The literature of Interpretation has the character of "doctrinalization,"259 and it is unified by the community's effort to understand the Christian mythos.m A set
of writings does not determine the ecclesial community's
proper duration. On the contrary, the duration appropriate
to this kind of faith and social existence will determine
how the writings function in this community.261
In summary, these literatures have two central uses in
theological reflection. First, they preserve the historical
reality of ecclesial existence, so that its symbolic universe can become a continuing occasion for salvific transformation. They "make available" ecclesial existence as a
historical entity. Second, their decisive and central function occurs in theological portraiture, simply because these
literatures express the symbolic universe of ecclesial existence in its most comprehensive and enduring fashion.262
With the closing of the house of authority, the hermeneutic
"seeing through" that attends theological portraiture is no
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longer concerned with rules for interpreting discrete texts.
Now theological reflection deals with literature pertinent
to the depiction of ecclesial existence.263
Along with the linguistic and written expressions of
ecclesial duration, there is finally institutionalization.
Farley argues that ecclesia requires some form of institutionalization, but he insists as well that the specific
forms are not intrinsic to ecclesia per se.2M While the
term "church" combines intersubjectivity, sociality, and
institutional structure,265 Farley is exploring an "idealactual" entity in ecciesiality; therefore, no contemporary
branch of Christendom can be normative for the inquiry.
They all represent a plurality of historical actualizations
that in fact contradict ecciesiality, and thus they have a
"highly tenuous relation" to ecclesial existence.266 Positively, of course, the principal function of institutionalization is to enable a social entity to persist through
time . 267
Farley's disqualification of any historical or contemporary group as the embodiment of ecclesia is not to be dismissed as idle polemic. His point involves not only the
vehicles of persistence for a normative event.2'8

Rather, we

are here coming to the core of ecclesia as universalized
redemptive existence.
Heretofore we have not paid sufficient attention to
this feature, but it is basic to every aspect of Farley's
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prolegomena. Farley's work is a portraiture of ecclesial
existence, which means a "universalized modality" of divine
redemptive presence.269 The universality is temporal, social, and religious; or, in other words, it cannot be limited to any epoch, socio-cultural group, or institutional religion. This is quite consistent with the repudiation of
the Scripture principle and its concomitant postulate of
"selective intervention."270 Ecclesial existence abolishes
salvation history in the traditional sense, since its universalism abolishes all ethnic and national conditions of
redemption271--"provincial" or "determinate" times and
spaces.272 Very simply, redemptive existence literally demands (Farley's word) the negation of all such boundaries.273
The universal element refers both to the negative
fact that no specific human cultural entity (language, land, nation, sex, epoch) is an indispensable
condition for the redemptive presence of God and to
the positive fact that redemption applies potentially to all the environments or life-worlds in which
human beings have their being.
Professor Farley is quite aware of the inherent differences between his portraiture and the corollaries of the
classical criteriology. He argues that the classical criteriology presumes both the periodization of revelationredemption and the "restriction" of revelation to an earlier
epoch. Normative revelation occurred in the past in connection with a singular, definitive epoch. Farley contends,
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however, that this periodization is by no means intrinsic to
revelation itself.
There is nothing in the nature of revelation as
such which necessarily restricts it to specific periods of time. In fact, the opposite is closer to
the truth. For if revelation is a disclosive activity of God, one would expect that activity to be
rooted in God's very nature and therefore characteristic of the ongoing relation between God and being.
If revelation is a concomitant of God's redemptive
activity, it has no independent or primary status in
theology. If this is the case, revelation will occur as long as redemptive activity occurs. Revelation-redemption describes a constant relation between a loving_and merciful God and a fragile and
fallen world.'"
What dare not be overlooked in the above citation is
the implicit relativization of the incarnation as a kairotic
moment of revelatory activity. Farley does refer to "originating events" and, more specifically, to their "initiating
center."m He tentatively asserts in Ecclesial Man that
"elements" in the teaching and public ministry of Jesus
"anticipate" ecclesia: "The message of the kingdom of God
is so cast that it transcends the salvation-history framework of the holy nation and the holy city."27 In Ecclesial
Reflection he defines the originating event as one that at
once effects the universalization of the "Torah community"
and the new focus of redemptive existence. The initiating
center is the Christ-event as defined above.21 But this
declaration is followed immediately by an important addition: ". . . as the event effecting a transition to a new
kind of historical-corporate existence, it also includes the
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transition of Jesus' accomplishment into kerygma and ecclesial community."279 The difficulty is apparent when one realizes that the "ecclesial community," as elsewhere defined,
can exist without any overt ties to the apostolic church.28°
If the originative events are not hapax, as they are
in classical Christianity, can they still be declared normative? Farley maintains that the events in question are
normative because of their "historical actuality"281__"an
actualization of redemptive possibilities and world relationships"282_,and the redemptive transformation they effect.m The events from which ecclesiality arises are unified by precisely this capacity to signal a transition to a
"new mode" of redemptive existence.284 "They are the events
which effected a new condition of redemptive existence; thus
their content is, ever after, the content of what ecclesial
existence requires to remain a distinctive historical
type."285 Significantly, Farley observes that any comprehensive treatment of redemption would be necessarily Christological.286
To reiterate, the originating event (the ministry of
Jesus, its impact on a small band of disciples, the Gentile
mission) is normative insofar as its result is a mode of
corporate existence that offers universally accessible redemption.287 The linguistic vehicles of theological portraiture will ideally capture the revelatory, trans-historical
character of the events. The "story "NM and "images"289
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pressed into service will facilitate proclamation and "celebrative remembering."m
Faith, Farley says, describes the way in which men and
women live in and toward God and toward the world under the
impact of redemption.291 Its "intrinsic feature" in the
light of ecclesiality reflects a corresponding universality:
"[it is] the unrestricted reach of the perceptiveness which
redemption effects."292 Indeed, faith is directed to realities that transcend the behaviors, experiences, or images
of any historical religion, including Christianity.m The
"references of faith" are those realities of faith as "carried" by the images and doctrinalizations of the ecclesial
community. Their matrix and unity is ecclesiality itself-"a
universalized form of redemptive community."214 Farley is
convinced that it is possible to penetrate the matrix of
faith, and this is the object of second-order reflection
within the context of phenomenological theology.295
If the first moment of theological reflection is portraiture, wherein ecclesiality comes into view as a historical entity, the second moment moves beyond these principally
hermeneutical aspects to the question of truth.296 Farley
variously calls this second moment "truth discernment" or
theological judgment.297 The abandonment of the gutted house
of authority does not free the theologian from his responsibility to make theological judgments. To be sure, judg-
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ments attend all "critical-cognitive" and "reality-oriented"
enterprises.m
In keeping with his phenomenological orientation,
Farley appropriates a fourth theory of truth--the traditional, threefold typology includes the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic/operational--to serve this moment of
theological reflection. Begun by Husserl and developed by
Martin Heidegger, he terms it the "disclosure" approach to
truth.299 It emphasizes the essence of truth and the "region
of its occurrence" and not primarily the bearers of truth
(the statements and language).300
Farley does not simply
discount the traditional typology; his approach is much more
carefully nuanced. His argument is that judgments are true
when their claims can be grounded in "world structural" and
"as-such" references.m
My own inclination is to retain two fundamental features of truth proffered by these [traditional] theories. The first discloses truth as a predicate of
judgments, hence, the possibility of true and false
judgments. That which gives a judgment this predicate is the degree to which the judgment expresses
"how the world is." The second feature of truth
indicates what in fact must happen for "how the
world is" to obtain a judgmental expression, namely,
a reality disclosure. These two features may help
explain why language about truth is equivocal. Thus
the problem of truth is at one time the problem of
how reality comes forth, occurs, is manifest--in
short, the problem of grounding, of evidence, warrants, and verification. At another time the problem of truth is the problem of types of statements,
their qualities, references, and relations.m
Farley's theological portraiture identified three dimensions of "ecclesial universals": "ecclesiality's global
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reference, the human problematic of sin and the reality of
redemption, and the transcendent."303 Early Christian literature presupposes the imagery and narrative described by
Paul Ricoeur as the Adamic myth, and it complements the same
with its "story of Jesus."3"
. . . the Christian faith involves a depiction of
human existence by way of images of human evil, reconciliation, the world, hope, and transcendence.
This intended imagery is a constitutive feature of
the community of faith or ecclesia. Second, this
imagery is not merely a collection of representations in a world-view, but expresses an experiential
dimension which is finally unified in the motif of
redemption. In other words, one component of the
community of faith is an individually experienced
alteration of existence toward redemption. Third,
the matrix of this experience is a determinate intersubjectivity, a specific structure of co-intentions which makes the faith-community distinctive as
a community.
Evil and redemption are thus motifs in the Adam-Gospel
story, and they are intended as being at least in some way
universa1.306 Moreover, if ecclesiality is at once a faith
and a universal modality of redemption,307 any circumvention
of the truth question is illicit.308 Truth-intentions or
reality-intentions are of necessity "immanent" in faith, in
the ecclesial community, and in theological portraiture009
"If there is no relation between the primary symbol's references and how the world really is in both general structure
and discreteness, there is no way the symbol can be an agent
of transformation except in the most accidental and arbitrary sense. "310
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Not only are truth questions unavoidable, every dimension of theology occurs under their "propulsion."311 The
truth-intentions become explicit in faith's reflection.312
Specifically, theology reviews the truth-intentions endemic
to faith, and it evaluates their claims about "how the world
is" and the evidence for these claims.313 In this express
movement to theological judgment, two questions are always
in view. First, what "grounds" a theological claim as true,
and how does this grounding take place? Second, how is the
ground present in appropriate fields of evidence?314
Professor Farley acknowledges an indebtedness to
Bernard Lonergan as he offers four "general features" of
judgment, which mutatis mutandis persist in theological
judgment as well.
The first is the reference of the judgment to reality, to "how the world is," to what is the case.
This reference can be to how the world is in fact or
in structure. Because of the element of structure,
some theological judgments are a priori in character. Second, because of this reference to something
as itself, to something as such, judgments have a
universal character. This does not mean that the
reference itself is to something global or worldwide. Negatively expressed, it means that the reference is not simply correlative to a single apprehending subject. Its as such character makes it
available in principle. In short, the references of
true judgments have an intersubjective availability.
Furthermore, however fleeting, however historically relative these references are, their intersubjective availability gives them a nonrelative aspect. . . .
Third, all true judgments make a claim, thus
implying the appropriateness of evidence. Reasonsfor are an immanent meaning stratum of true judgments. The fields of evidence that supply reasons
for, for instance, numbers, the historical past, or
human behavior set the criteria for the judgment.
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Hence, the third feature of judgment is the presence
as part of the judgment's proper environment of criteria.
Finally, the judgment is not born ex nihilo but
represents a transition or moment in the cognitive
process. The transition is from meaning-oriented
insight or apprehension of the reference to understanding.
To render the theological application still more
overt, because a distinctive "as suchness" and universality
accompanies the ecclesial universals, a theological judgment
seeks to identify and formulate this "immanent universality."M6

Therefore, the movement to theological judgment is

one of discerning "potential candidates" for ecclesial universals in their present setting in ecclesiality, and proceeding to a formulation (or abandonment) of these candidates by uncovering their "as-such" (or world structural)
elements.m7
In this light, Farley can describe theology itself as
an effort to bring pre-theological, apprehended verities to
formulation. These formulations are "intended" as true by
interrogating pertinent fields of evidence. Theological
judgments require the interrogation of fields of evidence
and are therefore correlative with such evidence. Because
it aspires to formulation that states a truth-intention,
theology can be further--and more tersely--defined as "a
reflection toward making judgments."318
In a post-authority milieu, therefore, one's criteria
are no longer the venerated traditions but fields of evi-
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dence, of which Farley proposes two categories. First,
there is the ecclesial "symbolic universe," the AdamicGospel paradigm, and the corresponding "depth social structure" of ecclesial existence. The second field includes
descriptions of ecclesial existence from a specific (parochial) confessional standpoint, wherein a faith community
consults its own corporate experience and determinacy in a
confessional way. Here confession aims to give motive and
unity to historical description.319
The culmination of judgment as evidence-oriented inquiry and a claim-making enterprise is understanding. True
judgment and understanding are correlative. Like its correlate, understanding too has four "moments" or "aspects."
First, it is able to disentangle references from arbitrary
or inappropriate trappings of world-view or language. Second, understanding entails insight into what Farley calls
the conditions of a reality's occurrence (for example, historical origin, "ontological genesis," or transcendent possibility). Third, understanding involves grasping these
references in their own "interior constitutive structure,"
their aspects, their interrelationship, and their unity.
Fourth, understanding grasps the subject at hand in its appropriate place: ". . . in its own 'world,' the environment
proper to its being, function, and meaning, and also in its
place in the world, the interrelationship between it and its
'world' and other environments."320 Together, these features
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demonstrate that understanding has a historical character.
In practice, this means that as it is correlated with the
rendering of judgments, understanding is an ongoing and perpetually incomplete set of insights.321
The culmination of this theological reflection, in
both the movements of portraiture and truth discernment, is
ecclesial existence. Disclosure and discernment enable one
to perceive the realities of evil as well as the possibilities of redemption.I2 Moreover, ecclesial existence is not
a once-for-all treasure to be discovered; rather, it is a
living, changing reality that can be portrayed through many
Ecclesial reflection in its several
types of inquiries.1B
dimensions is therefore progressive, and it has a distinctly
dialectical character.324 Ecclesiality or ecclesial existence persists and is perpetuated as theology describes the
way in which the ecclesial community is the vehicle of redemption through its "traditioning," through its retention
of the Adamic-Gospel mythos of redemption, through its function as a social setting for the actual occurrence of redemption, and finally through its role in world transformation (praxis).325
Archimedean Point or Positivist Cul-de-sac?
At one level a critique of the theological prolegomena
of Edward Farley is difficult. The social phenomenology he
appropriates is complex and calls for an expertise that ex-
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ceeds all but a few systematic theologians (and, for that
matter, even many working philosophers). But on another
level the very use of social phenomenology on such a massive
scale presents its own set of fundamental problems. For
Farley it is axiomatic that the house of authority--both a
rough synonym for the Scripture principle and, it must be
acknowledged, for classical Christianity as well--lies in
ruins. Therefore, if systematic theology is to proceed at
all, something has to replace the Old and New Testaments as
the vital source of theological substance. The Biblical
material is not abandoned, but it is relegated to fodder for
ecclesial symbolism. Some of its own symbolism is retained
(for example, redemption and universality), but at least an
equal amount is not only ignored but even categorically rejected as well (for example, atonement with its attendant
theological backdrop; and, perhaps most consistently, any
and every allusion to election or particularism).
The major premise of Farley's enterprise is that Biblical authority is a time-bound, contemporarily limited
relic, and one now useless for grounding a traditional dogmatic theology. From this premise Farley draws his conclusions with nearly Aristotelian precision. Biblical theology, even if not all its categories, is gone. A theologically appropriated social phenomenology has now taken its
place. This major premise is, for Farley, incontestable.
Therefore, virtually any criticism from a traditional orien-
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tation is precluded. Theologians who acknowledge modernity
and still retain their basic faith commitment are scored for
their inconsistency and pigeonholed as neo-orthodox. Critiques can be discounted or ignored if they come from people
who are trying to retrieve cherished personal effects from
the rubble of the house of authority. The Scripture principle is to Farley what the opinio legis, is to Luther,
Melanchthon, and their compatriots.
In fairness, Farley cannot be accused of scuttling
Biblical theology simply because he found the categories of
phenomenology more enticing. Farley confronted Biblical
criticism already in Requiem for a Lost Piety. New attitudes toward Holy Scripture were simply something with which
the contemporary Christian has to contend, and in this booklet he proposed that most of the traditional Protestant pieties are now meaningless to contemporary Christians.326
What Farley ventures in Ecclesial Man and particularly
in Ecclesial Reflection is an approach to theology that he
had earlier described as "non-historical." Writing some
years before the publication of Ecclesial Man, he was already rejecting "the logic of sovereignty," which is roughly
equivalent to the "royal metaphor" discounted in Ecclesial
Reflection. This early article, "Jesus Christ in Historical
and Non-Historical Schemes," helpfully and dispassionately
identifies the issue between historical and non-historical
theological models.
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Historical and non-historical theological
schemes are two very different models or pictures of
God and created being. The one expresses a logic of
sovereign will according to which created being is
on the way toward a complete actualization of the
plans of the artificer. The other expresses an
everlasting dialectic of struggle within being, a
struggle which may be escaped or endured, but which
never ends as long as there is anything at all. The
fundamental articles, doctrines, and events of the
Christian faith take on different meanings and functions within these two differing pictures. Not only
the analysis of the religious situation, evil and
salvation, but also the function of the central religious figure, is fundamentally different within
the two schemes. Strictly speaking, a historically
indispensable figure
is possible only within the
historical scheme.327
It is hard to exaggerate the issues at stake in this seemingly perpetual debate. Moreover, any reading of Ecclesial
Reflection will highlight Farley's preference for a nonhistorical scheme.
Farley argues that theological reflection is still
meaningful because it is not an antiquarian phenomenon but
is a perennial dimension of faith itself. In addition, precritical ways of interpreting theology are not integral
either to its existence or vitality.328

In this regard,

Farley has positioned himself to discount any criticism emanating from house of authority premises. But a further
problem necessarily arises. Is Farley open to fundamental
or foundational questions from a phenomenological point of
departure as well? Do these questions involve something
more than just individual aspects of his interpretation or
appropriation of Husserl?
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Amid the details of Husserl's phenomenology, several
features are basic. By Farley's own estimation, the minimal
features of phenomenological method are essence analysis and
intentionality.3

Along with these two, one might add (and,

to be sure, Farley does not exclude this) Husserl's insistence that the phenomenological method requires the suspension or "bracketing" of "the natural attitude."3250 This reflects the ideal of freedom from metaphysical and/or existential presuppositions as outlined earlier in this chapter.
The phenomenological epoche claims nothing that is not evident by a direct, immanent reference to consciousness. This
ego cogito is the Archimedean point, the starting point for
a transcendental philosophy.331
Farley would surely deny this application, yet one
cannot help but wonder whether his wholesale appropriation
of historical-critical methodology does not ignore this call
to initial freedom from presuppositions. Farley's critique
of the house of authority reflects the most radical conclusions of historical criticism. Frankly, the long and sometimes tedious "historical archaeology" in Ecclesial Reflection (Part One) reads like recycled Wellhausen and Bultmann.
The Jesuit reviewer Avery Dulles, himself not disposed to
party-line orthodoxy for its own sake, notes that this part
of Farley's work amounts to "a caricature built out of the
worst tendencies of a now discredited theology."332
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Simply put, Farley is reluctant to bracket Ernst
Troeltsch and his triad of criticism, analogy, and correlation.MB Is this criticism really relevant at a methodological level? It certainly is when one notes the stark metaphysical presuppositions latent in Troeltsch's axioms. Further, it should not be overlooked--and Farley's own observation in this regard has been duly noted--that phenomenology
has been appropriated most readily by those working within
the history of religions school. Is this coincidence, or
does it reflect a natural affinity?
Coupled with Farley's hypercriticism is a propensity
for highly idiosyncratic language. Much of the traditional
theological vocabulary is jettisoned in favor of Farley's
own technical jargon. Farley identifies such matters as
redemptive knowledge of God by divine initiative as an "essentially gnostic formulation,"334 and he approaches ridicule
when it comes to the traditional notion of an "inner testimony of the Holy Spirit," likening such pneumatic insight to
science fiction.335 One wonders how much is gained by
Farley's circumlocutions of accepted terms and whether, in
fact, his theology is itself not a new manifestation of
gnosticism. While intellectual difficulty is not a valid
criticism of a theological orientation, obscurity is; and
along these lines one can scarcely envision many converts to
Farley's ecclesiality.
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Edward Farley is very consistent about his definition
of ecclesiality as a corporate, universalized, redemptive
existence.
Although it does involve human individuals, ecclesiality itself is a corporate existence, a community
with its own distinctive intersubjectivity, a distinctive kind of coinherence of selves in each
other. As a redemptive existence, ecclesiality connotes some breaking of the hold of evil on the individual and social human self, an experience and
interpretation of evil initially formulated by the
faith of Israel and continuing as a substructure of
ecclesiality. As a universalized existence, ecclesiality coincides with no discernible form of human
sociality (a nation, race, ethnic group); thus none
of these can have the status of an exclusive condition of redemption.336
These three features, Farley insists, indicate the nature of
the originating event necessary to ecclesiality. It must be
an event whose outcome was a community or corporate existence. Further, to signal the historical transition the
event has to be one of universalization. "The founding
event is that set of subevents and persons whose telos and
outcome was the creation of a universalized, redemptive existence."327
This paragraph is instructive insofar as it implies
(at very least) the question of the extent to which Farley's
ecclesiality demands--or even has a place for--Christology.
To appropriate Luther's principle, does Farley's scheme
"necessitate Christ"? At one level the answer is surely
affirmative. We have noted previously that the features of
ecclesiality combine to offer a historical and not a mythi-
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cal figure.338

Farley does work with the Christ-event, and

he does so beyond a mere consideration of ecclesial origins.
Ecclesial existence is a historical phenomenon.
At the same time, the issue is aggravated by Farley's
equal insistence that one cannot "reduce" the essence of
Christianity (and all that this admittedly ambiguous holdover from Harnack entails) to the constitutive features of
this historical religion.339 The obvious and rigorous historical criticism, the brazen denunciation of the "scandal
of particularity"340
as_ part of the repugnant "monarchical
metaphor" and logic of triumph, 0 coupled with an insistence
on the historical dimension of ecclesiality, all combine to
produce a paradoxical milieu at best ambivalent to Christology. History and Christology may still be important, but
in what sense?
Portraiture of ecclesial origins is the first step in
theological reflection. But given Farley's pervasive use of
historical criticism, the conclusion seems inescapable that
he is more concerned about present and future manifestations
of ecclesiality that he is about the incarnation. While it
is not developed in Ecclesial Reflection, one anticipates a
Christology much more functional than ontological in character. The person of Christ is an invaluable paradigm or object lesson, for He embodies and inculcates the essential
aspects of ecclesial existence.
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Farley thus seeks to retain the historical character
of theology without the undesirable encumbrances of historical Christianity. Given his antipathy toward any logic of
sovereignty, a non-historical scheme is inevitable, and the
consequences for Christology are dramatic.
My thesis is that in the non-historical scheme,
such a figure is always dispensable and "merely historical." I mean by "dispensable" that one can understand the basic elements in the religious situation without reference to the so-called central religious figure. The reason should be clear. In a
non-historical scheme those basic elements are enduring structures, relations, or possibilities. If
God is in some way the source of power or illumination, this must mean an ever-present dimension or
depth of being. Insofar as any one figure is referred to in connection with salvation, he can only
be a symbol of that continuing and always available
source, or an instance of the actualization of that
power, or a teacher and embodiment of crucial insights concerning the perennial elements of the
tragic situation. Even if the central religious
figure is an actual human being in history, the decisive thing is always the residue, the effects, or
the symbolic content. The figure himself is dispensable in that nothing can possibly happen in the
interpretation of such a figure, even to the point
of asserting his non-existence, which would decisively affect crucial elements in the religious situation.342
Christology aua Christology is impossible in the nonhistorical scheme. If an inquiry purports to deal with
Christ but from a non-historical vantage point, it amounts
to anthropology and a truncated soteriology. "The minimum
conditions for a Christology must be the existence of a historical figure within the accompanying teleological-temporal
framework."343
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Further, along with these Christological strictures
comes a related hermeneutical problem. Farley would perhaps
demur from this assessment too, yet in light of his at least
implicit affinities for Bultmann on a presuppositional
leve1,344 the only evident hermeneutical criterion is the
extent to which story and imagery or myth and doctrine correspond to his definition of ecclesiality as corporate, universalized, redemptive existence.
Clearly, Christology is the first casualty of the
abandonment of theology's primary historical grid. Farley
finds the logic of sovereignty so nefarious that he is willing at very least to transpose the fundamental articles,
doctrines, and events of the Christian faith.345 Much is
made of the images of God as love, the reality of human
evil, and the reality of creaturely contingency and freedom.
These, he says, are part of the immanent essence of "the
ecclesial symbolic universe."3" Traditional salvationhistory frameworks simply cannot cope with the theodicy issue arising from "the element of specific interventions."
Classical responses are "theological rhetorical devices"
that can do nothing to lessen the problem.347
Not surprisingly, one finds comparatively little mention of eschatology in Ecclesial Reflection. To be sure,
the purpose of that work is to delineate prolegomena or
theological method. Perhaps Farley can recast eschatology
in phenomenological categories. Yet it seems difficult, for
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one reticent to talk about God's specific intervention in
the universe He has created,3" to talk meaningfully about
resurrection, hope, eternal life, or beatific vision. Surely it is not reactionary to ask, with Jiirgen Moltmann,
whether this loss of eschatology as a medium of theological
thinking is not still the condition that facilitates an
adaptation of Christianity to its environment and, as a result, a surrender of faith itself.349
Does Farley attain the Archimedean point sought by
Husserl? Has his application of the phenomenological epoche
and attempts at Wesenschau led to a more compelling vision
of theology and its method?
Quite obviously, when one avails himself so thoroughly
of phenomenology in the elaboration of his theological method, he assumes its liabilities as well as its benefits. The
most persistent of these liabilities, and ones acknowledged
by Farley himself, are its natural propensities to restrict
theology to the confines of immanence. Can phenomenology
prescind its formal and descriptive roles and its preoccupation with intentional acts? At a much more basic level, can
it--without significant modification--make room for the kind
of transcendence with which "theo"-logy is self-evidently
concerned? Does it not inexorably entail the collapsing of
theology into a voracious anthropology?350 Farley's virtual
hermeneutical positivism over against theology's classical
authorities (whether Scripture, tradition, or magisterium)
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is finally an unsatisfactory response to these questions.
Moreover, one is left asking in what sense the use of phenomenology for constructive theology is any less arbitrary
than Tillich's appropriation of existentialism or a liberationist's appropriation of Marx.
There is in Farley a self-consistency, but it is a
consistency set within carefully defined boundaries. Because he does not subject his own critical tools to objective examination, they share the fate of A. J. Ayer's selfdefeating principle of verification. To quote Karl Rahner,
admittedly out of context, "they are continually sharpening
knives and no longer have anything to cut."351
Farley is well aware of such criticisms. But for him
the alternatives--and his choice--are clear. He is nothing
if not brutally honest. For him traditional authority is
constrictive. The intellectual and spiritual demands of
classical Christianity are too onerous. There is a certain
courage involved in facing conclusions from which other
theologians retreat behind much more blatant inconsistencies
of method. If Farley's prolegomena is finally not compelling, his intellectual integrity and his almost dramatic
confrontation of fundamental issues certainly is.
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CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters have surveyed and assessed
three distinctive ways of doing theology in the context of
the contemporary intellectual milieu. Their efforts are
united by the conviction that the Enlightenment's advent of
historical consciousness marks a point of no return in prolegomena; nevertheless, inevitable methodological transitions do not signal the demise of theology itself. Theology
can, does, and must cope with modernity. Its efforts to
cope with the shift from a classical to an empirical culture, to use Lonergan's language, do more to unify current
theological models than traditional confessional barriers
have done to divide them. Indeed, the prolegomena explored
in these chapters, ostensibly representing the prevailing
traditions since the sixteenth century and (at least in the
cases of Lonergan and Thielicke) assuredly reflecting the
same, all devote more attention to recent philosophical emphases than they do to long-standing parochial differences:
Bernard Lonergan's key works in theological prolegomena pay the most overt and painstaking attention to method,
defining it as "a normative pattern of recurrent and related
operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."2
This definition corresponds to his definition of theology:
289

290
"A theology mediates between a cultural matrix and the significance and role of religion in that matrix."3 As David
Tracy has correctly observed, Lonergan's efforts in theological method are designed both to address the issues raised
by historical consciousness and the emergence of numerous
specializations in every modern field of study.4
The prolegomena of Helmut Thielicke is quite explicit
in its identification of theology's guiding or integrating
motif and consistent in the reiteration of fundamental
themes. His methodological procedures are more translucent.
The Gospel is a divine message, yet it also has a human address. The issue for post-Enlightenment theologians is
whether to begin anthropologically with the recipients or
theologically with the message. The former Cartesian approach, rooted in existential and hermeneutical concerns,
almost always accommodates the kerygma to its audience.
Thielicke's alternative is a non-Cartesian theology of the
Holy Spirit. The God who gives (and is) the message effects
the transition from the divine message to the human recipient. As He presents this message, God "constitutes" the
hearers as true recipients both in intellectual apprehension
and in personal, relational appropriation to its truth. The
Word of God and the Creator Spirit are correlative: "(Together they bring] about the death of the self-encircling
self and the creation of the self in Christ that is theonomously instead of autonomously oriented."5
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The personal and relational themes that pervade
Thielicke's The Evangelical Faith are much less in evidence
in the major revisionist works of Edward Farley.6 Farley's
foe is classical Christianity; the major foil is divine and
Biblical authority. The house of authority, with its Hellsgeschichte superintended by a sovereign God and disclosed in
inspired Scripture, is reconstructed. Farley substitutes a
temporal process of reflective inquiry by the ecclesial community. Such post-authority theology reinterprets the symbols, stories, and mythos of the Biblical tradition for today. Working from a distinctive application of Edmund
Husserl's social phenomenology, Farley emphasizes human
freedom and autonomy in his process of ecclesial reflection,
from which arise humanly expressed and controlled ecclesial
universals. However one might be disposed toward his program, Farley's theology is a sincere attempt effectively to
reconstruct the Christian kervgma for the modern world and
thereby to take seriously human freedom and consciousness
vis2
a-vis a moribund New Testament faith.?
As these pages are written by one working within the
context of confessional Lutheranism, the guiding theological
accents will differ from the mediation of nature and grace
characteristic of classical and contemporary Romanism8 and
from the absolute sovereignty of God or "union with Christ"
emphases of Calvinism.9 This is stated not in order to argue for any mutual exclusivity, or even necessarily to cham-
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pion a uniquely Lutheran leit-motiv. The present writer is
convinced that there is sound exegetical basis for a distinctively Lutheran dogmatics; however, the elaboration of
this Biblical and theological rationale would itself require
the development of a full-blown prolegomena.
A dogmatics written within the Lutheran theological
tradition will begin with the merciful self-disclosure of
God in the person of Jesus Christ." Its favored conceptual
categories are drawn largely (but certainly not exclusively)
from the apostle Paul and his pervasive unfolding of "justification" as the most compelling description of the pardon
secured at the cross and empty tomb of Jesus." Moreover,
it emphasizes in radical fashion the Law/Gospel polarity as
the appropriate communicative vehicle both for exposing human fallenness and for declaring God's promise of unconditional absolution.12 Save for these evangelical verities,
which will suffuse any Lutheran prolegomena along with the
dogmatic loci themselves, systematic theology is more pathological than doxological in character.0
Creation, fall, redemption, sanctification, restoration, Christian hope are all realities for Lutheran dogmatics; and they cannot be reduced to metaphor or symbol
without a massive overhaul of the corpus doctrinae. Lutheran dogmatics insists, for example, that sin and fall represent the willful, personal rebellion of creature against
Creator; and this relational estrangement is not a cipher
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for human finitude, anxiety, or social exploitation. Similarly, the New Testament atonement is the vicarious sacrifice of Jesus Christ to appease the wrath and judgment of
God; it dare not be relegated to the status of a humanitarian object lesson.
These and other examples have led some Lutheran theologians to speak of a "realist ontology" as it pertains to
the traditional conceptual Vorbild. Simply stated, God and
His saving actions are ontologically antecedent to one's
conceptualization of them. To be of use to the church, a
pattern of theology will conform to what God is like in Himself and to what He has accomplished according to His own
self-revelation.14
According to this classic Christian model, God is
real, the creator and sustainer of all that exists;
He is really Triune (an immanent, not just an economic Trinity); the first Adam really fell and his
sin was really imputed to the whole human race; the
Son of God really became incarnate; He really suffered and died and rose again; the atonement is
real; heaven is real; hell is real; forgiveness and
justification are real, not just metaphors for something else. Unless all this is included in our
theological Vorbild, there is nothing left of our
Christianity and our Gospel, except words, empty
words, impotent words, words without referents and
without meaning, like tinsel on a discarded Christmas tree, or bridgework on a corpse.15
Quite clearly, these assertions--reflected as early as
Melanchthon's Augsburg Confession'6--preclude any hermeneutic that would countenance a dichotomy between Historie
(what actually happened) and Geschichte (events of significance) as these terms are sometimes applied to the saving
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acts of God narrated in the Biblical record. While the
vocables themselves are ambiguous and the distinction between them often innocuous (as it is here), what cannot be
permitted is an evangelically lethal disjunction that would
affirm the latter and allow the former to be shrouded in a
mist of obscurity."
Raising the scepter of hermeneutics at once entails
the role to be accorded historical-critical methodology,
which is almost invariably regarded as an indispensable feature of an academically credible theology. The literature
on historical criticism is already immense and still growing; and the issues revolve around the definition of the
term itself, the possibility of objective internal and external controls,18 and qualifications of the rigorous principles set down by Ernst Troeltsch and practiced by the
likes of Rudolf Bultmann and, one might add, Edward
Farley.19 A historical method seems both inevitable and altogether necessary. But what will be excluded is a critical
principle that permits a cross-examination of the text,
wherein the exegete will either impugn or confirm the canonical record--and thus irretrievably concede the sola Scriptura.20 To the extent that a historical-critical method imposes alien categories on Scripture, it will be rejected.
An appropriate historical method will interpret Biblical
history on the basis of the grammar of the inspired text
itself .21
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These hermeneutical strictures in turn reflect the
venerable revelation/reason debates. Following Anselm's
definition of theology as "faith seeking understanding,"
reason plays an ineluctable and even welcome role in the
theological enterprise. But this role, in the language of
the orthodox dogmaticians, will be ministerial and not magisterial. Of the three men discussed in this thesis, Helmut
Thielicke pays the most explicit attention to this question;
and his response runs along fairly traditional lines. In
the wake of Genesis 3, there can be no indifferent reason,
or ratio per se. Since the fall we contend with rebellious
or normative reason, which permits the principles of thought
to control what is thought. Only the Holy Spirit can effect
a receptive reason, one which will assume a servant's function under the authority of God and His self-revelation as
an organ of perception and expression.22 Clearly, Gerhard
Ebeling is correct when he observes that a fruitful study of
theology presupposes a living relationship to its subject
and a "loving empathy."23
Bound up with the positions taken above is a correspondence theory of truth rooted in an affirmation of God's
revelation as propositional. This connection is almost
self-evident. Yet those who work cheerfully within the context of classical Christianity and its traditional theological models do themselves a profound disservice if, for
apologetic reasons or to refute neo-orthodoxy, they defend
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correspondence and propositional views to the exclusion of
all competitors. Coherence and pragmatic/operational theories of truth, along with understandings of revelation as
personal encounter, event, or narrative, serve a very salutary objective in the tasks of dogmatics.24 When the various models of truth and revelation are preserved in proper
balance, doctrinal statements will amount to much more than
a catalogue of albeit accurate assertions. Along with their
usual--and indispensable--functions in the service of the
church's identity; catechesis, and integrity,25 doctrinal
statements can and should have an expressive and evocative
role. Not only will they express the faith of those who
confess them, they can also intensify or instill faith in
those to whom they are addressed.26 Hence, George
Lindbeck's threefold typology of doctrine as "cognitivepropositional," "experiential-expressive," and "culturallinguistic" (Lindbeck's preference) are not mutually exclusive.27
Whenever theological affirmations are made, as they
will be in any meaningful dogmatic enterprise, the counterproposition is necessarily excluded. Assertion, as the
Formula of Concord recognizes by example, assumes antithesis. This is true not only at the level of individual articles of faith but at the comprehensive level of Vorbild as
well. A proclamation of the New Testament Gospel and a consistent articulation of the Christian pattern of dogma can-
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not admit competitors. Edward Farley faces these implications most squarely, and he candidly scuttles the classical
Christian model in favor of an overt universalism. Helmut
Thielicke recognizes the problem, and he notes that apokatastasis can never become a doctrine--unless, of course,
one is willing to annul the unconditional urgency of the
present hour of decision consistently reiterated in the
teachings of Jesus .m Theodicy dilemmas will have to wait
for eschatological resolution.29 Bernard Lonergan responds
to the issue with his own theory of religion with affinities
for the "anonymous Christian" views of Karl Rahner.30 Finally, as these pages are written from within the Lutheran
tradition, it seems difficult to retain a Law/Gospel preachment in any eschatologically meaningful sense of these terms
if universalism is maintained.
A writer such as Edward Farley would read these pages
and declare first that we have begged many of the contemporary questions and, second, that we have retreated to the
familiar security of the house of authority and thus ignored
a "paradigm shift" now centuries in development.31 Theology
as scientia means something much different than it did for
St. Thomas,32 and for many it is now a discipline emancipated from all traditional authorities. To the extent that
it retains these authorities,33 it forfeits any scientific
character. Here Thielicke's comments cited in Chapter Two
are most apropos. Theology passes from science to ideology
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only to the extent that it refuses even to acknowledge and
examine its own assumptions. Farley's comments notwithstanding, such an open and honest examination does not inexorably lead to their repudiation. It is disingenuous for
some writers to champion the skeptical conclusions of exegetes as "assured results" and then score their more positive conclusions (for example, concerning Biblical history,
or a synchronic rather than diachronic view of its theology)
as inconsistent or special pleading.
From the three subjects of this dissertation, we encounter ways of confronting modernity that are at once unified and disparate. Each realizes that theology cannot proceed as though the Enlightenment was a transient phenomenon.
Its impact was swift, pronounced, and permanent. The veil
has been rent, and theology can no longer dwell in a holy of
holies hermetically protected from all sources of possible
defilement. Lonergan, Thielicke, and Farley find this situation not daunting but invigorating, not one from which
theology must flee but one which must be constructively engaged.
Their respective engagements with contemporary culture
do reflect significant differences. Bernard Lonergan affirms substantially the Roman Catholic tradition; and he
integrates a cognitional theory, epistemology, and metaphysics into a transcendental method involving eight interdependent functional specialties. He teaches even the casual
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reader that methodological diversity is endemic to contemporary theology. Helmut Thielicke reminds us that a theology attentive to the New Testament kerygma will stress personal and relational (coram Deo) considerations. By contrast, Edward Farley finds all the major theological traditions intellectually and spiritually deficient. In their
stead, he offers a reconstruction of Christian imagery in
phenomenological dress.
Whether it be positively, through affirmation, or indirectly, through features of their thought that provoke our
dissent, Lonergan, Thielicke, and Farley succeed in exposing
the issues involved in a current theological response to
Jesus' call to love Him with all of one's heart, soul, and
mind.
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The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans.
and ed. by Theodore G. Tappert, in collaboration with
Jaroslav Pelikan, Robert H. Fischer, and Arthur Carl
Piepkorn (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959).
12

Note here Luther's programmatic statement in his
"Commentary on Psalm 51" of 1538: "This is the twofold
theological knowledge which David teaches in this psalm, so
that the content of the psalm is the theological knowledge
of man and also the theological knowledge of God. Let no
one, therefore, ponder the Divine Majesty, what God has done
and how mighty He is; or think of man as the master of his
property, the way the lawyer does; or of his health, the way
the physician does. But let him think of man as sinner.
The proper subject of theology is man guilty of sin and condemned, and God the Justifier and Savior of man the sinner.
Whatever is asked or discussed in theology outside this subject, is error and poison. All Scripture points to this,
that God commends his kindness to us and in His Son restores
to righteousness and life the nature that has fallen into
sin and condemnation." From Luther's Works, American Edition, Vol. 12: Selected Psalms I, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan (St.
Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955), p. 311. Note
also Apology of the Augsburg Confession IV, 5-6; XII, 53;
Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, V, 1; and
C. F. W. Walther, The Proper Distinction Between Law and
Gospel, trans. W. H. T. Dau (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1928).
13

While Francis Pieper's prolegomena (in Christian
Dogmatics, Vol. 1 [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1950; German ed. 1924]) unambiguously asserts the normative
authority of Holy Scripture and Christianity's proclamation
of salvation by grace alone (contra all other religions),
one does not always hear as forcefully as one might like
that all of•theology is an exposition of this Gospel and
that all articles of faith are interdependent precisely because of their relationship to the one doctrine of the Gospel. This insistence--and a clear statement of the same in
one's prolegomena--is more important than subsidiary questions as to whether one follows a synthetic, analytic, or
"history of salvation" outline (and these are not major issues for Pieper either--fidelity to the Reformation solas
is). Typical examples of classical Lutheran prolegomena are
offered by Heinrich Schmid, Doctrinal Theology of the Evan-
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gelical Lutheran Church, 3d ed., revised, trans. by Charles
A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1899; reprint, 1961), pp. 15-102. Schmid's anthology includes the locus de scriptura in his "introduction." For a handy survey of two other modern Lutheran approaches, see Ronald F. Thiemann, "Toward a Theology of Creation: A Response to Gustaf Wingren," in Creation and Method: Critical Essays on Christocentric Theology, ed. Henry
Vander Goot (Washington, DC: University Press of America,
1981), pp. 119-136; and, in the same volume, Michael Root,
"Creation, Redemption, and the Limits of System: A Study of
Regin Prenter" (pp. 13-28). Finally, for all its usefulness, the overwhelming pervasiveness of the Gospel through
every locus of dogmatics is not sufficiently evident in Carl
E. Braaten's "Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics," in Christian Dogmatics, Vol. 1, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W.
Jenson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984).
14

Robert D. Preus, "Perennial Problems in the Doctrine of Justification," Concordia Theological Quarterly 45
(July 1981):175-176. For a different view, or a least assertions with potentially different implications, see Eric
W. Gritsch and Robert W. Jenson, Lutheranism: The Theological Movement and Its Confessional Writings (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 42-44, 64-67, 101-109.
15

Preus, pp. 175-176.

16

The Lutheran Confessions note, for example, that God
wahrhaftiglich ist Gott (Augsburg Confession I, 2), our fallen condition is vere peccatum (Augsburg Confession II, 2),
Jesus Christ is vere Deus, vere homo, and vere resurrexit
(Augsburg Confession III, 2, 4), and His body and blood in
the Lord's Supper is vere adsint (Augsburg Confession X, 1).
See Hans Lietzmann, ed., Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche herausgegeben im Gedenkjahr der
Augsburgischen Konfession 1930 (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 51, 53, 54, 64. These examples are
enumerated by Preus, p. 174.
V

H. Richard Niebuhr's celebrated distinction between
"internal" and "external" history is scarcely an improvement. See The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Company, 1941), pp. 44-66.
18

The inability of historical criticism to offer any
criterion for the discernment of a (requisite) canon within
the canon is virtually the thesis of Gerhard Maier, The End
of the Historical-Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. Leverenz
and Rudolph F. Norden (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1977).
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19One

example of a mediating position within Lutheran
circles is Peter Stuhlmacher's notion of "consent," in Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Toward a Hermeneutics of Consent, trans. Roy A.
Harrisville (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977).
2
°This

has long been the claim of Samuel H. Nafzger.•
See "Scripture and Word of God," in Studies in Lutheran Hermeneutics, ed. John Reumann, in collaboration with Samuel H.
Nafzger and Harold H. Ditmanson (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1979), pp. 107-126. In the same volume, see also the
essays by Ralph A. Bohlmann, "Confessional Biblical Interpretation: Some Basic Principles" (pp. 189-213); and Kurt
E. Marquart, "The Incompatibility between Historical-Critical Theology and the Lutheran Confessions" (pp. 313-333).
Perhaps the most perceptive treatments of the implications
of historical criticism are offered by Van A. Harvey, The
Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical
Knowledge and Christian Belief, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), pp. 4-37; and Gerhard Ebeling, "The Significance of the Critical Historical Method for Church and
Theology in Protestantism," in Word and Faith, trans. James
W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1963), pp. 17-61.
21 Horace

D. Hummel, The Word Becoming Flesh: An Introduction to the Origin, Purpose, and Meaning of the Old
Testament (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1979), p.
559.
22

Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, vol. 2, The
Doctrine of God and of Christ, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1977), 269.
23

Gerhard Ebeling, The Study of Theology, trans. Duane
A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), p. 46.
24

A most accessible discussion of these issues is offered by Avery Dulles, S.J., in Models of Revelation (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1983). A provocative contemporary treatment is Ronald F. Thiemann's Revelation and
Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), especially pp. 2-7,
9-15, 112-140. An interesting defense of revelation as
propositional (as well as personal) is Ronald H. Nash's The
Word of God and the Mind of Man (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1982). Nash avails himself of
the patristic Logos doctrine to support his contention of
the natural affinity between the ontic and noetic spheres
(see especially pp. 59-69).
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These are enumerated by Carl E. Braaten in the
aforecited "Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics," p. 55.
26

Avery Dulles, S.J., The Survival of Dogma: Faith.
Authority. and Dogma in a Changing World (New York: The
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 195-196. For similar sentiments, see Carl J. Peter, "Doctrine and the Future:
Some Suggestions," in Toward Vatican III: The Work That
Needs to Be Done, pp. 45-54.
V George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1984), pp. 16-18, for hib first statement
of the three models.
28Helmut Thielicke, The Evangelical Faith, vol. 3,
Theology of the Holy Spirit: The Third Article of the
Creed; The Manifestations of the Holy Spirit in the Word,
the Church. the Religions, and the Last Things, trans.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1982), 455-456, 412-413.
29Helmut

Thielicke, Theological Ethics, vol. 1, Foundations, ed. William H. Lazareth (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1966), p. 427. See also Thomas F. Torrance, The
Ground and Grammar of Theology (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1980), 107-108.
30

Lonergan's theory of religion is described by
Lindbeck, p. 31.
3
1 This

is described by David Tracy in "Theological
Method," in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King,
2d ed., rev. and enlarged (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1985), pp. 52-59. The terminology, of course, is borrowed
from Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
32

Classically stated by St. Thomas in Summa Theologise, Prima Pars, Question 1, Article 1, in Nature and Grace:
Selections from the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, in
The Library of Christian Classics Ichthus Edition, trans.
and ed. A. M. Fairweather (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1954), pp. 35-36. See the relevant discussion of
"Theology" along sympathetic Thomistic lines by Karl Rahner
in Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum Mundi,
ed. Karl Rahner (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1986), pp. 1686-1695; and, more generally, Rahner's
Science and Christian Faith, vol. 21, Theological Investigations, trans. Hugo M. Riley (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988), 3-112.
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Here it matters little whether one is working within
a Protestant context, which claims to be normed by Scripture
alone, or within a Roman orbit, with its accent on Scripture
and tradition. Tradition for Catholic theology is both a
process and a product, that is, it is the process and development whereby revealed truth derived from the preaching of
Jesus and the apostles is transmitted by the church with the
aid of the Holy Spirit. See the relevant article in Karl
Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Dictionary of Theology, 2d
rev. ed. (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company,
1981), pp. 506-508; and David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1975), pp. 94-97.
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